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Part 1 
An Overview of the Access Problem

Introduction
John H. Goddeeris 
Andrew J. Hogan
Michigan State University
With the 1992 presidential election approaching, deficiencies in the 
U.S. system of health care finance are beginning to draw national at 
tention. The recent upset election of Harris Wofford (who made sup 
port for national health insurance a key plank in his platform) over 
Richard Thornburgh in Pennsylvania has catapulted health care reform 
near the top of the political agenda ("Wofford: Costs Are Voters' Key 
Health Reform Concern" 1991).
A very substantial minority of the population has no insurance coverage 
of any kind to assist them in buying health care, at a time when one 
episode of illness requiring hospitalization can easily generate bills in 
the tens of thousands of dollars. This situation did not suddenly arise 
in the 1990s. While there has always been at least a significant seg 
ment of the population with no health coverage, a combination of trends 
has begun to bring the problems of access to a head.
  The size of the uninsured population grew substantially in the early 
1980s. Although estimates vary on how many are uninsured and 
how that has changed over time, the number of uninsured under 
age 65 (almost all of those 65 and over have at least basic coverage 
through the Medicare program) apparently increased by at least 
6 million between 1978 and 1986 (Brown 1989; Congressional 
Budget Office 1991; see also chapter 2 of this volume).
  The problem of lack of health insurance has been gradually creeping 
up the income ladder. In the 1970s, the working poor experienced 
the greatest problems. In the 1980s, the problem was extended 
to the near poor. A recent study based on the 1991 Current Popula-
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tion Survey found that nearly three-fourths of the most recent in 
crease in the uninsured came from families with annual incomes 
of $25,000 or more (Pear 1991, p. A16).
  Health care costs continue to rise at rates much faster than the 
general price level or the economy's productive capacity. Cost 
increases are of great concern in their own right, but they also 
contribute to fears about access. For one thing, as the cost of health 
care (and its power to extend life and improve its quality) expands, 
so may the gap between the standard of care for the well-insured 
and the uninsured. And as health insurance premiums increase as 
a share of labor costs, from less than 0.5 percent of total compen 
sation in 1948 to almost 6 percent in 1988 (Piacentini and Cerino 
1990, p. 190), many employers who want to provide coverage 
must seriously consider dropping it, thereby adding to the numbers 
of the uninsured.
  The old system of implicit subsidies for financing indigent care 
has eroded. In the past, health care providers could, with relative 
ease, pass the cost of the care they delivered to the poor unin 
sured on to the bills paid by the privately insured. But as premium 
increases mount, employers become far less willing to passively 
accept this cost shift.
Policymakers in many of the states perceived these trends by the 
mid-1980s. They were well aware of complaints about the existing 
financing system from diverse elements of their constituencies: 
employers, large and small, who were finding it increasingly difficult 
to maintain coverage for their workers; doctors and hospitals, who felt 
a moral obligation to provide care but were encountering increasing 
numbers with no means to pay; and the uninsured and their advocates. 
But the states also observed a national government that had just slash 
ed income tax rates and was battling large deficits without much suc 
cess. There appeared to be no federal appetite for considering new social 
programs or the higher taxes that they might entail. 1
State policymakers saw no reason to expect prompt action on access 
to health care at the federal level. A number of states began to look 
very seriously at the problems of the uninsured to see what they might
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do on their own. Among them was Michigan, where then-governor 
James Blanchard convened the Governor's Task Force on Access to 
Health Care in late 1987. The Task Force was assisted in its delibera 
tions by an Academic Consortium of researchers from the state's ma 
jor universities. This Consortium was charged with exploring the state's 
options for expanding access and how much they would cost.
This volume grows out of the Consortium's work. Although the 
original research was done for the State of Michigan, the authors have 
tried to distill from what they learned lessons applicable to any state 
attempting to deal with problems of access. Frequently they use Michigan 
data for illustrative purposes. While the numbers should be of interest 
to those in other states, at least as an indication of orders of magnitude, 
some readers may be more intrigued with the methods of analysis as 
models that could be applied elsewhere.
In chapter 2, Rashid Bashshur and Cater Webb take a broad look at 
the problems of access to health care. They provide some background 
on the U.S. system of health care financing and the increase in the 1980s 
in the share of the under-65 population with no health coverage. Bashshur 
and Webb also report data on the makeup of the uninsured population, 
finding it a diverse group, predominately young and with some con 
nection to the labor force. The employed uninsured, however, tend to 
work for small firms and to be paid relatively low wages. Bashshur 
and Webb also note wide variation in the extent of access problems, 
as measured by lack of coverage, across regions and states. They argue 
that an important first step for a state attempting to address its problems 
is to gather data on the nature of its own target population.
Andrew Hogan and John Goddeeris consider in chapter 3 the most 
radical kind of state response to access problems the creation of a single- 
state insurance plan to cover the entire population, perhaps along the 
lines of those operating in Canadian provinces. Their chapter reviews 
some of the arguments in favor of a state plan, including those related 
to more rational delivery of health care from a public health perspec 
tive, the potential for administrative savings, and other possible advan 
tages of a single payer for cost control. The authors are, however, skep 
tical that a politically feasible state plan (see Aaron 1991) would prove 
effective in controlling cost growth. They emphasize also that a state
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plan is likely to have substantial redistributional effects as compared 
with the current system, increasing burdens on the wealthier segments 
of the population while benefiting the current uninsured or poorly in 
sured poor. Another important issue they identify is the possible loss 
of significant federal tax subsidies as the financing of health care shifts 
out of the workplace and onto personal taxes. They illustrate these ideas 
using data from Michigan.
In chapter 4, Goddeeris looks at another route to universal coverage. 
The idea is to build on the current employment-based system of health 
insurance by encouraging employers to cover their workers, and then 
pick up the remaining uninsured through new public programs. The 
most likely method for extending employment-based insurance is a "play 
or pay" tax, whereby employers who do not cover their workers must 
pay a tax equal to some share of wages. This idea is at the heart of 
several recent proposals at the national level and has been partially im 
plemented in Massachusetts. Goddeeris discusses a number of issues 
that arise with this approach. While it might be the most politically feasi 
ble route to universal coverage, he argues that it is likely to require 
more new tax revenue than appears at first glance, as large numbers 
of individuals who are currently insured find it advantageous to switch 
to subsidized public coverage. These predictions are borne out in an 
analysis of Michigan data.
The next chapter considers a more piecemeal approach to dealing with 
problems of access, one which targets specific populations. One target 
group includes those small employers who would like to offer insurance 
but are deterred by costs that are higher for the same coverage than 
they would be for a larger firm. Hogan and Stephen Woodbury look 
at the use of pools of small employers, possibly subsidized, as a way 
of making health insurance more affordable for them. Hogan and Wood- 
bury next consider the implications of making Medicaid available on 
a buy-in basis for low-income uninsured who do not currently qualify. 
Another subgroup of the uninsured are those considered uninsurable 
due to preexisting conditions. Dianne Wolman discusses the experience 
of a number of states in setting up special pools for these high-risk 
groups. Finally, if policy initiatives chosen leave some segments of the 
population uninsured, serious need for care will still exist on the part
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of individuals with no means to pay. Society may wish to make ar 
rangements for financing what would otherwise be uncompensated care. 
John Herrick and Joseph Papsidero discuss the uncompensated care prob 
lem and approaches that various states have taken to dealing with it.
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 deal with more generic issues broadly relevant 
to policies that attempt to expand access. In chapter 6, David Nerenz 
and his colleagues discuss the design of benefit packages in health in 
surance plans, including considerations of the scope of coverage and 
the role of cost-sharing. They also discuss how costs of coverage are 
likely to vary depending on the nature of the benefit package and other 
factors, and they provide some illustrative calculations based on data 
from a large Michigan health maintenance organization.
John Anderson takes a public finance perspective in chapter 7. Most 
public policy initiatives to expand health care access require additional 
government revenue. Anderson discusses alternative tax instruments, 
including both increases in rates and expansions of the base for existing 
taxes, and explores their revenue potential and economic effects. While 
the amount of revenue needed will influence the choice of instrument, 
Anderson also emphasizes that it is sound tax policy to look for taxes 
that distribute the burden fairly and do not unduly distort economic 
activity.
In chapter 8, Woodbury and Hogan focus on the labor market im 
pacts of policies aimed at broadening health care coverage. They offer 
one of the most comprehensive analyses available of these important 
issues. The chapter begins with some descriptive analysis of the rela 
tionships between health insurance coverage and wage levels, industry 
of employment, and other factors. The authors go on to analyze the 
effects of policies like those discussed in chapters 3 through 5, using 
labor demand and supply analysis. They conclude that for the most part 
added costs of health insurance, whether imposed on the employer or 
financed through taxes, will ultimately be borne by the worker in lower 
after-tax wages (an exception occurs when minimum wage laws pre 
vent full backward-shifting of the cost of insurance to workers). A claim 
is sometimes made that removing health care costs from the workplace, 
as the creation of a universal tax-financed system could do, would reduce 
labor costs and thereby improve competitiveness of American business.
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Woodbury and Hogan find that unlinking of health insurance from 
employment is more likely to have the contrary effect of raising labor 
costs and reducing employment.
Most of the discussion in this volume is in some degree short run, 
focusing on the needs of the uninsured and the costs of meeting them 
within a health care delivery system not radically different from what 
we have. In the final chapter, medical ethicist Leonard Fleck takes a 
longer view. He argues that deliberations over the future of our health 
care systems ought to be guided by a well-thought-out vision of what 
a just society requires. As he points out, asserting that "health care 
is a right of all" does not take us very far, and we as a society must 
face up to difficult questions of how far that right extends in cases where 
care is extremely costly and of positive but very limited benefit. Fleck 
believes that basic moral questions about health care need to be con 
fronted and discussed in public forums, in a process that attempts to 
reach some consensus on how a just society would set limits on access. 
He describes in some detail a project he has proposed that might serve 
as one model for such a process of moral conversation and 
consensus-building.
The Michigan Governor's Task Force issued its report in June 1990. 
Much of the empirical work on the chapters of this volume was con 
ducted around that time. Since then, a major recession has struck 
Michigan and many other states. State budget deficits have soared, as 
has the federal budget deficit. Most states are struggling to fund the 
expansions of the Medicaid program mandated by the federal govern 
ment during the late 1980s and have backed away from new initiatives 
to improve access to health care. The Massachusetts Miracle turned 
into an economic nightmare, and the new governor has prevented the 
full implementation of the mandated benefit program passed by the 
Dukakis administration. In Michigan, tight state finances have led to 
a backward movement on health care access improvement through the 
elimination of the General Assistance program. Other states have taken 
similar measures.
The dire financial predicaments of many of the states have clearly 
shifted the focus of health care reform back to the federal level. The
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Bush administration is being forced, reluctantly, to address the issue. 
If federal action is not forthcoming as the result of the presidential elec 
tion, however, and if the economy recovers in 1992, renewed interest 
at the state level is likely. It is hoped that this volume will assist state 
policy makers in their deliberations.
NOTE
1. Actually, there was one failed attempt at improving coverage at the federal level. The Medicare 
Catastrophic Coverage Act expanded Medicare coverage for the elderly through an income-related 
premium surcharge.The legislation was later repealed due to a groundswell of opposition to the 
surcharge.
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Nature and Dimensions 
of the Problem of Access
Rashid Bashshur 
Cater Webb
University of Michigan
Health and Health Care
The principle of health care as a right of citizenship is based on two 
assumptions: first, that the judicious consumption of health care can 
and will improve health; and second, that health is necessary to in 
dividuals and governments interested in creating and maintaining a free, 
equal, and productive society. Most countries in the world have ex 
plicitly or tacitly endorsed this principle by creating health care systems 
where no person is denied essential medical services because of inability 
to pay or other iniquitous reasons.
Despite such efforts, health and universal access to care remain elusive 
objectives. In their pursuit, all countries attending the World Health 
Organization's 1978 conference in Alma Ata declared "health for all 
by the year 2000" as the centerpiece of their national health policies 
(World Health Organization 1978). The goal of "health for all" en 
compasses a wide range of specific objectives concerned with health 
promotion and disease prevention, but it places major emphasis on equity 
of access to preventive, therapeutic, and rehabilitative health services.
Dimensions of Access
Access to health care is defined as the ability to obtain health ser 
vices when needed. While major emphasis is often placed on third-party 
coverage as the determinant of access, the two concepts are not coter 
minous. Access is assured when the medically insured or financially
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secure, face no significant barrier to the receipt of care. In that sense, 
health care coverage is necessary but not sufficient to assure access to 
health care. Other factors that can act as barriers include the availabili 
ty of health care facilities or resources within a reasonable distance from 
where people live, the relative magnitude of opportunity and indirect 
costs incurred when using health services (such as time and/or wage 
losses), and the level of human effort involved in the journey for care. l
Financial Access
Because they remain formidable, financial barriers to obtaining health 
care are the most frequently studied in the United States. That is why 
reference is made to the uninsured when talking about those who lack 
access to health care. The majority of industrialized nations have more 
or less successfully addressed financial barriers for their populations 
by one of three methods: (1) public ownership and public financing of 
health services, (2) public financing of privately and publicly delivered 
medical services through universal health insurance programs, or (3) 
a mix of public and private financing and delivery of care.
The United States falls into the last category, but it is notable for its 
lack of universal access, although certain public programs have created 
entitlement for limited segments in the population. For instance, 
Medicare offers certain health care benefits to nearly all persons over 
the age of 65; Medicaid covers certain members of the poor, such as 
families with dependent children, the disabled, blind, the elderly without 
assets, and occasionally the medically indigent; and the Civilian Health 
and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) insures 
the families of military personnel. In addition, the federal government 
also owns and operates three national health service systems: the In 
dian Health Service (IHS), the Veterans Administration (VA), and a 
medical service for all branches of the military. The remaining popula 
tion does not have entitlement, although the majority are covered by 
private health insurance plans typically linked with their employment. 
All told, three out of four Americans had coverage for health care ex 
penses through private health insurance or a mixture of private insurance 
and public programs in 1987, while another 10 percent had coverage 
through public programs (Table 1). The remaining 13 to 15 percent
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of the noninstitutionalized population, numbering approximately 31 to 
37 million people, had no health care coverage at all. 2 Thus, the pro 
mise "health for all" via universal entitlement to appropriate health 
services is yet to be fulfilled in the United States.
Table 1
Percentage Distribution of Health Insurance Coverage 
of the Civilian Noninstitutionalized Population, by Type of Coverage
United States, 1987
Private Only or Mixture 
of Private/Public
Total
74.5
Employment-related
64.3
Public only
10.0
Uninsured
15.5
SOURCE. Data computed from Short, Monheit, and Beauregard (1989)
Trends
Certain trends have contributed to growing concern with lack of finan 
cial access to health care. Among these are the ever-increasing cost of 
health services, the growing number of uninsured, and the costs of 
diminished access for individuals and society.
The Rising Cost of Health Services
The cost of health care as a share of our national income has been 
increasing rather steadily over the past several decades. The Health Care 
Financing Administration (HCFA) estimates that national spending on 
health increased from 5.9 percent of gross national product in 1960 to 
11.1 percent in 1988, reaching $539.9 billion in that year (Office of 
National Health Cost Estimates 1990). If attention is confined to ex 
penditures on personal health care (which excludes government public 
health spending, spending on medical research, and a few other items), 
the numbers are somewhat smaller, but the trend is similar (Table 2).
Over the same time period, the proportion of personal health expen 
ditures paid for directly out of consumers' pockets has decreased by 
about half, from 54.9 percent in 1960 to 27.8 percent in 1987 (Table 3).
Table 2
Growth of Medical Care and Personal Health Care Expenditures and Health Insurance Premiums
Expressed as a Ratio of the Average Individual Disposable Income and as a Percentage
of the Gross National Product: United States, Selected Calendar Years 1960-1987
Year
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1986
1987
Ratio of medical care
expenditures to
disposable income3 (%)
5.7
6.5
7.7
8.5
9.7
11.4
11.8
n.a.
Ratio of insurance
premiums to disposable
income1* (%)
2.1
2.5
2.8
3.2
4.4
4.9
4.7
n.a.
Personal health care
expenditures as a
percentage of GNP0
4.6
5.1
6.4
7.3
8.1
9.2
9.5
9.7
National health care
expenditures as a
percentage of GNPd
5.2
5.9
7.4
8.3
9.1
10.3
10.7
11.1
M
a. 
O
I
 
o'
VI
s,f
3CT"
3
SOURCES: Ratios of medical care and insurance premiums to disposable personal income taken from Source Book of Health Insurance Data: 1988
Update, Tables 3.1 and 5.10, personal and national health expenditures and GNP are from Health, United States, 1989, Tables 100 and 102
a. Includes all expenses for health care except loss of income.
b. Insurance premiums refers to the combined total of insurance companies' earned premiums, and earned income of Blue Cross-Blue Shield and other
hospital-medical plans, as paid for by employers, employees, and persons who purchased individual health insurance plans
c. Personal health care expenditures are defined as "spending for the direct consumption of health care goods and services" (Health, United States,
7959). Since 1950, expenditures for personal health care have totaled between 86 and 89 percent of total expenditures for health care in the United
States. As a consequence of using personal health care expenditures, the aggregate ratios of health spending to GNP are lower than those the reader
is probably accustomed to.
d. National health expenditures includes expenditures for personal health, program administration, and net cost of private health insurance, government
public health activities, and research and construction
n.a. = not available.
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In relative terms, third-party financing government programs and 
private insurance has come to play a much more prominent role in 
the health sector, although almost all of this expansion occurred prior 
to 1980. It is interesting to note that out-of-pocket health care expenses 
as a percentage of disposable income were virtually the same in 1988 
as in 1955, at about 3.3 percent (Office of National Health Cost Estimates 
1990). Despite the enormous growth of third-party payment over that 
period, out-of-pocket payments for health care as a share of income 
did not fall for the average American.
Table 3
Personal Health Care Expenditures in Billions of Dollars
and as a Percentage Distribution, by Source of Funds
United States, Selected Calendar Years 1960-1987
Year
1960 
1965
1970 
1975
1980 
1985
1986 
1987
All 
sources3 
(100%)
$23.7 
35.9
65.4 
117.1
219.7 
368.3
401.6 
442.6
Direct 
payment 
(percent)
54.9 
51.6
40.5 
32.6
28.7 
28.2
28.0 
27.8
Private 
health 
insurance 
(percent)
21.1 
24.2
23.4 
26.7
30.7 
30.4
31.0 
31.4
Public 
payment 
(percent)
21.8 
22.0
34.3 
39.5
39.4 
40.2
39.7 
39.6
SOURCE: National Center for Health Statistics, Health, United States, 1989 Hyattsville, MD.
Public Health Service, 1990' 236.
a. Dollar amounts expressed in billions
Also of interest is the historical trend in the proportion of out-of-pocket 
costs borne by consumers by type of provider. In 1988, consumers paid 
23.7 percent of all expenditures for personal health services, compris 
ing 5.3 percent of hospital care, 18.9 percent of physician services, 
48.4 percent of nursing home care, and 51.7 percent of all other
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expenditures. In 1970, these rates were 39.5 percent overall, compris 
ing 9.0 percent of hospital care, 42.8 percent of physician services, 
48.2 percent of nursing home care, and 80.6 percent of all other ex 
penditures (Table 4).
Table 4 
Percentage of Consumer Expenditures Paid Out-of-Pocket
for Selected Health Care Providers 
United States, Selected Calendar Years 1960-1988
Total
Hospital care
Physician care
Nursing home care
All other
1960
55.9
20.7
62.7
80.5
87.5
1970 1980 
(percent)
39.5
9.0
42.8
48.2
80.6
26.8
5.2
26.9
43.3
61.4
1988
23.7
5.3
18.9
48.4
51.7
SOURCE- Abstracted from Office of National Health Cost Estimates (1990)
It should be emphasized that out-of-pocket expenses do not measure 
the full burden of health care costs on individuals. Leaving aside the 
taxes needed to finance public coverage, out-of-pocket payments do not 
include health insurance premiums, which are a burden on individuals 
either directly or as a substitute for other forms of employee compen 
sation. If we simply add payments for health insurance to out-of-pocket 
costs, the total amounts to 48 percent of all personal health care expen 
ditures (Short 1988).
Lack of Third-Party Coverage
Given the high cost of health care, lack of coverage through a public 
program or private insurer presents a formidable financial barrier to 
obtaining medical services for many Americans. During the 1980s, in 
dividuals without any third-party health care coverage increased both 
in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the civilian noninstitutional- 
ized population. Approximately 18 million individuals, corresponding 
to 9.5 percent of the U.S. population, were uninsured in 1977, whereas 
this estimate had risen to about 37 million individuals or 15.5 percent 
of the population, a decade later. 3 Preliminary results from the March
Nature and Dimensions of the Problem 17
1988 and 1989 Current Population Survey (CPS) suggest a decline in 
the proportion and number of the uninsured to 31 million or 13 percent 
in 1988, and 33 million or 15 percent in 1989. However, the change 
may simply reflect a methodological artifact resulting from changes in 
the survey instrument and coding procedures. 4
Private Coverage: The decline in health care coverage has occurred 
in both private and public sectors, but for different reasons. The decline 
of health insurance in the private sector can generally be attributed to 
the linking of insurance coverage and employment. By coupling health 
insurance to employment, health care coverage is subject to the vagaries 
of the marketplace, and it flows and ebbs with the fluctuations in the 
business cycle and changes in occupational and employment patterns.
One of the serious consequences of employer-linked insurance 
coverage that does not receive adequate attention is temporary loss of 
insurance, referred to as "uninsured spells" (Swartz and McBride 1990). 
Swartz and McBride estimated that "half of all uninsured spells end 
within four months while only 15 percent last longer than 24 months." 
Recent analysis of census data has revealed that 63 million Americans 
were uninsured for at least one month during a 28-month period in 
1985-1987 (Short 1988).
In a cohort study of privately insured and uninsured persons over a 
32-month period, Monheit and Schur (1988) found substantial "volatility 
in health insurance status," especially among the uninsured. They con 
cluded that the "uninsured population is quite heterogeneous," con 
sisting of individuals who lose coverage for relatively short periods of 
time, individuals without insurance for extended periods of time, and 
individuals who are regularly uninsured. This is so despite the fact of 
COBRA (Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985), 
which mandated firms with 20 or more workers to offer employees who 
become ineligible for health benefits the opportunity to continue group 
insurance benefits for themselves and their dependents. Firms are allowed 
to charge employees up to 102 percent of the premiums. If the newly 
ineligible employees can pay the premiums, coverage can be continued 
for up to 18 months if they no longer work for the firm or if their hours 
have been reduced. Coverage is extended to 36 months when ineligibility
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is due to divorce, legal separation, Medicare entitlement, or a depen 
dent child's passing the age where coverage is terminated by the plan 
(U.S. General Accounting Office 1989, p. 50). The difficulty of mak 
ing the premium payments has apparently limited the number of eligibles 
who take advantage of the COBRA provisions.
A more specific result of the employment-health insurance linkage 
is suggested by Renner and Navarro (1989), who argue that the "dein- 
dustrialization" of America has been the major cause of the decline 
in private insurance in the United States. While there is debate over 
what constitutes deindustrialization (Kutscher and Personick 1986), 
generally the term refers to the movement from a manufacturing-based 
economy to a service-based economy. Although the goods-producing 
sector (the manufacturing, construction, mining, and agricultural in 
dustries) has maintained a large share of its labor force overall, employ 
ment growth during the past few decades has been almost exclusively 
in service-producing industries, whose share of the economy's jobs 
almost doubled between 1960 and 1989 (Table 5). The growth of the 
service industry has paralleled a relative decline in the manufacturing 
industries, with the share of manufacturing jobs decreasing by almost 
one-third from 1960 to 1989. It has been projected that by 1995, four 
out of five new (nonagricultural) jobs will be in the service sector (Per 
sonick 1987).
One aspect of these changes in the labor market is "worker displace 
ment." Displaced workers are individuals who, through no fault of their 
own, have lost jobs in which they had made substantial investment in 
time and training, usually three or more years. In a supplement to the 
January 1988 Current Population Survey, designed to study displace 
ment, it was found that workers in goods-producing industries were two 
to six times more likely to be displaced than workers in service industries 
from 1983 to 1987, even though this was a period of rapid job expansion. 
Furthermore, three out of every four workers displaced during this period 
reported having had some type of health insurance coverage when 
employed at their lost jobs, but half of those still unemployed at the 
time of the survey were without insurance; four out of ten who had 
dropped out of the workforce no longer had group health coverage; and 
20 percent of the reemployed were still without insurance (Herz 1990).
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Table 5
Percentage Distribution of Nonagricultural Employment 
in the Manufacturing and Service Industries, and
Probability of Being Uninsured by Industry 
United States, Selected Calendar Years 1960-1987
Combined
industrial
categories
Manufacturing3 
Servicesb
1960 1979 1987 1989
(percent)
31.0 
13.6
23.5 
18.7
18.6 
23.6
18.1 
24.8
Probability of
being uninsured
(1987)
(percent)
10.2 
13.3
SOURCES Data for industry percentage distributions in 1960 and 1987 taken from U S Bureau
of Labor Statistics as published in U.S. Bureau of the Census (1989, p. 397). Data for 1979 tabulated
from Table 6 in V Personick (1987). Data for 1989 based on average of seasonally adjusted
quarterly averages in Table 1 in S.E. Haugen and W. Parks, "Job Growth Moderated in 1989
While Unemployment Held Steady," Monthly Labor Review (February 1990) 3-16. Probabilities
of being uninsured by industry based on Government Accounting Office tabulations of 1987 CPS
data reported in U.S. General Accounting Office (1990).
a. The manufacturing industry includes durable and nondurable goods
b. The services industry includes business and repair, personal, entertainment and recreation,
and professional services.
More specifically, deindustrialization is associated with three changes 
in the composition of the labor force, all of which have negatively af 
fected private insurance coverage for workers and their dependents (Ren- 
ner and Navarro 1989, pp. 86-90). Employment patterns have shifted 
from union to nonunion labor, from full-time to part-time work loads, 
and from high-paying manufacturing jobs to low-paying service jobs, 
all contributing to a decrease in employer-provided health insurance 
benefits for workers. Unions played a major role in securing health in 
surance coverage in the standard wage-compensation package in the 
Northeast and North Central regions of the United States after World 
War II (Swartz 1989, p. 2), and they continue to play a key role in 
maintaining health insurance benefits (Ruben 1990). The percentage 
of the entire labor force with union membership has receded from 35 
percent in 1954 to 16.1 percent in 1985 (Doyle 1985).
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When measured in current dollars, the 1970 average weekly earn 
ings in manufacturing were 37 percent higher than in services, and 47 
percent higher by 1987. 5 At least part of the growth in service industries 
has been in part-time jobs, with average weekly hours dropping from 
35.9 to 32.5 from 1960 to 1987. 6 Another measure of the shift to ser 
vices is that share of worker hours dropped in the goods-producing sector 
from 41.1 percent in 1959 to 30.3 percent in 1984 (Kutscher and Per- 
sonick 1986, p. 7). Among service workers, average weekly earnings 
(as measured in constant 1977 dollars) dropped from $151 in 1970 to 
a low of $140 in 1980, then rose slowly to $149 by 1987, which is still 
below 1970 levels. In the same time period, the average weekly earn 
ings for the manufacturing industries rose steadily from $208 to $220.
Hence, the basic problem is that overall real wages declined during 
the 1970s, and they have not yet rebounded fully. At the same time, 
health care costs in real dollars kept increasing, with more people be 
ing priced out.
Public Coverage: The decline in the proportion of people covered 
by public programs, particularly Medicaid, can be attributed in large 
part to the tightening of the categoric eligibility requirements for benefits 
as a consequence of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 
(OBRA). OBRA was designed to reduce spending, and it was successful 
in curbing the rate of increase in expenditures by reducing the size of 
the federal matching funds to state expenditures, restricting eligibility 
for welfare benefits such as Medicaid, and permitting states to change 
reimbursement and administrative systems, including the change from 
a retrospective cost-based hospital reimbursement system, which is 
generally held to increase costs, to a prospective payment system. 7 The 
tightening of eligibility requirements reduced access for the working 
poor, who constitute approximately two-thirds of the uninsured 
(Employee Benefit Research Institute 1990, p. 1).
The Medicaid Program Evaluation, published in 1987, reported that 
the annual rate of increase in Medicaid expenditures dropped by about 
one-half during the period from 1981 to 1984, and that reductions in 
expenditures per Medicaid recipient accounted for 85 percent of the 
total decrease in growth. Declines in spending affected adults and
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children, while expenditures per recipient increased 2 to 3 percent for 
the aged, blind, and disabled. Slowed growth in spending occurred 
despite the fact that the number of persons whose income was below 
the federal poverty line increased by 10 million between 1979 and 1983, 
and that the sharpest increase occurred in the number of families with 
incomes below 50 percent of poverty, up 66 percent.
The Costs of Diminished Access to Health Care
A theoretically optimal system of care to achieve "health for all" 
with the proper levers for an effective control of use of service would 
necessarily encourage appropriate use of care (i.e., assure access for 
people who have legitimate need for care), while discouraging care when 
not medically indicated. In such a system, access to care would be 
assured at a level that is no more and no less than is necessary to restore, 
sustain, or promote health, or else to ameliorate pain and suffering when 
all else fails. The design of such a system has been elusive, however, 
and we are mired in a system of unbalanced incentives and controls. 
The primary utilization controls that have been imposed on patients are 
based on the assumption that increasing their direct costs may prompt 
them to become smarter consumers of health care and use the proper 
mix of services. Yet, evidence from the Rand Health Insurance Ex 
periment suggests that the average person is unable to differentiate be 
tween what is necessary or appropriate and what is not, and that once 
the decision to see the physician is made, it is the doctor and not the 
patient who chooses the service mix. 8
When requiring expensive medical treatment, the uninsured and those 
with inadequate coverage find themselves in a real predicament: to forgo 
the needed care; to lose their savings and their assets (if any) to obtain 
it; or else to renege on paying, thereby shifting the burden to the pro 
vider. There is evidence that all three options occur in varying degrees.
Data from a 1986 survey supported by the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation revealed that approximately one million Americans could 
not obtain health care that year because they could not afford it. Another 
19 million reported that they required services but faced financial bar 
riers in obtaining them. 9 The survey also found that, compared to people
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who had health insurance, the uninsured were somewhat less likely to 
obtain preventive services such as immunizations for young children 
(94 percent versus 81 percent) and prenatal care in the first trimester 
(85 percent versus 80 percent). They were also 13 percent less likely 
to see a physician in a 12-month period, overall. In addition, the un 
insured were 48 percent less likely than the insured to see a physician 
within 30 days for serious symptoms such as persistent high fever, 
nausea, or bleeding (Brown 1989). A study compared the utilization 
behavior of three types of Medicare recipients: (1) those who had 
Medicare only; (2) those with Medicare and Medicaid (about 13 per 
cent of the noninstitutionalized elderly); and (3) those with Medicare 
and private medigap-types of insurance. The researchers found that the 
number of outpatient visits was lower for those who had only Medicare, 
as compared to those who had Medicare and medigap, while the highest 
outpatient visit rates were observed among those with both Medicare 
and Medicaid. In terms of hospitalization, private supplemental insurance 
increased the likelihood of admission. However, no differences among 
the three types of coverage were found with regards to length of stay, 
including the small proportion of those without any coverage (Dunlop, 
Wells, and Wilensky 1989).
While forgoing unnecessary care for minor or self-limiting condi 
tions may have neutral, or possibly positive, effects on health, unat 
tended illness may lead to further deterioration in health, often requir 
ing subsequently more expensive treatment. This is ironic because 
preventive care is not only relatively inexpensive, it may also lead to 
long-term savings by enabling early detection and less costly treatment 
of certain diseases. For example, a study by the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) found that Medicaid recipients and uninsured women 
began prenatal care later than did privately insured women, and they 
had fewer visits, overall (U.S. General Accounting Office 1988). Women 
with inadequate prenatal care were more likely to have low birth weight 
babies, and such babies cost between $14,000 and $30,000 in hospitaliza 
tion during the first year and in long-term health care costs. "For every 
$1 spent for prenatal care for high-risk women, an estimated $3.38 can 
be saved by preventing costs associated with low birth weight." 10
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When the uninsured receive services, they may be unable to pay for 
them, thereby resulting in uncompensated care which includes both bad 
debt and charity or free care. We do not have reliable estimates of un 
compensated care provided by physicians. However, estimates for 
hospitals indicate a growing problem. For instance, it is estimated that 
uncompensated hospital costs jumped from $2.8 billion to $7.2 billion 
between 1980 and 1987. This increase occurred while changes in reim 
bursement made cross-subsidization of such financial burdens more dif 
ficult (King 1989, p. 32).
Profile of the Uninsured
In this part of the chapter, we describe the characteristics of the un 
insured and those on public programs in the United States, and their 
variations by region and state. The inclusion of data on public coverage 
is predicated on (1) the observed association between the decrease in 
the number of individuals covered by Medicaid and the increase in the 
number of uninsured, and (2) the assumption that Medicaid is the most 
feasible mechanism available to the states for expanding health care 
coverage for the uninsured within the existing system. Hence, by know 
ing the levels of Medicaid coverage in each state, the potential for fur 
ther expansion of Medicaid can be assessed. For instance, states with 
a high uninsured rate and a low rate of Medicaid coverage may be more 
able to expand Medicaid coverage than states already encumbered with 
high rates of Medicaid coverage, other things being equal. In addition 
to these data, we present a special analysis of health care coverage in 
Michigan from a 1989 survey as an example of the type of information 
necessary for developing policy at the state level.
Persons lacking coverage in the United States will be described in 
terms of socio-demographic, economic, and employment characteristics 
(data shown in Table 6, Table 7, and Table 8). These variables are im 
portant for policy formulation because they identify who the uninsured 
are in terms of significant social and economic variables that can serve 
as the basis for possible solutions. For example, the size of the uninsured
Table 6 
Size and Distribution of the Civilian Noninstitutionalized Population, by Type of Health Care Coverage
and Selected Population Characteristics: United States, 1987
Population
characteristic
Total
Age
18 and younger
19-24
25-64
65 and older
Sex
Male
Female
Marital status
Married
Single
Divorced & separated
Widowed
Ethnicity
White
Black
Hispanic
Number in
thousands
237,890
67,106
22,675
120,200
27,909
115,148
122,743
105,024
40,532
18,556
13,551
182,794
28,356
18,752
Total
population
(percentage)
100.0
28.2
9.5
50.6
11.7
48.4
51.6
44. 2a
17.0
7.8
5.7
76. 8b
11.9
79
Private
third-party
coverage
(percentage)
74.5
26.7
8.1
53.4
11.8
48.8
51.2
49. 5a
15.1
6.4
5.1
83. 3b
8.5
5.3
Public
coverage
only
(percentage)
10.0
35.8
6.2
29.5
28.5
40.0
60.0
24.2a
14.4
12.8
15.2
52. Ob
29.8
14.4
Uninsured
15.5
30.7
18.7
49.9
0.7
52.1
47 9
31.4a
28.0
11.1
2.4
61. 7b
17.0
16.1
Z 
w
1
tfl
Q.
O
n
a
o'
a
VI
O
3-
n
7
o
cr
1
SOURCE. Data computed from Short, Monheit, and Beauregard (1989).
a. Figures add to less than 100 percent because marital status of persons under age 17 was not ascertained
b. Figures add to less than 100 percent because of missing data
Table 7
Probabilities and Percentage Distributions of Individuals With Public Coverage Only or No Insurance, 
by Selected Socio-Demographic and Economic Characteristics: United States, 1987
Population characteristic
Total
Age
18 and younger
19-24
25-64
65 and older
Sex
Male
Female
Marital status
Married
Single
Divorced & separated
Widowed
Ethnicity
White
Black
Hispanic
Probability of
Public 
coverage only (%) Uninsured (%)
10.0
12.7
6.5
5.9
24.4
8.3
11.7
5.5
8.5
16.3
26.6
6.8
25.1
18.3
15.5
16.8
30.2
15.3
0.9
16.6
14.3
11.0
25.4
22.0
6.6
12.4
22.0
31.5
Percentage
Public 
coverage only
100.0
35.8
6.2
29.5
28.5
40.0
60.0
24.2
14.4
12.8
15.2
52.0
29.8
14.4
distribution3
Uninsured
100.0
30.7
18.7
49.9
0.7
52.1
47.9
31.4
28.0
11.1
2.4
61.7
17.0
16.1
0>
?
cr
SOURCE: Data computed from Short, Monheit, and Beauregard (1989)
a. Due to missing data, the percentage distribution figures may not add to 100 percent
Table 8
Population Size, Probability and Percentage Distributions of the Uninsured, by Type of Family 
and Employment Status of Family Head: United States, 1987
Family 
characteristic
Total families, by type: 3
Single with dependents
Couple with dependents
Single, no dependents
Two or more adults, no
dependents
Uninsured families by employment
status of adults in family:0
Total
Total in families with a
working adult:
Working adult
Nonworking spouse
Child of working adult
Total in families without
a working adult:
Nonworking adults
Children
Number of 
uninsured 
(millions)
31.1
5.1
11.2
8.9
5.9
36.8
28.2
17.1
2.5
8.6
5.9
2.7
United States
Probability 
of being 
uninsured (%)
12.9
19.2
11.0
18.9
9.0
15.5
15.2
15.2
15.6
15.1
8.6
11.3
5.1
Michiganb
Percentage 
of 
uninsured
100.0
16.4
36.1
28.6
18.9
100.0
76.6
46.5
6.8
23.3
16.4
16.0
7.4
Probability 
of being 
uninsured (%)
10.1
11.8
8.9
18.3
3.3
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
23.4
n.a.
n.a.
Percentage 
of 
uninsured
100.0
17.1
40.0
36.6
6.3
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
SOURCES: Computed from Exhibit 2 in Moyer (1989), Table 2 in Short, Monheit, and Beauregard (1989), and Bashshur et al. (1989).
a. Preliminary tabulations from the March 1988 Current Population Survey.
b. Calculated from 1989 HISM data
c. Tabulations from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey-Household Survey, Round 1
n a. = Not ascertained due to small number of cases in the sample.
N>
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population reveals the magnitude of the problem, be it at the state or 
national level. Age, sex, and dependency status provide important clues 
regarding the nature of need in the target populations; employment at 
tributes and income levels might suggest the potential for securing 
coverage through employment, be it subscriber- or employer-paid.
Socio-Demographic Characteristics
Approximately 14 to 17 percent, or 33 to 37 million Americans are 
uninsured (EBRI 1990; Short 1988, p. 4). Half of the uninsured are 
between 25 and 65 years of age, another 30 percent, or 11.1 million, 
are children 18 years of age or younger, and the remaining 20 percent 
are between 19 and 25 (Table 7). Less than 1 percent of the uninsured 
are over 65. The largest proportion of persons with public coverage 
only are children less than 18 (35.8 percent), followed by adults between 
25 and 64 years of age, adults 65 years of age and older, and young 
adults age 19 to 25.
There are slightly more males than females among those without any 
third-party coverage, but three out of five of those covered by public 
programs only are female.
Thirty percent of the uninsured are married, 28 percent single, 11 
percent divorced or separated, and only 2.4 percent are widowed. The 
distribution for public coverage only is slightly different. A quarter are 
married, but the next largest group is the widowed at 15 percent, follow 
ed by single individuals, and finally the divorced and separated.
Nearly two-thirds of the uninsured are white, 17 percent are black, 
16 percent are Hispanic, and the remaining 5 percent are other minorities. 
The same overall trends are seen for public coverage. Over half of the 
individuals with public coverage are white, about 30 percent are black, 
14 percent are Hispanic, and 3.8 percent are other minorities.
The vulnerability of the American family to lack of financial access 
to health care, through private health insurance or public coverage, is 
revealed in the data provided in Table 8. More than one-third of all 
the uninsured are couples with dependent children; another 16.4 per 
cent are single parents with dependent children. Together, single-parent 
and two-parent families constitute 52.5 percent of the uninsured in the 
country.
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Economic and Employment Characteristics
While the data on the socio-demographic characteristics of the un 
insured and public program participants help identify the target popula 
tion, information on employment characteristics and income is necessary 
for designing programs to assist the uninsured. This is particularly im 
portant if the new coverage is connected to employment, through either 
voluntary or mandatory means.
The economic and employment profile of the uninsured is presented 
in terms of employment status, size of firm, type of industry, union 
affiliation, employment status of adults in the family, family income, 
and ratio of family income to poverty. These data are for persons below 
age 65, with children classified according to the characteristics of the 
head of household. Data are presented in Tables 8, 9 and 10.
Although the uninsured population includes individuals of widely vary 
ing characteristics, most prominently the uninsured are full-time workers 
in relatively small firms in the service sector. They are usually not 
members of unions, and most commonly earn less than $10 per hour.
About 77 percent of the uninsured are in families with at least one 
working adult (Table 8). From a policy perspective, this suggests that 
coverage extended through the workplace (for dependents and other fami 
ly members) can reach three-quarters of the uninsured, provided such 
action did not reduce employment. Of the employed uninsured, the 
majority, or 61 percent, ar working on a full-time basis; another 19 
percent are working part time, and 19 percent are self-employed.Con 
sidering only the uninsured employed and their dependents, 61 percent 
are working adults, 9 percent are nonworking spouses, and 30 percent 
are children. The remainder of the uninsured live in families without 
a working adult, and among the nonworking uninsured, one-third are 
children.
In terms of firm size, one-third of the employed uninsured are in small 
firms with fewer than 10 workers, 25 percent are employed by medium- 
sized firms with between 10 and 100 workers, and 10.7 percent are 
in large firms with over 100 workers (Table 9).
One in five of the uninsured is engaged in sales, and another 22 per 
cent are in other service industries, which include repair, personal and
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Table 9
Probabilities and Percentage Distributions of Uninsured Individuals
Under 65 Years of Age by Employment Characteristics:3
United States, 1987
Employment 
characteristic
Total
Employment status 
Full time
Part time
Self-employed 
Unemployed/not in 
the labor force
Size of firm
Less than 10 workers
10-25 workers
26-100 workers
Over 100 workers
Industry 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Construction
Manufacturing 
Transportation & 
communications
Sales
Financial services
Repair services 
Personal services
Professional services
Entertainment
Public administration
Union affiliation
Member
All others
Number of 
uninsured 
(millions)b
37.0
17.1
5.4
5.4 
9.1 C
12.5
4.9
4.3
2.0
1.4 
0.2 
3.9
3.8 
1.6
6.8
1.3
2.3 
1.7
3.6
0.6
0.8
0.9
27.0
Probability 
of being 
uninsured (%)
15.6
12.7
24.1
22.9 
42. Oc 
18.0 
26.3
17.8
12.3
6.0
29.6 
10.0* 
30.6
10.3 
10.4
21.4
8.3
21.6 
31.5
10.5
30.2
7.1
5.2
16.5
Percentage 
distribution of 
uninsured11
100.0
46.2
14.7
14.7 
24.4 
33.7
13.3
11.7
5.3
3.8 
0.5* 
10.6
103 
4.3
18.3
3.5
6.2 
4.7
9.8
1.5
2.2
2.4
72.9
SOURCES. Table 6 in Short, Monheit, and Beauregard (1989), p 11, and Tables 7 and 8 in 
U.S. General Accounting Office (1990, p. 9).
a. Computed from 1987 NMES data. Working adults classified according to their own employ 
ment characteristics. Nonworking spouses and children are classified according to the characteristics 
of the worker. Children of two working parents are classified according to the characteristics 
of the male head of household. Figures also include individuals with unknown employment status, 
establishment size, union membership or wages.
b. Due to missing data, the population figures and percentage distributions of the uninsured within 
characteristics may not add to the totals.
c. From GAO tabulations of March 1987 CPS data. Separate estimates of the probability of hav 
ing no insurance were made for unemployed and those not in the labor force, however, the two 
categories were combined in the report of the distribution of the uninsured by employment status. 
*Relative standard error is greater than or equal to 30 percent
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professional services, and entertainment. A quarter of the uninsured 
work in the production sector, with the majority in construction or min 
ing, which have about 10 percent each.
The distribution of the uninsured by hourly wage shows that most 
of those working earn between $3.50 and $10 per hour (Table 10). About 
one in three of the uninsured have family incomes below $10,000 a 
year, and another third have annual incomes between $10,000 and 
$20,000. At the other end of the spectrum, about 22 percent, or one 
in five, of the uninsured have family incomes above $30,000 a year. 
The distribution of the uninsured with respect to poverty (a measure 
that adjusts family income to family size) is quite similar, with about 
a third whose annual incomes are at or below the federal poverty line, 
30 percent with incomes between 100 and 200 percent of poverty, and 
37 percent with incomes exceeding 200 percent of poverty. It should 
be noted that 33 percent of this last group have incomes between 200 
and 500 percent of poverty; 9 percent of the uninsured have incomes 
that are five or more times larger than a poverty income. 11
Variation by Region and State
The variations in the distribution and absolute numbers of the un 
insured between regions are quite substantial (Table 11). Census data 
for 1986 revealed that 15.3 million, or 41.3 percent, of the uninsured 
lived in the South, followed by the West with 8.6 million, or 23.3 per 
cent. Approximately 7.2 million, or 19.5 percent, of the uninsured lived 
in the Midwest, while 5.9 million, or 15.9 percent, lived in the Northeast.
Disparity between the states is quite obvious. In order to give com 
plete information on this question, we grouped the states into three strata: 
(1) states with low levels of insurance coverage, defined as having 20 
percent or more uninsured; (2) states with a medium level of insurance, 
defined as having between 15 and 20 percent uninsured; and (3) states 
with high levels, defined as having under 15 percent uninsured. The 
data are shown in Table 12.
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Table 10
Nonelderly Uninsured Population, by Income, Poverty, 
and Hourly Wages: United States, 1987
Probability Percentage
of being distribution of
Income uninsured (%) uninsured3
Total
Hourly wage
$3.50 or less
$3. 51 -$5.00
$5.01-$10.00
$10.01-$15.00
Over $15.00
Family incomeb
Under $5,000
$5,000-$9,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$29,999
$30,000-$39,999
$40,000 or more
Ratio of family income
to poverty
In poverty
100-199 percent
200 percent or more
15.6
30.1
30.4
14.6
6.6
5.1
35.4
33.9
33.3
25.8
15.6
9.3
5.5
37.1
29.2
9.0
100.0
7.6
19.7
24.4
6.5
3.7
14.3
16.1
17.2
13.5
16.6
9.2
13.1
33.0
30.0
37.0
SOURCES. Family income data from Employment Benefit Research Institute tabulations of the 
March 1989 CPS, corrected Table 3 in EBRI (1990), 104, p. 7. Poverty data from U.S. General 
Accounting Office tabulations of March 1987 CPS data, Tables 4 and 5 in U.S. General Account 
ing Office (1990, p 8). Hourly wage data from Short, Monheit, and Beauregard (1989), p. 11. 
a. Due to missing data, the percentage distributions of the uninsured may not add to 100 percent, 
b. 1988 data.
Table 11
Population Size, Percentage Distribution, Probability of Being Uninsured, and the Probability
of Having Public Coverage Only, for Persons Under 65 Years of Age,
by Geographic Region: United States, 1986
Region
Total
Census region 
Northeast
Midwest 
South
West
More detailed regions 
Northeast
New England 
Middle Atlantic
Midwest
East-North Central
West-North Central
South
South Atlantic
East-South Central
West-South Central
West
Mountain
Pacific
Population 
in millions
37.0
5.9
7.2 
15.3
8.6
1.3 
4.6
5.1
2.1
6.4
3.0
5.9
2.2
6.4
Percentage 
distribution 
of uninsured
100.0
15.9
19.5 
41.3
23.3
3.5 
12.4
13.8
5.7
17.3
8.0
16.0
6.0
17.3
Probability 
of being 
uninsured (%)
16.3
11.3
11.2 
18.9
19.3
12.2 
14.3
14.1
14.0
18.5
22.7
25.2
19.7
20.5
Probability 
of having 
only public 
coverage (%)
10.0
10.3
9.2 
11.4
8.5
9.1 
11 5
12.3
10.2
11.2
13.9
11.4
9.6
13.6
 i
D. 
O 
3
3
5'
s>
3- 
n>
3
1
SOURCE. Data computed from the Employment Benefit Research Institute tabulations of the March 1987 Current Population Survey, in Source Book 
of Health Insurance Data, 1989.
Table 12 
Population Size, Percentage Distribution of Persons Under 65 Years of Age With No Insurance
and Public Coverage Only, and the Ratio of the Uninsured to Public Coverage Populations, 
for Individual States Arranged by Their Level of Private Health Insurance Coverage: United States, 1986
States by 
level of 
private insurance
Low level
Mississippi 
Texas
New Mexico
Arkansas
Alabama
Florida
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Idaho
Arizona
California
Alaska
District of Columbia
Kentucky 
Tennessee
Mid-level
Oregon 
Montana
Total 
population 
(000)
2,249 
14,569
1,249
2,007
3,575
9,653
3,920
2,793
863
2,895
23,874
453
526
3,139 
4,010
2,401 
715
Percentage 
with public 
coverage only
13.5 
9.8
11.4
14.7
12.0
10.4
15 3
11.9
n.a.
7.6
13.7
n.a
n.a
14.3 
15.5
9.7 
12.3
Percentage 
uninsured
27.0 
26.3
26.0
24.3
24.0
23.2
23 1
228
22.7
225
21.5
21.4
21.3
21.0 
21.0
19.9
18.7
Uninsured to 
public coverage (%)
200 
268
228
165
200
223
151
192
n.a.
296
157
n.a.
n.a.
147 
135
205 
152
Table 12 (continued)
States by 
level of 
private insurance
North Carolina
West Virginia
Georgia
Delaware
Indiana
Wyoming
Nevada
South Dakota
South Carolina
Nebraska
New York
Utah
Colorado
Missouri
North Dakota
Washington
Maryland
Maine
Ohio
Vermont
Total 
population 
(000)
5,364
1,621
5,311
553
4,654
441
878
595
2,840
1,383
15,286
1,546
2,769
4,391
548
3,808
3,972
953
9,356
461
Percentage 
with public 
coverage only
9.9
18.3
12.7
n.a.
7.3
n.a.
10.8
n.a.
14.3
9.4
13.1
10.0
13.9
10.7
n.a.
17.2
8.8
11.0
11.1
n.a.
Percentage 
uninsured
18.4
18.2
18.0
17.9
17.9
17.7
17.5
17.3
17.2
16.9
16.7
16.4
16.3
16.3
15.9
15.8
15.5
15.2
15.1
15.0
Uninsured to 
public coverage (%)
186
99
142
n.a.
245
n a.
162
n.a.
120
180
127
164
117
152
n a.
92
176
138
136
n.a.
Z 
w
§
V
0.
D
(D
VI
§
VI
O 
" »>
n>
^
1
n>
States by
level of
private insurance
High level
Illinois
Kansas
Virginia
Hawaii
Connecticut
New Jersey
Michigan
Massachusetts 
Pennsylvania
Iowa 
New Hampshire 
Wisconsin 
Minnesota
Rhode Island
SOURCE Data computed from the
Total
population
(000)
10,093
2,090
4,799
833
2,710
6,682
8,133
5,085 
9,925
2,532 
883 
4,143 
3,670
824
Employment Benefit Research
Percentage
with
public
coverage only
13.2
8.9
13.0
12.5
10.7
10.9
16.1
10.1 
10.9
11.1 
n.a. 
11.3 
12.9
10.1
Institute tabulations of the March
Percentage
uninsured
14.7
14.3
13.0
12.8
12.7
12.3
12.1
11.9 
11.9
11.6 
11.4 
10.7 
10.6
8.4
1987 Current Population
Uninsured
to public
coverage
ratio (%)
111
161
100
102
119
113
75
118 
109
105 
n.a. 
95 
82
83
Survey, Source Book
of Health Insurance Data, 1989, pp 13-14 
n.a. = Not ascertained because of the small number of cases in the sample
2
c
CL 
O
I
5'
0*  >
3-
0
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The majority of the states with the highest uninsured rates were in 
the South and West, consistent with the regional distribution described 
earlier. Mississippi had the highest uninsured rate in the country, with 
27 percent of the population under 65, followed closely by Texas and 
New Mexico. The other extreme of the distribution includes the industrial 
states and those with a strong union tradition, including Rhode Island 
(8.4 percent), Minnesota (10.6 percent), Wisconsin (10.7 percent), as 
well as Iowa, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Jersey 
(at less than 12 percent).
Coverage by public programs also varies by state. Indiana and Arizona 
had the lowest rates, at 7.3 and 7.6 percent, respectively. Arizona was 
the last holdout to join Medicaid, which explains its low participation. 
The reasons for Indiana's low rate are not apparent. The highest rate 
of public program participation was 18.3 percent in West Virginia. 
Michigan was not far behind, at 16.1 percent. In fact, Michigan was 
the only state among the "high-insurance" group with such a large 
percentage of public program participation. However, the range of dif 
ference in public coverage is narrower than the range of differences 
in the proportion of persons uninsured.
The ratios of the uninsured to Medicaid beneficiaries among the states 
were consistent with those observed on a regional level. The states with 
the highest rates of uninsured had the highest ratios of uninsured to public 
program beneficiaries. The average ratio of uninsured to public pro 
gram beneficiaries for the "low-insurance" group was close to 200, 
about 150 for the mid-level group, and about 100 for the high-level 
group. This means that in states with low levels of insurance, there were 
two uninsured for each person on a public program, whereas in states 
with high levels of insurance, the number of uninsured and those on 
public programs were evenly matched.
Who Are the Uninsured?
While the data on the profile of those lacking any health care coverage 
and those on public programs largely reflect the relative sizes of these 
groups in the population, the other policy-relevant explanation is the
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observed rate of uninsurance and public program participation for various 
segments in the population. This information is essential for identify 
ing groups at risk and for assessing the differential risk of lacking health 
care coverage in the population. Accordingly, analyses of the probability, 
or risk, of being uninsured for various segments in the population, na 
tionwide and for regions and states, by socio-demographic, employ 
ment, and economic characteristics, follow.
Socio-Demographic Differentials
The probability of being uninsured in the United States as a whole 
is highest among young adults between the ages of 19 and 24. This age 
group is twice as likely to be uninsured as the general population: nearly 
one out of three (or 30.2 percent) of those 19 to 24 years of age is unin 
sured (Table 7). This high uninsured rate is paralleled by a low coverage 
by public programs, exacerbating the problem faced by this group of 
young adults.
The next most likely age group to be uninsured is children under 19 
years of age. However, public program (primarily Medicaid) participa 
tion in this younger age group is rather high, at 12.7 percent. Thus, 
Medicaid has compensated for some of the deficit in private health in 
surance coverage among young people in this country. Nevertheless, 
given that "current benefit levels indicate that, especially for working- 
age adults and their children, current eligibility for Medicaid is con 
tingent upon virtual destitution" (Johns and Adler 1989), a smaller pro 
portion of Americans with incomes below the poverty line are now 
covered by Medicaid, 12 and Medicaid spending per child declined from 
1978 to 1984 (Johns and Adler 1989, p. 172).
Females have a slightly lower rate of uninsurance than males, in part 
due to the fact that more of them are covered by Medicaid. While it 
appears that Medicaid has served as an equalizer for women's insurance 
protection, spending per AFDC adult also diminished from 1978 to 1984, 
thereby decreasing the probability that physicians would treat Medicaid 
beneficiaries.
Being single, divorced, or separated carries a higher probability of 
being uninsured, as compared with the general population. When looking
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at these subgroups separately, some important differentials emerge in 
the relative disadvantage associated with certain groups. For example, 
approximately one-third of all single individuals are either uninsured 
or on a public program, with most of them being uninsured. Similarly, 
a little over 38 percent of divorced or separated persons are in these 
same categories, again with the largest portion being uninsured. On the 
other hand, while about a third of the widowed are uninsured or have 
public coverage, this group has the lowest rate of uninsurance of all 
adults and the highest rate of public program participation.
Finally, the disadvantage associated with minority status is obvious. 
Forty-seven percent of blacks and 49 percent of Hispanics are either 
uninsured or have public coverage only, and they face two-and-one- 
half times the risk of being uninsured as whites. Blacks are more likely 
to have public coverage, while Hispanics are more likely to be uninsured.
Overall, families have a 12 percent risk of being uninsured (Table 
8). The probability of being uninsured among single-parent families and 
their dependents is 19.2 percent, about a third higher than families over 
all. Single individuals with no dependents face a similar risk. Two-parent 
families and their dependents are slightly less likely to be uninsured 
than the population as a whole; households with two or more adults 
with no dependents are one-third less likely to be uninsured than the 
general population. All told, the risk of being uninsured increases two 
times between the household most and least at risk.
The data on socio-demographic characteristics of the uninsured and 
those on public programs reveal the dynamic relationship between the 
two conditions. It is clear that were it not for Medicaid, a much larger 
proportion of the population, including a substantial number of poor 
women and their dependent children, would be without any health care 
protection. At the same time, it is obvious that the Medicaid safety net 
has let a substantial proportion of the poor slip through the holes.
Economic and Employment Differentials
As was the case with the socio-demographic profile, the distribution 
of the uninsured by these characteristics largely reflects the relative size 
of each subgroup in the population. For example, while full-time workers
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have lower rates of uninsurance than part-time workers, they make up 
a much larger proportion of the uninsured due to the fact there are many 
more fiill-time than part-time workers. The earlier distributions described 
the uninsured, and they are useful in identifying the types of programs 
that might provide coverage to the largest proportion of the uninsured. 
Nonetheless, policymakers interested in targeting programs at subpopula- 
tions with higher rates of being uninsured require information on the 
probabilities of uninsurance to provide a clear perspective regarding 
relative risk.
Those at highest risk of having no health insurance are the unemployed 
(42 percent) and part-time workers (24.1 percent); workers in small 
firms employing fewer than 10 individuals (26.3 percent); those who 
work in personal services (31.5 percent), entertainment (30.6 percent), 
construction (30.6 percent) or agriculture (29.6 percent); workers who 
do not belong to a union (16.5 percent); workers who earn less than 
$5 an hour (30.3 percent) or below $20,000 a year (between 35.4 and 
25.8 percent); or those who live at or below the federal poverty line 
(37.0 percent).
As would be expected in a country that ties health insurance to employ 
ment, the full-time employed have the lowest probability of being unin 
sured, while the unemployed have the highest, over two-and-one-half 
times that of the overall population (Table 9). Part-time workers are 
the next most vulnerable, with one-and-one-half times the risk of hav 
ing no health insurance when compared to the general population, follow 
ed closely by the self-employed and those not in the labor force.
In relation to size of firm, the probability of being uninsured increases 
as the number of employees decreases. In the United States, employees 
of small firms with less than 10 workers are 75 percent more likely 
to be uninsured than those in medium firms employing 10 to 100 
employees, and almost four-and-one-half times more likely than those 
in large firms of over 100 employees. The relative disadvantage for 
employees of small firms is also an absolute disadvantage when com 
paring the uninsured rates of workers in different-sized firms to the 
general population. Nationwide, individuals in small firms have one- 
and-one-half times the likelihood of being uninsured compared to the 
U.S. population as a whole, while those in large firms are over two- 
and-one-half times less likely to be uninsured.
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Individuals employed in agriculture, construction, personal services, 
and entertainment all have about twice the risk of being uninsured as 
the average American, while those in sales and repairs are about 30 
percent more likely to be without insurance. Mining, manufacturing, 
transportation, communication, and utilities, and the professional ser 
vices industries have about a third lower risk of being uninsured than 
the average, and public administration and financial services industries 
have even lower rates of uninsurance.
Workers who are union members are about 70 percent less likely to 
be uninsured than the general population of working nonmembers, and 
are two-thirds less likely to be uninsured than the average.
Nationally, families with nonworking adults are only slightly more 
likely to be uninsured than families with a working adult or the overall 
population, a fact that reflects Medicare coverage for non workers ag 
ed 65 or more 13 (Table 8). When considering families whose members 
are younger than 65, the risk of a family without a working adult is 
28.7 percent, almost twice the risk of either families with working adults 
or the population as a whole.
Generally, one-third of those earning $5 or less an hour are unin 
sured, twice the rate of both workers who earn $5 to $10 an hour, and 
the population overall (Table 10). Individuals whose hourly wages ex 
ceed $10 an hour are 42 to 66 percent less likely to be uninsured than 
the national average, and the differential in the probability of being unin 
sured increases sixfold between the highest and lowest wage earners.
Family income is inversely related to the probability of being unin 
sured, as is income as a ratio of poverty. Families in the lowest income 
category, those with annual incomes of $5,000 or less, are six-and-one- 
half times more likely to be uninsured than those in the highest income 
bracket of $40,000 or more. Families in the $20,000 to $29,999 category 
are as likely to be uninsured as the overall population, while those with 
higher incomes are less likely to have no health insurance than average, 
and those with lower incomes are more likely to be uninsured. When 
computed as a ratio to poverty, families with incomes below the pov 
erty line are one-and-one-half times more likely to be uninsured than 
families with incomes between 100 and 200 percent of poverty, have
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two-and-one-third times the risk of the overall population, and four times 
the risk of families with incomes above 200 percent of poverty. Families 
with incomes between one and two times the poverty level were almost 
twice as likely to be uninsured as the general population, while those 
with incomes above 200 percent of poverty were about 40 percent less 
likely to be uninsured than the general population.
Regional and State Differentials
The risk of being uninsured by region followed a pattern quite similar 
to the geographic profile presented earlier (Table 11). Those in the West 
and South had higher probabilities of being uninsured than in the United 
States as a whole, and individuals living in the Midwest and Northeast 
had lower probabilities. Altogether, persons living in the West and South 
were almost 60 percent more likely to be uninsured than those in the 
East and Midwest.
The reasons for the wide variation between the regions are not clear. 
Swartz (1989, p. 2) suggested two explanations: limited Medicaid 
coverage and the lack of a tradition of strong unions in the South and 
West. While the latter explanation appears plausible, a perusal of the 
percentages covered by Medicaid does not completely support the 
hypothesis, since states with the low, mid-, and high levels of private 
insurance all had similar ranges of public program coverage for their 
populations (Table 12). If Arizona is removed from the West, the overall 
regional rates of Medicaid coverage would be comparable (Table 11). 
An interesting datum is the ratio of the uninsured to Medicaid 
beneficiaries. The lowest ratios are observed in the Northeast and 
Midwest, and the highest in the South and West, as follows:
Region Ratio of Uninsured to Medicaid
(expressed as percent)
Northeast 110
Midwest 122
South 166
West 227
Thus, for every 100 persons on Medicaid in the Northeast there were 
110 uninsured, whereas in the West this ratio was 227.
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Dimensions of the Uninsured Population in Michigan
In Michigan, the Health Insurance Survey of Michigan (HISM) was 
commissioned by the Governor's Task Force on Access to Health Care 
to obtain current, accurate, and reliable information on the uninsured, 
under-insured, and individuals with difficulties obtaining care. Some 
results from this survey are presented in Tables 13 and 14. For the most 
part, they are consistent with the national data presented in this chapter. 
A full report on the findings of HISM was issued by the Task Force 
(Bashshur, Webb and Homan 1989).
Conclusion
The problem of the uninsured (persons lacking any health care 
coverage) currently occupies center stage in discussions of health care 
policy at the federal and state levels. The number of medically un 
insured persons has been increasing over the last two decades, and the 
conscience of the nation dictates that no person should be denied ser 
vice when facing a legitimate need for care. Despite notable proposals 
for national health insurance plans to alleviate the problem, pressure 
has shifted to the states because federal action is not anticipated in the 
foreseeable future.
The profile of the uninsured reveals that the majority are young, mar 
ried or single with dependent children, white, work full time and in 
small firms, and earn less than $10 an hour. The probability of being 
uninsured is associated with being relatively young, single, divorced 
or separated, and a member of a minority group. In terms of employ 
ment, the probability of being uninsured is associated with being 
unemployed or being employed part time, in a small firm, and earning 
low income.
Geographically, the highest rates of uninsurance are found in the South 
and West and in states with low rates of participation in Medicaid and 
limited employment in large manufacturing firms with strong traditions 
of unionization. The great disparity between the regions and the states 
suggests the need for a federal role in addressing the problem as the 
equalizer.
Table 13
Probabilities and Percentage Distributions of Individuals With Public Coverage Only 
or No Insurance, by Selected Socio-Demographic and Economic Characteristics: Michigan, 1989
Population characteristic
Total
Age 
18 and younger 
19-24
25-64
65 and older
Sex
Male
Female
Marital status
Married
Single 
Divorced & separated 
Widowed
Ethnicity 
White
Black
Probability of
Public 
coverage only (%) Uninsured (%)
10.7
16.1 
8.6
7.6
11.3
9.4
12.0
4.5
9.1
27.1 
15.5
7.0
28.7
10.1
10.4 
20.9
9.6
0.8
10.8
9.4
6.1
22.7 
11.0 
5.9
8.5
15.5
Percentage
Public 
coverage only
100.0
46.3 
8.1
34.4
11.2
42.4
57.6
18.6
13.7 
19.0 
7.0
53.8
38.2
distribution3
Uninsured
100.0
31.9 
21.2
46.1
0.8
51.7
48.3
26.8
36.5 
8.2 
2.8
70.3
22.4
SOURCE. Health Insurance Survey of Michigan, 1989
a. Due to missing data, the percentage distribution figures may not add to 100 percent
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Table 14
Probabilities and Percentage Distribution
of Uninsured Individuals Under 65 Years of Age,
by Economic Variables: Michigan, 1989
Probability 
Employment of being 
characteristic uninsured3 (%)
Total
Employment status 
Full-time/full-year 
Part-time/part-year 
Unemployed 
Not in labor force
Size of firm
Less than 10 workers
10-100 workers
Over 100 workers
Industry 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Construction
Manufacturing 
Transportation & communications 
Sales
Financial services
Repair services 
Personal services
Professional services
Entertainment
Public administration
Union affiliation
Member
Nonmembers
11.2
8.1 
16.2 
33.8 
13.6
26.5
10.6
3.1
28.6 
33.3 
22.1
2.2 
n.a. 
16.4
2.6
30.0 
48.4
7.5
6.9
2.2
2.6
13.1
Percentage 
distribution 
of uninsured8
100.0
50.6 
21.0 
9.7 
18.7
38.5
21.4
11.7
0.8 
2.9 
11.9
4.4 
n.a. 
20.0
0.8
2.5 
12.5
14.3
0.4
0.8
5.8
65.8
SOURCE- Computed from 1989 HISM data
NOTE: Working adults are classified according to their own employment characteristics. Non- 
working spouses classified as not in the labor force Children, including dependents up to age 
25, are classified by the characteristics of the worker. Dependents of couples are classified by 
the characteristics of the male head of household Figures do not include individuals with unknown 
employment status, establishment size, or union membership, 
a. Figures may not add to 100 percent because of missing categories 
n.a. = Not ascertained due to small number of cases in the sample.
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Since the uninsured are a heterogeneous group, an essential first step 
for any state addressing the problem of access is the collection of in 
formation concerning socio-demographic, economic and employment 
characteristics of the target population. An example of the nature of 
such information is provided by the 1989 survey of health insurance 
coverage in Michigan. Such information can serve as the foundation 
for rational policy by informing policymakers of the magnitude and 
distribution of the uninsured in their state, and determining what groups 
are most at risk.
NOTES
1. For an identification and discussion of the dimensions of access, see Penchansky and Thomas 
(1981)
2. These figures are from 1987 and 1988 Current Population Survey (CPS) estimates of the number 
of uninsured. Changes in the number and types of questions on health insurance for the 1988 
version resulted in a large disparity between 1987 and 1988 estimates Estimates of the number 
of uninsured in 1987 obtained from the National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES) are almost 
identical to the 1987 CPS estimates. For more detail, see Swartz (1989); Moyer (1989), and Short, 
Monheit, and Beauregard (1989).
3. 1977 estimates found in Brown (1988) and Parley (1985) See Note 2 for citations for 1987 
estimates
4. The final data from the March 1988 CPS survey were not made generally available for public 
use For information on preliminary data from 1988, see Moyer (1989) Preliminary results of 
the March 1989 CPS survey can be found in Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI 1990).
5. For data on average weekly earnings in current and constant 1977 dollars, see Table 661 in 
U.S. Bureau of the Census (1989), p. 397
6. For data on employees average weekly hours, see Table 655 in U S. Bureau of the Census 
(1989), p. 404
7 The U.S General Accounting Office found that from 1973-1985 there was a 44 percent in 
crease in expenditures, measured in constant dollars, however, all of the expenditure growth 
occurred during the 1970s "After Adjusting for Inflation, Essentially No Growth Has Occurred 
in Medicaid Expenditures During the 1980's." For extended discussion, see Howell, Baugh, and 
Pine (1988)
8 See the discussion on empirical results, Section A on page 258 in Manning et a) (1987)
9. See "Access to Health Care in the United States Results of a 1986 Survey" (The Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation, Special Report Number Two, 1987), as cited by King (1989).
10. See "Healthy Start Program Evaluation, Preliminary Report" (Massachusetts Department 
of Public Health, 1988) and "Preventing Low Birthweight Summary" (Washington, DC In 
stitute of Medicine, National Academy Press, 1985), p. 50, as cited by King (1989), p 4
11. See Table 5 in U S General Accounting Office (1990), p 8
12 Sixty-three percent of persons with income below the federal poverty line were covered by 
Medicaid in 1975, as compared with 41 percent in 1986, as reported by King (1989), p 3 
13. Table 3 in Short, Monheit, and Beauregard (1989), p 8.
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Support for a universal health insurance through a single payer grew 
in the United States during the 1980s (Blendon 1991), especially among 
public health professionals and labor unions. Recently a number of large 
corporations have expressed support for the "Canadian Model" of 
universal health insurance, largely out of their frustration with private 
efforts to control health care costs (Califano 1989). The two principal 
motivations for interest in a Canadian-style universal health insurance 
plan are: (1) to provide access to basic health services as a right of all 
citizens; and (2) to control health care costs.
This chapter will focus primarily on the first issue of providing ac 
cess to basic health services for all citizens. The implications of a single- 
payer public health insurance program for cost containment will be 
discussed, though not in great detail. It should be noted that the Cana 
dian health insurance system was not designed principally to bring about 
health care cost containment (Evans 1988), and that the claim that Canada 
has been significantly more successful than the United States in restrain 
ing health expenditure growth has been called into question (Neuschler 
1990, pp. 37-46; Goodman and Musgrave 1991, pp. 2-9; for a pro- 
Canadian view, see Barer, Welch and Antioch 1991). There is no doubt 
that Canada spends much less on health care than the United States by 
any measure, or that since the full implementation of universal coverage 
in the early 1970s health care spending as a share of GNP has grown 
more slowly there. But this latter result is to some degree due to slower 
GNP growth in the United States. In per capita terms, real personal 
health expenditures have grown at about the same rate in the two
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countries during the time that Canada has had universal coverage. Fur 
ther, Canada enjoys the luxury of using the U.S. health care system 
as a safety valve when demand exceeds planned capacity.
The U.S. health system is highly decentralized and consumer-driven. 
For those who can afford health insurance, the system provides very 
easy access to the latest technology in settings with excellent amenities. 
While the U.S. health system may not appear rational from a public 
health perspective, it is highly responsive to the needs of privately in 
sured consumers.
The U.S. health system is clearly undergoing financial distress. 
Because of the system's decentralized, consumer-driven nature and 
because poverty, illness, and lack of health insurance tend to cluster 
in the same population groups, this financial distress is manifested in 
an increasingly noncompetitive performance in achieving public health 
objectives compared to other industrialized nations (Bodenheimer 1989, 
p. 10). Although the causes are undoubtedly complex and go beyond 
the reach of medical care alone, much of the poor public health perfor 
mance can be attributed to the lack of ready access by one-quarter to 
one-third of the population to routine preventive health services and 
primary medical care. This lack of access is due largely to a lack of 
personal financial resources, expressed most often as a lack of adequate 
health insurance coverage (Pepper Commission 1990, pp. 33-35). In 
cluded in this subpopulation are those covered by Medicaid, which in 
most states pays providers such low rates that recipients frequently en 
counter difficulty in finding providers who will accept them, particularly 
in specialties like obstetrics (Pepper Commission 1990, pp. 30-31). 
Growth in the number of uninsured results from reduced health insurance 
coverage rates by both private employers and by Medicaid (Piacentini 
and Cerino 1990, pp. 246, 352).
Reductions in insurance coverage for the working poor may be a 
reflection of the fact that their real incomes have not increased while 
health care costs have soared (Piacentini and Cerino 1990; Peterson 
1991). The working poor may have accepted a lack of health insurance 
in preference to further wage cuts. And as both the willingness and ability 
of many working class households to increase tax contributions waned
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during the 1980s, funding of public health insurance programs 
(Medicaid, Medicare, Veterans Administration) has not kept pace with 
increases in health care costs or with the growth of the poverty and 
near-poverty populations. The combination of large numbers of unin 
sured and underfunded public programs has shifted much of the burden 
for the sizable real growth in personal health expenditures onto private 
insurers and self-insured employers and union trusts. Consequently, 
employers and workers have experienced disproportionately large in 
creases in health care costs (Levit and Cowan 1990). This has, in turn, 
engendered risk-avoidance maneuvering in the private insurance market, 
especially the market for individual and small business policies. These 
markets constantly churn as insurers and insureds attempt to shift risk 
onto each other, illustrating some of the classic symptoms of insurance 
market failure described by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
Thus, while we may be skeptical that a single-payer universal health 
insurance plan could by itself retard the growth of health care costs due 
to population aging, technological change, or the deeply held predilec 
tion of the American public for medical miracles, such a plan could 
reduce the administrative and transaction costs associated with the cur 
rent health insurance market and could provide a mechanism through 
which public health goals could be given some ascendancy over in 
dividual medical consumerism. It goes without saying that a universal 
health insurance plan would alleviate problems of access to basic health 
care that arise from the lack of financial resources at the household level.
This chapter briefly discusses the implications for health care costs 
of a state-initiated program of universal coverage. There are many open 
questions here, but it is not realistic to expect such a program to substan 
tially slow the growth of costs in the near future. The heart of the analysis 
considers the likely redistributional effects of a move to universal 
coverage, including illustrative quantitative estimates for Michigan. A 
Canadian-style system is likely to redistribute income toward the cur 
rently uninsured poor and away from those in the upper tail of the in 
come distribution. When initiated by a single state, it would also risk 
losing significant subsidies built into the federal tax system. Even a state 
plan providing only basic coverage and financed in a way that retains 
federal subsidies would have important redistributional effects.
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Universal Health Coverage and Health Care Costs
Comparisons with Canada and other countries around the world have 
raised hopes in the United States that a state system of universal coverage 
could improve public health outcomes while actually reducing the 
total cost of health care. There are three main arguments for this view:
(1) a single-payer system would substantially reduce administrative costs;
(2) a single payer could exert greater control over fees for services and 
impose a more rational pattern of investment in capital and equipment 
on the industry; and (3) universal coverage would lead to a more effi 
cient utilization of services by the currently uninsured that would reduce 
the total cost of their health care. With regard to the last point, it is 
tempting to think that better coverage for the uninsured would lead to 
healthier lifestyles, greater use of preventive care, and earlier treatment 
when acute problems arise, and that all of these things would translate 
into lower, not higher, total health care costs. The available evidence 
indicates, however, that the uninsured use less care than those who are 
insured and have similar characteristics (Long and Rodgers 1990). The 
natural inference is that improving their access to care will, on net, in 
crease their consumption.
While each of these arguments for the cost-saving potential of universal 
coverage is important and merits continued research, it is unlikely that 
a move to such a system in the United States would reduce the growth 
of health care spending in the near term, particularly if enacted by a 
single state rather than the national government. Let us consider 
arguments (1) and (2) in somewhat more detail, focusing particularly 
on how they apply to a state-initiated system.
Administrative Costs
One appealing argument for a system of universal coverage is the 
potential for enormous savings in administrative costs. It has been sug 
gested that more than half of the difference in per capita costs between 
the American and Canadian health care systems may be accounted for 
by higher administrative cost in the United States (Evans et al. 1989; 
Himmelstein and Woolhandler 1986). A single public payer has no need 
to incur many of the costs that competing private insurance plans must
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bear. These include all of the costs of marketing, of screening poten 
tial enrollees in order to set appropriate premiums, of determining ap 
propriate differentials in premiums for different risk classes of enrollees, 
of determining eligibility when claims are paid, of coordination of 
benefits when members of the same household are covered by more 
than one plan, as well as the additional costs arising when individuals 
change their coverage. Even the collection of premiums is likely to be 
much less costly when carried out as part of a state tax system already 
in place than when spread across many competing insurance firms.
More important are the additional costs related to administration of 
the health care system incurred by health care providers and consumers. 
Doctors and hospitals bear a heavy burden of administrative cost in deal 
ing with large numbers of different insurers, in determining the eligibility 
of patients, and in direct billing and collections. Consumers and their 
employers incur costs associated with comparison of plans in making 
decisions about which to choose. The considerable resources devoted 
in the current system to the zero-sum game of cost-shifting would 
presumably be saved in a universal system.
It is important to understand, however, that Canada's system has a 
number of features that contribute to its very low level of administrative 
cost, and that elimination of any of these features would correspondingly 
reduce administrative cost savings. The Canadian system provides the 
same coverage to everyone in a province through a single payer, with 
minimal cost-sharing by patients, no balance-billing by providers, and 
no supplemental private insurance coverage for services covered under 
the public system.
With the federally funded Medicare program already in place and 
providing health coverage to the elderly and disabled in the United States, 
it is unlikely that a state would want to displace that coverage and lose 
federal funds. Thus, at least Medicare (and other federal health care 
programs through the Department of Defense and Veterans Administra 
tion) would remain in place, as would private insurance coverage sup 
plemental to Medicare, unless it is included as part of the state pro 
gram. If individuals are to be allowed a choice among competing plans, 
or if the universal plan provides only basic coverage that may be sup 
plemented privately, or if consumer cost-sharing is relied upon (as a way
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to limit use of services or to reduce the central plan's share of cost), 
administrative cost savings would fall considerably.
Administrative costs are also lower in Canada because less attempt 
is made in that system to track the costs of individual patients or to 
monitor the appropriateness of care (Neuschler 1990). Unless these ef 
forts are abandoned in the United States (which seems unlikely even 
if a system of universal coverage is adopted), they will remain a source 
of greater administrative overhead. Finally, it should be understood that 
to realize administrative savings would require the elimination of ex 
isting jobs in the health insurance industry and elsewhere in the health 
care system. Canada and other countries have never had the enormous 
commitment of resources to health insurance administration that the 
United States has, and thus did not face the problem of scaling it back.
Fees, Budgets, and a Single Payer
Undoubtedly, some of Canada's success in keeping health care costs 
below those in the U.S. derives from the ability of a single payer to 
control physicians' fees and hospital budgets. These are determined by 
a process of negotiation involving medical societies, provincial hospital 
associations, and departments of health (and ultimately the provincial 
legislatures). In contrast to the very decentralized and open-ended U.S. 
system, this process does place limits on total health spending, but it 
does so in a rather unsophisticated way. There is no guarantee that the 
total level of spending is in any sense socially optimal, or even that 
the limited resources going to health care are used in the most efficient 
way possible.
How well the Canadian system of budgeting would work in the United 
States, and particularly for a single state on its own, is an open ques 
tion. As Victor Fuchs (1986) has emphasized, total health care expen 
ditures may be viewed as the product of costs per service and volume 
of services, and both elements must be controlled to contain expenditure 
growth over the long run. With regard to physicians' services, Canada 
has had less success limiting volume of services than controlling fees. 
Total hospital budgets are set, but as a result some health services are 
apparently not as readily available to middle-income and upper-income
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Canadians as to their U.S. counterparts (Goodman and Musgrave 1991, 
pp. 17-18; Rublee 1991).
It is often said that U.S. consumers will not tolerate the waiting or 
denial of services which the Canadians are said to have learned to ac 
cept. If that is so, the potential for constraining the use of medical ser 
vices through a single payer may be limited. A single state would also 
have much less monopoly power in dealing with physicians than would 
the U.S. government or even a Canadian province. Physicians' fees 
(or, more important, physicians' total incomes) could not be kept far 
below those in other states without prompting extensive out-migration 
of doctors and consequent access problems due to physician shortages.
Political Concerns
Whether resources devoted to health care would increase or decrease 
in the aggregate with the establishment of state-financed universal 
coverage depends to a great extent on the political willingness to con 
strain costs. Under any reasonable cost-containment scenario, it seems 
certain that the distribution of resources would be greatly affected. The 
current U.S. health care system is oriented to satisfying the demands 
of the privately insured employee or retiree, with the needs of public- 
pay-only patients being met for the most part as either volume filler 
or as part of a social mission. Under a single-payer system, all patients 
provide an equal opportunity for financial gain or loss. Barring large 
copayments which the poor would be unable to pay, some resources 
now devoted to serving the privately insured would shift toward popula 
tion groups that are currently underserved. This would be especially 
true if the universal health insurance plan prohibits private rivals or 
supplements, as is the case in Canada. If the benefit plan is reasonably 
comprehensive with minimal copayments and if private health insurance 
for services covered in the national health plan is prohibited, then a 
significant redistribution of resources would likely take place. If the 
national health plan resembles the U.S. Medicare program, where 
Medicare-only coverage is tantamount to being underinsured and where 
most middle-income and upper-income retirees have supplemental 
private insurance, then the redistribution would be considerably 
moderated.
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If cost containment were a sustainable political goal in a universal 
health plan, then we could expect those who are now well-insured to 
see a reduction in their real coverage (access to services on demand) 
over time. Depending on the financing mechanism used, that same group 
of upper-middle and upper-income voters is likely to be asked to bear 
a larger share of the cost than it currently does. The political feasibility 
of simultaneously reducing coverage and increasing the cost burden for 
a large block of relatively affluent voters seems dubious and casts doubt 
on the potential of a state-initiated universal health care system to truly 
contain costs.
Given the fate of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage legislation with 
its redistributional premium structure, the political feasibility of a single- 
payer universal health plan which also truly constrains the normal growth 
in personal health expenditures is doubtful. 1
Distributional Effects of Universal Coverage 
An Illustration Using Michigan Data
Any universal health care plan implemented by a state may create 
major changes in the distribution of health care use and in how the costs 
are borne. In this section we analyze the distributional effects of two 
illustrative approaches to universal health care, using data from 
Michigan. Our analysis requires us to make a number of assumptions, 
which could be tested more carefully against empirical data. More study 
is clearly desirable before implementation of any plan. At least some 
of the patterns we identify are strong enough, however, that we doubt 
that they would be substantially altered in a more comprehensive study.
The two approaches to universal coverage we consider are: (1) a 
Canadian-style system, with a single public payer supported by income 
taxes, excluding all forms of private coverage, and with minimal 
copayments; and (2) a mixed public-private option in which there is 
limited universal coverage similar to that provided in the current U.S. 
Medicare program, with possible private supplementary insurance. Both 
approaches exclude populations currently receiving health care coverage 
through federal programs (Medicare, the Departments of Defense and 
Veterans Affairs). Our rationale is that a state would not want to forgo
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federal funding and would therefore expect such individuals to retain 
their current coverage.
Our main focus is on the distributional implications of alternative 
financing mechanisms, and we downplay other possible effects of a 
system of universal coverage. We do assume some increase in utiliza 
tion of care for the currently uninsured, but no effects for others. Costs 
per unit of care are treated as the same under all options, and no ad 
ministrative savings are incorporated. Proponents of universal coverage 
may perceive this as biased against their view, but we consider the cost- 
containment potential of a universal system to be sufficiently uncertain 
that our assumptions are a reasonable baseline.
The Current System
To provide a background for the analysis, we begin by describing 
the distributional impacts of the current system in Michigan. Data on 
population, income, and insurance coverage are taken from the 1988 
Current Population Survey and its supplement on health insurance. These 
data refer to conditions in 1987. We divide the population into family 
"insurance units" 2 and array the families by income as a percent of 
the federal poverty standard. Income is gross money income before taxes 
and including transfer payments. It does not include the value of fringe 
benefits, such as employer-provided health insurance. For the value of 
health care utilized we use 1987 national per capita personal health care 
expenditures (Piacentini and Cerino 1990, p. 160) of $1,726. This per 
capita expenditure is adjusted by a factor of 1.2142 for adults or 0.7041 
for children, reflecting relative per capita expenditures in the Michigan 
Medicaid Program for its Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
population. We adjusted health expenditures by uninsured households 
to 42 percent of the level of insured households based on data from the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (Long and Rodgers 1990; 
CBO 1991). We also identify as "underinsured" those whose family 
income was less than 200 percent of the poverty standard and who pur 
chased nongroup health insurance or a group plan for which no employer 
made a contribution. Our expectation is that insurance coverage is usually 
quite limited in these cases. We treat consumption of the underinsured
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as midway between the uninsured and the insured. Lacking sufficient 
data to do otherwise, we make the simplifying assumptions that medical 
care use among the other insured does not vary with the type (public 
vs. private) or comprehensiveness of coverage. In reality, private 
coverage tends to be less extensive for those at lower incomes and this 
probably restrains their utilization relative to those with more complete 
coverage.
In Figure 1 we summarize how the use of health care and the burden 
of paying for it are currently spread across income classes in Michigan. 
The bottom (negative) half of the figure depicts health care use. The 
height of the bar for each income group reflects the amount of health 
care utilized by the income group, which is determined by the size of 
the population in the group, the percent who are children, and the per 
cent who are uninsured. We have distinguished public and private utiliza 
tion. Public utilization is care paid by the Medicaid program. Not sur 
prisingly, it is concentrated at the low end of the income distribution. 
It may be more surprising that even in the group below the poverty 
line, less than half of care used is provided by Medicaid.
The top (positive) half of Figure 1 shows how much health care is 
paid for in each income group. A group may not pay for all the care 
it uses because some is publicly financed, and some is "uncompensated." 
We mean by uncompensated any excess in the cost of providing care 
over the direct payments made by the recipient or any third party. In 
our analysis uncompensated care is generated by Medicaid, which is 
assumed to reimburse for only 75 percent of the cost of care for its 
beneficiaries, and by the uninsured and underinsured. Of course, it is 
possible that some groups pay for more care than they use, if they pay 
taxes to support Medicaid or if costs of uncompensated care are shifted 
to them. Some costs of care are also shifted to out-of-state taxpayers 
through federal tax subsidies.
In allocating the cost of care, we attribute to each family:
Out-of-Pocket Costs: Out-of-pocket costs were calculated for all 
as 18 percent of the value of total health care utilized, based on 
data from the national health accounts (Levit and Cowan 1990). 
It is likely that this percentage varies with insurance coverage and
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income, so that this is an area where better data could improve 
the precision of the estimates. The remaining care used by the un 
insured is uncompensated. For the underinsured, we assume that 
half of care is covered by insurance, and the remainder after out- 
of-pocket payments is uncompensated. The broad income group 
ings that we use also mask the fact that out-of-pocket payments 
are highly variable within these groups (particularly for the un 
insured), depending on the need for care.
Net Private Insurance: This is the cost of its private health in 
surance, excluding any amount of subsidy through the tax system. 
Even if insurance is employer-provided, we treat it as though it 
substitutes for higher wages, so that its cost is borne by the 
employee. This assumption is standard in the health economics 
literature, and is discussed in chapter 8 of this volume. For an 
insured family, the gross cost of health insurance is taken to be 
the value of health care used but not paid for out-of-pocket (half 
the value of health care used for the underinsured), plus an im 
putation for the cost of uncompensated care. In effect we assume 
that if there were no uncompensated care, insurance premiums 
in the aggregate would be lower by the current cost of that care. 
To deal with the tax subsidy, we compute the taxes an employee 
would have paid on the gross value of employer-provided health 
insurance if it were treated as taxable income. This includes all 
PICA3 taxes, and state and federal income taxes. Tax subsidies 
for health insurance and health services are calculated based on 
the family's 1987 marginal tax rate: 14.3 percent PICA (for earn 
ings under $43,000), 0 - 38.5 percent federal income tax, 4 4.6 
percent state income tax. The marginal rate appropriate to the fami 
ly's taxable income and earnings was multiplied by the value of 
the family's private health insurance coverage to produce a tax 
subsidy. 5 The net cost of health insurance is the value of the 
premium minus the reduction in taxes that results from taking com 
pensation in this form rather than as taxable wages.
Tax Support: Medicaid is tax-supported, with state and federal 
dollars. The costs of tax subsidies for health insurance are also
Coverage Through a Single Public Payer 63
borne by taxpayers. State Medicaid dollars and state tax subsidies 
must be paid by Michigan taxpayers, so these costs must be 
distributed back to Michigan households. State contributions to 
the Medicaid program and the costs of financing state income tax 
subsidies for employer-sponsored health insurance were allocated 
equally to the state sales tax (assumed to be proportioned to total 
family income) and the state income tax, based on state taxable 
family income. Federal contributions to the Medicaid program were 
raised from federal taxable family income at the average marginal 
rate of 20 percent. The costs of federal spending and tax subsidies, 
however, are borne by taxpayers throughout the United States. 
We attribute the federal share of Medicaid to Michigan taxpayers, 
but treat the federal tax subsidies as shifted to out-of-state 
taxpayers. 6
Out-of-pocket costs, net private insurance, and tax support corres 
pond to the first three segments of the top bars in Figure 1. The last 
segment allocates by income class the federal tax subsidy for employer- 
provided health insurance. We regard the burden of the subsidy as be 
ing borne by out-of-state taxpayers.
Figure 1 shows that the value of health care utilized exceeds the amount 
paid for at all levels of income. Federal tax subsidies make this possi 
ble. The subsidies are unimportant for low-income households, but the 
poor receive more care than they pay for because of Medicaid coverage 
and uncompensated care. Higher-income taxpayers must support this 
care for the poor, but what they pay is not as large as the federal sub 
sidies they receive for their own care. The current system is progressive 
in the sense that the ratio of payments to health care use rises somewhat 
with income.
Figure 2 breaks apart the components of tax support in Figure 1 and 
allows us to look more closely at Michigan's subsidies to health care 
and financing of Medicaid. Subsidies through the state income tax system 
must be borne by state taxpayers. Figure 2 shows that these have relative 
ly little redistributive effect across income classes, because those who 
receive the subsidies to a large degree also pay to refinance them.
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Among families at the same income, the subsidies do favor those with 
employer-provided health insurance over others. Not surprisingly, tax 
support for Medicaid comes heavily from households with relatively 
high incomes.
The Canadian Model
In analyzing a Canadian-style state health plan, we assume that the 
state is able to retain current federal Medicaid dollars, but that the re 
maining health care utilization is financed entirely through a nearly 
threefold increase in the state's flat rate income tax. Health care utiliza 
tion (displayed in the bottom half of Figure 3) changes from the cur 
rent system only for those currently uninsured or underinsured. Health 
care use increases for the uninsured to the level of the rest of the popula 
tion, more than doubling their medical care consumption. Even this in 
crease in use may understate the benefit of the state plan to the unin 
sured, as the state plan ends their dependence on uncompensated care, 
the availability of which is always uncertain and for which quality may be 
low. In modeling the current system, the underinsured had been treated 
as consuming medical care at a level half way between the uninsured 
and the insured. Health care use by the underinsured is therefore also 
assumed to increase somewhat under the state health plan. In all, these 
changes represent a 15 percent increase in total health care utilization.
The top bars in Figure 3 show the distribution of the costs of care 
under this plan. The Canadian-style plan eliminates health insurance 
as an employee benefit, and we assume that for those with employer- 
provided coverage wages rise by the employer cost of that coverage 
(this is implied by the assumption that the cost of health insurance is 
borne by the worker). However, families now bear a cost through the 
taxes they pay to finance the state health plan. The bars are divided 
into three segments. The first is labeled "Current Taxes" and reflects 
taxes that support the current Medicaid program. We allocate these to 
income classes exactly as we did for the current system. The second 
segment shows new state income taxes needed, allocated to taxpayers 
in each income class.
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Figure 3
Health Expenditures and Income Taxes 
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From a state's perspective, a major drawback to an income tax- 
financed universal health plan is the increase in federal tax liabilities 
for state residents, as the federal subsidies to employer-provided coverage 
are forgone. Not all federal subsidies would be lost, however. For those 
who itemize deductions on their federal returns, higher state taxes are 
deductible from federal taxable income. In effect, the federal treasury 
bears a share of each itemizing family's state income tax, equal to the 
federal marginal tax rate.
The third segment in the top of Figure 3 indicates in each group the 
portion of higher state taxes shifted to out-of-state taxpayers via deduc- 
tibility. We calculate this by taking into account federal marginal tax 
rates and the share of taxpayers in each group who are itemizers (using 
national averages on itemizing by income in 1987, from U.S. Depart 
ment of Treasury 1989, Table 1). This segment is small enough to be 
imperceptible in the figure up to 300 percent of poverty (in the 200-300 
percent group it reaches only $48 million). 7 It grows much larger in 
the highest-income groups, even in relation to new state taxes, for two 
reasons: higher-income taxpayers face higher marginal tax rates, and 
they are much more likely to be itemizers.
Compared with the current system, the distribution of the cost is borne 
more heavily by the higher-income groups under the Canadian-style 
plan. The Michigan income tax is a flat rate tax, with a personal ex 
emption of $1,600 per member of the household. The exemptions make 
taxes paid a smaller share of income for those of the low end of the 
distribution. Because of low tax contributions and the elimination of 
out-of-pocket payments for their own care, those at the low end of the 
distribution bear a much smaller portion of the cost than they do cur 
rently. For those with incomes up to 200 percent of the poverty level, 
the ratio of contributions to health care use is significantly lower under 
the Canadian model than under the current system. The two systems 
are approximately the same between 200 and 300 percent of poverty, 
and the ratio becomes much larger for the Canadian model at higher 
incomes. The higher overall ratio for the Canadian model reflects the 
loss of federal subsidies, a point to which we will return.
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Of course, a state system providing this type of coverage does not 
have to be financed in this way, and other financing mechanisms (for 
example, income-based premiums) could have different distributional 
consequences. Any system that effectively exempts those at low incomes 
from bearing the costs of their care will, however, involve significant 
redistributions.
Limited Public Coverage With Private Supplementation
Our alternative version of universal coverage is rather different from 
the Canadian-style plan. We assume that all are guaranteed limited 
coverage along the lines of the federal Medicare program (coverage 
for hospital and physician care, with some limits and cost-sharing), which 
may then be supplemented with private coverage. Roughly in keeping 
with Medicare, we assume that the public insurance covers half of the 
cost of care for a typical household. This coverage is financed through 
a flat-rate payroll tax on the earnings of all workers, with a ceiling on 
the amount of payroll tax owed by any individual. The particular form 
of the payroll tax used in our analysis is an 8.5 percent tax on the first 
$30,000 of earnings. This combination is sufficient to raise the needed 
revenue. A higher ceiling would make it possible to reduce the rate 
somewhat.
To analyze the distribution of health care use and costs under this 
approach, we must make some additional assumptions concerning 
whether or not basic public coverage is supplemented with private in 
surance. We assume that persons currently eligible for Medicaid would 
be covered fully (basic plus supplemental coverage) through the 
state/federal Medicaid program. Anyone currently covered by private 
insurance is assumed to retain it to supplement the public program and 
cover the other half of medical costs. The supplemental private coverage 
is assumed to be of the same type as is currently held: group or in 
dividual, employer-provided or individually purchased. Those who are 
currently uninsured do not supplement, and therefore are responsible 
for half of their health care expenses out-of-pocket. Those in this group 
with incomes below 200 percent of poverty pay out-of-pocket for 18 
percent of what insurance does not cover (as we assume they do in the
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current system) and default on the remainder. Some uncompensated care 
thus remains in the system. Its cost is borne in the premiums of sup 
plemental private insurance. As for the payroll tax, it is assumed to 
be borne by workers. For those who had not been receiving a health 
benefit in 1987, this means that their earnings fall to offset the amount 
of payroll tax paid by the employer. Most of the earnings are lost to 
workers in households with incomes below 200 percent of the poverty 
standard, roughly 7 percent of the current earnings of workers without 
employer-provided health insurance.
Figure 4 presents the distribution of health care expenditures and sup 
porting state payroll taxes (8.5 percent) under a mixed public-private 
state health insurance plan. Redistribution under the mixed plan is not 
as marked as in the single-payer income tax-supported approach. 
However, a significant amount of redistribution of health resources would 
take place, and in a form similar to that of mandated benefits for all 
employers (see chapter 4 in this volume). Payroll tax financing, as pro 
posed for our second approach, has one distinct advantage over the use 
of an income tax. The payroll tax would be treated as a business ex 
pense and not part of an employee's taxable income. The practical ad 
vantage of the payroll tax approach becomes evident when it is recogniz 
ed that, without federal cooperation, the increase in federal taxes due 
to the rise in taxable income occasioned by the loss of employee health 
benefits under a Canadian-style health plan could be 10 percent of total 
personal health care costs.
Figure 5 summarizes the distributional effects of the current system 
as compared with the two versions of universal coverage we are con 
sidering. For each system and each income class it shows the ratio of net 
contributions all payments for health care, netting out subsidies and 
including taxes to use of health care. Figure 5 clearly shows that both 
versions of universal coverage would redistribute resources from the 
top of the income distribution (primarily those at more than 500 per 
cent of poverty) to those at or near the bottom. In both universal systems 
those in poverty pay very little for the care they receive, while high- 
income families pay for more than the cost of their care. The Canadian 
model, with the open-ended income tax financing we have assumed, 
is the most redistributive.
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Figure 4
Michigan Health Expenditures and Payroll Taxes 
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Figure 5
Redistributive Effects of Health Care Financing Systems 
by Income Category
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At the right end of Figure 5 is the overall or average ratio of net con 
tributions to use for each system. It is less than 100 percent in each 
case because of federal tax subsidies. The overall ratio is the same for 
the mixed-payer model and the current system at about 75 percent, but 
the Canadian model sacrifices substantial federal subsidies and the ratio 
rises to 85 percent. Not shown in Figure 5 is an overall increase in health 
care expenditures from about $12.4 billion under the current system 
to $13.8 billion under the mixed model to $14.3 billion under the Cana 
dian system, due to the increased access to care by the uninsured and 
underinsured.
Concluding Remarks
Clearly, if a state must go-it-alone in a noncooperative federal en 
vironment, the mixed-payer system discussed here, along with the 
mandated-benefit approach discussed in chapter 4, has significant cost 
advantages. While the mixed-payer and mandated-benefit approaches 
have been identified as having weak cost-containment potential (Aaron 
1991), even the most optimistic proponents of the Canadian-style single- 
payer health plan will probably be hard pressed to argue that their plans 
can expand access and reduce costs while overcoming a 10 percent 
federal income and payroll tax surcharge. Without some cooperation 
from the federal government on recovery of additional federal income 
and PICA payroll tax revenues, state-sponsored, income tax-supported 
health plans appear to be too costly.
Even the modest level of redistribution of health resources involved 
in the mixed-payer model could make this approach infeasible in the 
current political climate (Blendon 1991). For those with incomes greater 
than five times the poverty level, the mixed-payer scenario looks 
precariously like the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage debacle, where 
wealthy Medicare beneficiaries were asked to pay actuarially unfair 
premiums to pay for increased coverage for low-income beneficiaries. 
Even though the catastrophic coverage still left the wealthy beneficiaries 
with an overall net subsidy for their full Medicare coverage, they rebelled 
and successfully forced Congress to repeal the legislation. This lesson 
will not be lost on state legislators considering either the mixed-payer 
or the single-payer model.
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Examination of the consequences of the single public payer health 
plan enacted by an individual state brings into sharp contrast the con 
tradictory health care tax and expenditure policies adopted and main 
tained by state and federal governments in the United States. At a time 
when state and federal governments have searched ever more aggressive 
ly for effective cost-containment strategies and have faced dire fiscal 
restraints leading to substantial underfunding of major public health in 
surance programs (and increasingly destabilizing cost-shifting onto 
private payers), these same units of government are providing ever more 
subsidies to middle-income and upper-income health insurance 
policyholders, effectively blunting the demand-side discipline of the 
market.
Ironically, inaction at the federal level maintains in place a federal 
tax code which is a formidable obstacle for any state wishing, through 
a Canadian-style public health insurance model, to bring its population 
face-to-face with the complete cost of health care, to be paid with highly 
distasteful income taxes. In the policy experiments reported here, a state 
government wishing to go-it-alone would almost certainly choose against 
creating an income and payroll tax windfall for an uncooperative federal 
government and would probably choose the mixed public-private payer 
model (or the mandated-benefits approach discussed in chapter 4). 
However, the mixed-payer model has the effect of increasing total health 
care tax subsidies, 8 diluting any discipline the demand side of the market 
might bring to bear on the gap between the growth of per capita in 
come and the growth of per capita health expenditures. It appears then 
that fundamental reforms may require the federal government to reassess 
the ad hoc and perhaps outdated policy implemented after World War 
II of treating employer-provided health insurance as a business expense 
and not part of taxable compensation.
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NOTES
1. Blendon (1991) provides background on American preferences for redistribute health care 
financing policies and the failure of Medicare catastrophic coverage legislation.
2. Households can contain individuals who cannot be covered under a typical family health in 
surance policy, i.e., adult children of the head of household or spouse. Households with these 
kinds of members were broken into insurance units, i.e., familial groups which could be covered 
by standard health insurance policies.
3. PICA payroll contributions are not considered by all as a tax because, in principle, social security 
benefits are linked to individual contributions. However, the pay-as-you-go financing used for 
both social security payments and Medicare means that most current contributions are spent in 
the same year they are collected and almost always before the individual contributor could make 
a claim on them. Payment of current PICA payroll taxes may create a moral obligation on a future 
generation of workers to provide an adequate level of contributions toward the retirement of the 
current cohort of workers Nonetheless, we consider the marginal PICA contributions which workers 
would make on the value of their health benefits, were they to become taxable, to be unrelated 
for all practical purposes to future social security income, i.e , we consider them to be a tax.
4. Here we calculate the federal marginal income tax rate that would apply if the household did 
not itemize deductions This overstates the marginal rate for some itemizers, but we expect this 
to be a relatively minor source of error. This analysis takes no account of the medical deduction 
on the federal income tax. That deduction can reduce the price of medical care by a percentage 
equal to a family's federal marginal tax rate, but only for those who itemize deductions, and only 
for that portion of medical expenses in excess of 7.5 percent of income The income restriction 
severely limits the use of the deduction. Nationally in 1987, only 5 percent of returns claimed 
the deduction at all, and the total amount deducted was only .6 percent of all income reported 
(U.S. Department of Treasury, 1989)
5. This treatment of tax subsidies ignores the fact that medical care is excluded from the base 
of the state's sales tax. This sales tax exclusion encourages consumption of medical care relative 
to other goods, although it is by no means the only major exclusion from the sales tax base in 
Michigan or most other states. See chapter 7 in this volume for further discussion.
6. Of course, Michigan taxpayers bear, in an analogous way, some of the costs of health care 
in all other states. But these costs cannot be controlled by state policies, and therefore are un 
changed under any of the options we consider. As we will show, a move to a state health care 
system could forfeit federal subsidies to Michigan, but Michigan taxpayers would continue to 
subsidize health care in other states.
7. The increase in the state income tax would surely induce some nonitemizers to switch to itemizing, 
so our analysis understates to some degree the share of cost shifted out-of-state.
8. While the net contribution to use ratio is the same under the mixed payer model, total use 
rises, 25 percent of which is financed by state and federal tax subsidies.
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Combining Private Insurance
with Public Programs 
to Achieve Universal Coverage
John H. Goddeeris
Michigan State University
For many who embrace universal health insurance as an objective, 
a tax-financed state plan that would cover all residents is simply too 
radical a restructuring of the current health care system. In 1987, the 
share of personal health expenditures accounted for by private health 
insurance amounted to about 3.1 percent of gross national product, or 
$552 per capita (Letsch, Levit, and Waldo 1988). This is more than 
half of the amount raised by all state taxes combined in that year (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census 1989). So even before adding in the cost of ex 
tending coverage to the uninsured, merely shifting what is now financed 
through private insurance into the public sector would require, on 
average, a more than 50 percent increase in the size of state govern 
ment budgets. To the extent that financing is merely shifted, wages and 
profits would rise in some combination to offset the tax increase, on 
average, but individual businesses and workers are understandably wary 
of how such an enormous shift would affect them. In addition, pro 
viders of medical services tend not to look favorably on the idea of con 
centrating so much buying power into government hands. The health 
insurance industry worries about what role would be left for it to play 
in such a revamped system.
A natural alternative is to build on the current employment-based in 
surance system, requiring or encouraging more employers to provide 
coverage for their workers, and adding a "safety net" public program 
or set of programs to accommodate the remaining uninsured. Such an 
approach is surely less threatening to providers and to health insurers, 
and at least at first glance it appears that it might be accomplished with 
little expansion of state government budgets. Numerous studies have 
shown that as many as three-quarters of the current uninsured are in
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households with at least one worker (Brown 1989). If employers could 
be induced to cover most of that group, so it is hoped, picking up the 
remainder with public coverage might be manageable.
What would seem to be the main virtue of this approach the fact 
that it is an incremental change that builds from the system already in 
place may, however, be its fatal flaw. By extending insurance coverage 
to all, it would boost substantially the demand for medical care in a 
system that already is ineffective in controlling the rate of increase of 
costs. ! It would be administratively simpler to implement than a single 
state insurance plan (because it would rely on existing institutions), but 
over the long run it would not reduce the enormous administrative costs 
of the system in the way that a move to a single plan could (Himmel- 
stein and Woolhandler 1989). In fact, by causing many more two-earner 
households to get coverage for each earner, it would create additional 
problems of coordination of benefits and probably add overhead cost 
to the system.
Universal coverage by this route is also likely to require higher state 
expenditures than it first appears. Most of the uninsured do indeed have 
some connection to the workforce, but the working uninsured tend to 
earn quite low wages or be employed only part time or part of the year. 
Employers will be very reluctant to bear the cost of insuring them. It 
is also true that many poor individuals and families who are now counted 
as insured pay for their own nongroup coverage out-of-pocket or must 
pay the full premiums to receive coverage from employers. With a public 
safety net available, many of them could drop their current insurance 
and move to subsidized public coverage. Employers who now cover 
their workers only reluctantly might also find it advantageous to drop 
coverage and turn their employees over to the public sector. These 
possibilities are explored quantitatively later in this chapter, using data 
from Michigan.
Expanding Private Coverage
Proponents of this approach to universal coverage see private insurance 
at the center, expanding its current role, with the state ready to support
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those who would remain uncovered. It is therefore appropriate to focus 
the discussion first on the steps that would be taken to expand 
employment-based coverage, as these will determine the size and com 
position of the population left to be covered publicly. There is a broad 
range of possibilities as to who among the current uninsured would be 
affected by a mandate directed at employers. Employers might be re 
quired by law to provide coverage to their employees, or they might 
be given an option of paying a special tax instead. Coverage of 
dependents might or might not be required. Exemptions or special rules 
might apply to some types of workers (e.g., part-time or seasonal 
employees) or types of firms (small or new businesses).
Approaches Implemented or Proposed
We can gain a sense of the range of options being considered by look 
ing at several routes to expanding employer coverage already im 
plemented or proposed. Hawaii is the one state with real experience; 
it has had mandated health insurance since the passage of its Prepaid 
Health Care Act in 1974 (American Hospital Association 1988). 
Employers there must provide health insurance for those workers who 
have completed at least four consecutive weeks of work, are working 
at least 20 hours per week, and whose monthly wage is at least 86.67 
times the minimum hourly. Employees are only obligated to contribute 
1.5 percent of gross wages toward the premium. The employer must 
offer dependent coverage, but is not required to pay for it. Some groups 
are exempted, including government employees, seasonal farm workers, 
and workers in family-owned businesses.
Massachusetts has gained much notoriety as the second state to legislate 
an expansion of employer-provided insurance (Enthoven and Kronick 
1989). It seeks to induce coverage by taxing firms that do not provide 
it at 12 percent of wages, up to $1,680 per employee. The tax is not 
scheduled to take effect until 1992, so no experience with it yet exists. 
Employers with five or fewer employees, temporary or seasonal 
employees, and employees working less than 20 hours per week are 
all to be excluded. Employees with insurance coverage from some other 
source may also decline coverage, and the employer need not pay a tax.
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Some proposals for mandating coverage at the federal level have also 
been widely discussed. One is the Basic Health Benefits for All 
Americans Act, introduced in Congress by Senator Kennedy and 
Representative Waxman. It would require that employers provide 
coverage for employees working at least 17.5 hours per week, as well 
as for dependents if they are not covered elsewhere. Employed 
dependents could retain coverage through their parents' plans. Employers 
would be required to pay 80 percent of the premium for employees work 
ing at least 25 hours per week and a smaller share for those working 
between 17.5 and 24 hours. A federal subsidy to small businesses for 
costs in excess of 5 percent of gross revenues is also included.
Another proposal is the "Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 1990s" 
(Enthoven and Kronick 1989). 2 Under it, employers would be required 
to cover all employees working at least 25 hours per week, along with 
their dependents not otherwise covered. For part-time and seasonal 
employees, the employer could instead pay a tax of 8 percent of wages 
up to $1,800 per worker. For small businesses, payments for health 
benefits would be capped at 8 percent of total payroll.
Issues Surrounding Expanded Private Coverage
The similarities and differences among these approaches provide some 
food for thought for states interested in expanding employer-provided 
coverage.
1. Legal Mandate or Tax Incentives? The federal proposals and the 
Hawaii law require that employers provide coverage, at least for full- 
time workers. This may not be an option for a state at this time; in fact, 
it violates the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). When 
the Hawaii law was tested in court, it was ruled to be preempted by 
ERISA, although a later amendment to ERISA made an exception for 
the Hawaii case. In the current climate of strong business opposition 
to mandated benefits, 3 further exceptions seem unlikely.
The alternative to a direct mandate is a so-called "play or pay" tax, 
to which firms not providing health insurance benefits are subject, as 
in Massachusetts. 4 Even apart from the legal difficulties with mandating, 
this approach has certain advantages. In principle, the tax can be set
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high enough that nearly all firms will provide coverage rather than pay 
it, so it does not necessarily lead to fewer individuals gaining coverage. 
At the same time, it preserves an element of choice for the employer.
More important, mandating almost of necessity involves exceptions. 
Employers of low-wage workers employed only a few hours a week 
cannot be expected to guarantee health insurance coverage, nor, perhaps, 
can a small start-up business not yet proven financially viable. But mak 
ing exceptions means drawing lines, raising questions of fairness be 
tween similar cases that fall on opposite sides of the division. Further 
more, business decisions are distorted by the presence of these excep 
tions. If health insurance coverage need not be provided to those work 
ing less than, say, 20 hours per week, 25-hour employees may be shifted 
to 18 hours. If firms with five or fewer employees are exempt, deci 
sions about expanding (or contracting) will be influenced by this fact.
Use of the tax may eliminate the need for all or at least most excep 
tions. While employers of part-time or very low-wage workers should 
not be expected to make the same contribution to health insurance 
coverage as others, they can be required to contribute in proportion 
to wages paid. This seems more fair than exempting some types of 
workers entirely, it reduces certain labor market distortions, and it pro 
vides a source of revenue for partially financing the coverage of those 
who will not get insurance through their employers. In the remainder 
of this discussion, I assume that coverage is not to be legally mandated, 
but rather induced through the use of a tax.
2. What Must the Employer Do to Avoid the Tax? One possibility is 
that employers are given a credit, dollar-for-dollar against tax owed, 
for payments for health care coverage made on behalf of employees. 
The problem with this approach is that it gives no incentive to spend 
less on coverage than an employer's maximum total tax liability a dollar 
saved on coverage just becomes an additional tax dollar owed. The 
employer's incentive for cost consciousness in purchasing insurance is 
thereby attenuated. In addition, it is desirable to set the tax liability rather 
high to discourage firms from opting out of providing coverage. The 
combination of a high tax liability and dollar-for-dollar credit could 
stimulate additional spending on health coverage for those who are 
already well insured, contributing further to growing health costs.
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The alternative is to waive the tax if some specified share (80 per 
cent is commonly suggested) of the premium for a "qualified plan" 
is paid by the employer, regardless of the cost to the employer. In that 
way, a dollar saved in purchasing coverage goes directly back to the 
firm, enhancing its incentive to buy wisely. This approach requires that 
a qualified plan be defined, and raises the possibility that much cur 
rently held coverage may be ruled inadequate. But if truly universal 
coverage for a basic set of services is the goal, it makes sense to re 
quire that employer-provided coverage meet certain criteria. Defining 
a qualified plan also provides an opportunity to assure that particular 
cost-containment features be included, if that is desired.
3. Coverage of Dependents and Those Currently in Public Programs. 
Except for the Hawaii case, in all of the examples discussed above 
employers who provide coverage must cover dependents of their 
employees. In light of the large number of current uninsured who are 
dependents (mainly children) of workers (see chapter 2 of this volume), 
such a requirement seems a natural element of this strategy for univer 
sal coverage. In fact, it is probably good policy to let workers who are 
dependent children of other workers get their coverage through their 
parents, rather than their own employers. Families would be kept 
together for insurance purposes, reducing administrative costs to at least 
some degree. More important, very young workers usually earn low 
wages and have high job turnover rates. Requiring their own employers 
to provide insurance or even pay a tax may be particularly burdensome, 
and may have adverse employment effects.
Some workers or dependents of workers may have insurance coverage 
from existing government programs, especially Medicare or Medicaid. 
Because federal funds contribute heavily to the finance of these pro 
grams (Medicare is entirely federally financed, Medicaid about half, 
with some variation across states), it is probably not in the interest of 
a state to encourage that this coverage be replaced by an employer. In 
particular, the requirement that employers provide coverage or pay a 
tax probably should not extend to employees 65 and over, who are almost 
always eligible for Medicare. Excluding the elderly may, however, lead 
to political problems or charges of inequity if the basic package of
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services available to all the nonelderly is perceived as more extensive 
than what Medicare offers.
4. Efforts to Expand Availability of Coverage. While the phenomenon 
of workers without insurance coverage is by no means limited to small 
businesses, it is well documented that small firms are much less likely 
to offer coverage than are larger ones. An important reason is that 
premium costs for similar coverage are much higher for small firms. 
Available evidence on the magnitude of the difference is sketchy, but 
a difference in cost of $40 per $100 of benefits between a firm with 
fewer than 10 employees and one with more than 100 employees is 
probably a conservative estimate (American Hospital Association 1988; 
Danzon 1989). These cost differences stem from higher administrative 
and marketing costs for insuring small firms, and from insurers' con 
cerns about adverse selection.
A reduction in that cost differential would by itself increase the number 
of small businesses offering insurance. Without a reduction, even rather 
strong tax incentives might not be enough to induce provision by very 
many additional small firms. Most proposals for expanding private 
coverage therefore include attempts to enhance the availability of in 
surance and improve the terms upon which it is offered to small firms. 
One option is for the state to create a single large insurance pool, which 
might also contain those gaining public coverage. Firms could be per 
mitted to buy into the pool on a community-rated basis (the same rates 
would be available for all firms within a particular area of the state), 
with different rates for individual, couple, and family coverage.
This approach, with one large pool encompassing most of the cur 
rent uninsured, would be in essence a scaled-down version of a state 
insurance plan, with many of the attendant advantages and disadvan 
tages. Marketing costs could be considerably reduced, at least some 
administrative economies could be realized, and if enrollment in the 
pool were large enough, problems of adverse selection would be 
minimized. Some firms would, in effect, subsidize others under such 
an arrangement, however. Each employer would pay premiums intended 
to reflect the costs of providing coverage to an "average" firm with 
a similar mix of workers by family type, but not all firms are average. 
Firms who employ workers at higher-than-average risk, due to age or
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other factors, would pay the same premiums as everyone else, and the 
extra costs of their coverage would be spread across all participants 
in the plan.
The implications for health care costs of having a single large pool 
are also very important to consider. While the pool concentrates the 
buying power of small firms and thereby gives them some clout in the 
market, it also blunts their individual incentive to use that power effec 
tively. If a firm has only a single option for purchasing insurance (i.e., 
through the pool) at rates over which it has no control, the firm has 
no role to play in assuring that it receives good coverage at a reasonable 
cost. Incentives for cost control can of course be built into the benefit 
package, with copayments, deductibles, and so forth. To a large ex 
tent, however, the responsibility for controlling costs (and assuring quali 
ty) would fall on the administrators of the pool.
Alternatively, market competition can be relied on for cost control 
and quality assurance, along the lines suggested by Enthoven and Kronick 
(1989). Competing qualified insurance plans might be made available 
to small businesses, with a state agency serving as a broker, certifying 
which plans are qualified, providing information to firms to facilitate 
comparisons among plans, managing the enrollment process, and 
generally administering the rules of the game. The basic idea is that 
giving firms a choice provides a better opportunity to satisfy individual 
preferences, and promotes competition among insurers to hold down 
costs while maintaining high quality.
But the most thoughtful proponents of this approach recognize that 
managing competition is essential and by no means easy (Enthoven 1986, 
1988). There are difficult questions regarding the dimensions along 
which insurers should be permitted to compete. On what bases, for ex 
ample, should they be permitted to set different premiums for different 
firms? Given the opportunity, insurers will compete to attract firms with 
relatively healthy workers. The most obvious way to do so is to charge 
lower premiums to firms with younger, healthier workforces. If this 
is permitted, firms employing workers who are bad health risks (and 
in a firm with few employees it may only take one case of serious ill 
ness) may find no good options available to them. They will choose 
to let their employees turn to public coverage, which will become a 
dumping ground for those at highest risk.
Combining Private Insurance with Public Programs 85
Requiring insurers to community rate would not eliminate all these 
problems. If required to community rate, insurers might attempt to tailor 
the benefit packages they offer to be particularly attractive to the healthy, 
or in subtle ways make it difficult for the chronically ill to receive covered 
services. Firms of moderate size expecting their experience to be bet 
ter than average would have an incentive to self-insure, if that is still 
an option.
An important but still unanswered question about the competitive ap 
proach favored by Enthoven and Kronick is whether sufficient numbers 
of insurers would be willing to come forward and comply with the rules 
of the game, so that the potential benefits of choice and competition 
could actually be achieved.
Likely Effects on Firms and Workers
Employer Responses to a "Play or Pay" Tax
If employers are given a choice of providing insurance or paying a 
tax, it is no simple matter to predict how many individuals would gain 
employer-provided coverage under any particular plan. Surely the firm 
would look at which option, tax or coverage, is cheaper from its point 
of view. But employers have an interest in keeping their workers hap 
py, so they will also be influenced by what the worker prefers. 5 The 
employer will be less likely to provide insurance if good public coverage 
is available free to workers than if an uncovered worker faces a premium 
or tax for public coverage in addition to the employer's tax. Complicating 
the firm's problem is the fact that it cannot decide on an employee-by- 
employee basis whether to provide coverage or pay the tax, but rather 
must make blanket decisions that apply at least to broad groups of 
employees. 6 High-wage workers in predominantly low-wage firms may 
end up without insurance from their employers (because it is not worth 
while to cover the entire firm). The converse would also be true.
Unless the tax rate is set very high, however, it is likely that for many 
low-wage and part-time workers employers will find it cheaper to pay 
the tax rather than provide coverage. Suppose, for example, that the 
tax rate is 10 percent and a worker is employed 20 hours per week
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and earning $5 per hour. The tax owed would be $10 per week or about 
$40 per month, far less than the cost of insurance coverage, even for 
a single individual.
It is appealing to suppose that all firms already providing coverage 
would continue to do so when the additional tax inducement is added, 
but this is unlikely. In many cases, the current coverage may not meet 
the standards for a qualified plan, the employer may be paying less than 
the share of the premium required, or the employer may not be cover 
ing dependents. The public safety net could also provide a better alter 
native to employer group coverage than is currently available for most 
workers. For these reasons, at least some employers now paying a share 
of the costs of their employees' coverage would choose to drop coverage 
and pay the tax instead. Many workers now counted as having employer 
group coverage would thus move to public coverage under this sort of 
package.
Incidence of the Costs of New Coverage 
and Labor Market Effects
Who would bear the costs of new employer-provided coverage and 
how the package would affect labor markets depend on the interaction 
of a number of factors, including the nature of public coverage and the 
terms upon which it is made available to those not covered in the 
workplace. The analysis is pursued in more detail in chapter 8. As a 
first approximation, however, standard economics suggests that in the 
long run the money wages of those who gain coverage would fall by 
about the cost of coverage to the employer. This conclusion is based 
on two presumptions. First, firms make employment decisions on the 
basis of total compensation per worker (wages plus benefits); they will 
only choose to hire the same number of workers if compensation does 
not change. Second, the supply of workers (and work hours) will be 
about the same at either wage level. This simple analysis has very strong 
implications. It says that those who gain employer-provided coverage 
will, for the most part, pay for it themselves (in the form of lower wages), 
and that total labor costs, business profits, and prices will therefore be 
little affected.
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These predictions may be substantially correct, but they need to be 
qualified in several important ways. First, the phrase "in the long run" 
deliberately sidesteps the issue of what happens right away. While some 
employers would cut wages if forced to add insurance, others may find 
it impossible or unwise to do so (for example, due to existing collec 
tive bargaining agreements). Their workers would get smaller wage in 
creases than otherwise, until eventually the difference in wage level 
had compensated for the cost of insurance. In the meantime, however, 
those firms would suffer lower profits, would (to the extent possible) 
pass some of their higher costs into prices, and in some cases would 
not survive.
Second, the presumption that labor supply is unaffected by changes 
in wage rates and insurance coverage is not entirely accurate, particularly 
for two-earner couples. Empirical studies have shown that decisions 
about whether and how much to work by the lower-earning spouse are 
rather strongly influenced by the terms of compensation. Frequently, 
these secondary earners already have insurance through a spouse's job. 
Forcing their own employers to provide coverage (or pay a tax) will 
reduce the money wages the employers are willing to offer, and thereby 
reduce the workers' incentive to work. Employers will in turn find such 
secondary earners more difficult and expensive to hire.
The numbers of secondary earners affected in this way are quite large. 
Analyses of national proposals for mandated insurance coverage (Gor 
don 1988; Thorpe 1989) have suggested that, of all workers gaining 
insurance under a federal mandate, roughly half already have coverage 
through an employed family member.
Finally, for workers at or near the legal minimum wage, wages can 
not be reduced enough to compensate for the added costs of coverage. 
If wages cannot be reduced at all, the cost of coverage (or the tax) is 
effectively an add-on to the minimum wage. For those close to the 
minimum wage, it is likely that most employers will find it cheaper 
to pay the tax than to provide coverage, and hence the tax rate becomes 
an upper bound on the extra increase in labor cost felt by the employer. 
Recent empirical studies have found that employment of minimum wage 
workers declines by about 1 to 3 percent in response to a 10 percent 
increase in the minimum wage (Brown 1988). A 10 percent payroll tax
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would have a similar effect. 7 A higher tax rate would induce more in 
surance coverage on behalf of low-wage workers, but it would also create 
more adverse employment effects while leading to higher prices and 
lower profits for those firms that employ such workers.
Costs of New Public Programs
No attempt to expand the reach of insurance in the workplace can 
by itself lead to universal coverage. Although most of the uninsured 
have some connection to the labor force, there are still large numbers 
who have none and who do not qualify for any existing public insurance 
program. A universal system needs a safety net program or set of pro 
grams to assure that they are covered. Those who have no proof of other 
insurance could be assessed (probably through the existing state tax 
system) an income-based premium. They might then be given Medicaid- 
style coverage, or placed in a new large insurance pool that also in 
cludes employees of small businesses. If a more competitive approach 
is desired, this population could be given vouchers and, where possi 
ble, allowed to choose among competing qualified plans. Issues of equity 
(as well as work incentives) could arise if the level of coverage 
guaranteed is perceived as less attractive than Medicaid.
As discussed at the outset, an obvious appeal of this route to univer 
sal coverage is that it requires a much smaller expansion of govern 
ment budgets than would an entirely tax-financed system. The hope  
not entirely without foundation is that the additional commitment of 
state dollars required might be held to an acceptable magnitude. After 
all, most workers and their families already have coverage, and most 
of the uninsured are in households with at least one worker. If coverage 
could be extended further in the workplace, and no one lost coverage 
they now hold, a relatively small residual group might be left to be picked 
up in the public sector.
What becomes clear on a close examination of the data, however, 
is that depending on exactly how the total package is designed, large 
numbers of individuals who are currently insured could move to heavi 
ly subsidized public coverage. The key to seeing this point is to recognize
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that many individuals now have private coverage and are counted as 
insured, yet are quite poor. Thorpe (1989) has estimated that for the 
nation as a whole in 1987, 6.7 million individuals in poverty households 
had private insurance, as did an additional 4.5 million individuals in 
households under 125 percent of the poverty level. Some of them got 
group coverage through employers, but paid much or all of the cost 
themselves. Others purchased their own nongroup insurance. (Thorpe 
estimated that altogether about 10 million individuals had only such 
coverage.) Given their low incomes, it is likely that much of this coverage 
is quite limited and would not satisfy standards for a qualified plan. 
Unless the tax rate is set quite high, few in this group can be expected 
to gain employer-provided coverage, and many may lose the partial 
employer support that they now have. Depending again on the tax rate, 
others at incomes substantially above poverty may lose private coverage. 
The split between private or public coverage might be largely a mat 
ter of indifference from a policy perspective if the taxes paid by 
employers plus supplemental taxes directly on individuals covered the 
costs of the newly publicly insured. But this too would not happen, even 
at quite high tax rates.
An Analysis of Michigan Data
These ideas may be illustrated with data from Michigan. For other 
states interested in this approach to universal coverage, the method of 
analysis may be of more interest than the quantitative results. I have 
estimated the net increase in public insurance coverage under the kind 
of package being discussed here, using data from the March 1988 Cur 
rent Population Survey (CPS). 8 The details assumed for the package 
are as follows.
All employers must provide coverage to all employees, and spouses 
and dependents not otherwise covered, or pay a payroll tax. The only 
exceptions are that any workers who have coverage under an existing 
government program (Medicaid, Medicare, or CHAMPUS, a federal 
program for dependents of military personnel) need not be covered by 
the employer, and workers who are under 18 and living with parents 
or between 18 and 22 and students are to get coverage through their
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parents. Three tax rates are considered: 10, 15 and 20 percent. 
Presumably, a ceiling on the amount of tax owed per employee would 
be included in such a package. I do not specify one for my analysis, 
assuming instead that all workers above particular earnings levels would 
be provided coverage by their employers.
Those who are not already covered in a public program and do not 
get coverage from an employer or purchase it themselves are automatical 
ly participants in a new public insurance program. For that they are 
assessed a tax (which could be filed with the regular state income tax 
in states that have one) on all income above a $2,000 per person ex 
emption, at a rate equal to that of the payroll tax, up to a point at which 
a fair premium has been paid. Any payroll tax already paid on an in 
dividual's behalf would be credited dollar-for-dollar against income tax 
owed. The self-employed would, as a result of this income tax, have 
the same responsibility in providing for their own insurance that 
employers have for employees. 9 This income tax (or income-based 
premium) places a rather heavy burden on the poor among the current 
uninsured. Despite this, we will see that it raises relatively little revenue.
To estimate who ends up with public coverage, the CPS sample of 
individuals must first be grouped into family units that would be kept 
together for insurance purposes. Each unit is classified as either already 
having public coverage, retaining or picking up private coverage, or 
(the residual) entering the new public program. In general, family units 
are put in the private insurance group if earnings are high enough (singly 
or in combination) that payroll taxes paid in 1988 would be at least as 
large as 80 percent of the estimated 1988 premium for a qualified plan. 
Workers who do not meet this test but already have employment-based 
coverage are assumed to keep it, if all members of the family unit have 
coverage and the employer pays at least part of the cost. This last assump 
tion is optimistic, as surely some of those employers would drop 
coverage. 10
The results of the analysis for Michigan, as reported in Table 1, show 
substantial enrollments in the new public program, both because many 
of the current uninsured fail to gain private coverage (even with tax 
rates as high as 20 percent), and because many of the insured shift over. 
According to the March 1988 CPS, the total number of uninsured under
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age 65 in Michigan is about 870,000. n The estimated enrollment in 
the new program ranges from 1.2 million with a 10 percent tax to 
770,000 if the tax is 20 percent. At the lower rate, only about 200,000 
of the state's uninsured gain employment-based coverage, while about 
490,000 of the insured move to public coverage. At the 20 percent rate, 
about 520,000 of the uninsured would gain coverage from employers, 
but about two-thirds of that number (320,000) would be leaving their 
current coverage to enter the public program.
Table 1
Numbers Gaining Public Coverage (100,000s) 
Illustration for Michigan
Tax rate
10 percent 15 percent 20 percent
Total 
Number already insured
11.7 
4.9
9.5 
4.0
7.7 
3.2
SOURCES. March 1988 CPS for Michigan and author's assumptions about participation
Table 2 shows the expected age composition of the public program 
at each of the tax rates, along with comparative data on the composi 
tion of the Michigan population under age 65 and the Michigan unin 
sured population. The composition of the group does not change much 
as the tax rate changes, but it does look rather different from the cur 
rent uninsured population. In particular, those aged 15 to 20 or over 
44 would form a considerably larger share of the new program 
enrollments than they do of the current uninsured population. Both 
subgroups contain relatively large numbers of insured individuals who 
would find public coverage an attractive alternative. In the younger 
subgroup, many are 18 to 20 years of age and not in school, but ap 
parently covered under parents' policies. The size of the public pro 
gram could be kept down to some degree by broadening the definition 
of dependent and requiring that some of these individuals continue to 
be covered through their parents. Table 2 also shows that a relatively 
large share of uninsured males aged 26 to 44 would gain employment- 
based insurance and therefore not require public coverage.
Table 2 
Composition of the New Public Program (Percent by Age Group)
Illustration for Michigan o
Age group
0-4
5-14
15-20
21-25
26-44 (Male)
26-44 (Female)
45-64
10 percent
8.2
12.7
15.4
16.8
13.1
12.1
21.7
Tax rate
15 percent
8.8
13.1
15.8
16.6
12.3
10.9
22.5
20 percent
8.9
12.1
15.0
17.6
11.7
10.3
24.5
Population 
under 65
7.8
15.2
10.8
10.6
17.0
16.7
21.9
Current 
uninsured
10.6
18.3
8.4
17.7
21.9
10.5
12.6
SOURCES. March 1988 CPS for Michigan and author's assumptions about participation.
3
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Gross costs for the new public program under different assumptions 
about its size and the benefit package are reported in Table 3. The cost 
numbers are based on my calculations using data from Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield of Michigan in its Area Rated Groups line of business, sold mainly 
to small firms. The Basic Package is traditional Blue Cross-Blue Shield 
coverage, covering mainly inpatient hospital care and associated pro 
fessional services. The Expanded Package adds major medical coverage 
of a broader set of services with deductible and copayment provisions, 
as well as coverage of prescription drugs with low copayments. Some 
advantages of these numbers are that they are based on actual cost ex 
perience, not premiums, and were available by age category. Using 
them does not imply that public coverage would have to be of this type.
Table 3
Gross and Net Costs of the New Public Program ($100 millions) 
Illustration for Michigan
Tax rate
10 percent 15 percent 20 percent
Gross Cost
Basic Package
Expanded Package
Revenue
Payroll Tax
Income Tax
Net Cost
Basic Package
Expanded Package
10.6
13.4
4.3
0.7
5.5
8.3
8.6
10.8
3.7
1.0
3.9
6.2
7.2
9.1
2.8
1.2
3.3
5.1
SOURCES: Author's calculations from March 1988 CPS for Michigan and Blue Cross-Blue Shield 
of Michigan 1988 cost experience for Area Rated Groups line of business
Costs amount to a little more than $900 per enrollee per year for the 
Basic Package, and about $1,150 for the Expanded Package (in both 
cases, a little higher for the population mix at the 20 percent tax rate). 
If other estimates are available and believed more appropriate, they could 
of course be easily substituted. See chapter 6 for additional discussion 
of costs of coverage and their relationship to the benefit package offered.
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Table 3 also includes estimates of tax revenues the entire program 
package would generate, and then nets these out against gross program 
costs. Payroll tax revenues fall as the tax rate increases, as substantial 
ly more firms choose to provide coverage rather than pay the tax. In 
come tax revenues increase with the tax rate, but still amount to only 
about $150 per year per enrollee at the high 20 percent rate. Most of 
those who end up in the public program under this tax rate are quite 
poor, and frequently they would have no income tax liability due to 
payroll taxes already paid on their behalf.
The bottom line net costs to state government (in 1989 dollars) range 
from about $330 million with the Basic Package and 20 percent tax rate 
to about $830 million with the Expanded Package and 10 percent rate. 
These figures are after netting out payroll tax and extra income tax 
revenues the program would generate. Universal coverage is not cheap. 
To put the numbers in some perspective, each $100 million would 
amount to about $12 for each Michigan resident under age 65, or would 
require adding roughly 0.13 percent to the state's broad-based income 
tax, currently at 4.6 percent.
The experience in other states would of course be different, but not 
necessarily more favorable. The Medicaid program already covers a 
larger share of Michigan's poor population than is the case in most states. 
The share of the state's under-65 population without insurance is well 
below the national average. Based on 1986 and 1987 CPS numbers, 
the national share was over 17 percent compared with about 12 percent 
in Michigan.
Concluding Comments
The net costs to state government of taking this path to universal 
coverage, as identified in the previous section, do not all represent a 
net increase in medical services provided in the state. It is very likely 
that, with better financial access to medical care, the previously unin 
sured will consume more medical services than they currently do. But 
they use some care now, and pay some of the cost of it out of their 
own pockets. Much of that cost for the uninsured who are poor 
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would be shifted to the public sector. The same is true for those poor 
families now paying for their own insurance but who would switch to 
public coverage. Thus a share of the added costs to state government 
would really represent a shift from the uninsured and other poor families 
to the general taxpayer.
Much of the care currently received by the uninsured is also paid 
for in other less explicit ways, by providers accepting lower returns 
than they otherwise would, and by other payers paying more for the 
care received, to help cover the costs of care given to those who cannot 
pay. If state and local governments are already making payments for 
such uncompensated care, these could be folded into the new program 
and would reduce the amount of new revenue to be raised. To the ex 
tent that employers are now paying for uncompensated care, a system 
of universal coverage should bring downward pressure on the cost of 
employer-provided insurance. However, how the gains from a signifi 
cant reduction in uncompensated care would be distributed among pro 
viders and various payers is not well understood.
Getting to universal coverage by expanding and supplementing the 
employment-based insurance system would not be easy, and would very 
likely require a significant increase in a state government's budget. No 
state should embark on this path unless it is willing to face that fact. 
But given a strong commitment to coverage for all, the necessary budget 
increase is not entirely outside the range of plausibility, and it is cer 
tainly far smaller than what would be needed for a Canadian model state 
health plan.
The costs of financing a combined public-private system at the point 
of implementation are surely an important factor affecting its political 
feasibility. What is probably more important, however, for the long- 
run success of such an approach is whether it can be implemented in 
a way that promotes a better balance between cost and quality im 
provements in health care, or whether it would merely add to already 
formidable pressures for ever-increasing costs.
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NOTES
1. See the comments of Johnston on the proposal by the National Leadership Commission on 
Health Care (Johnston and Remhardt 1989).
2 Viewing the Enthoven-Kromck proposal as merely a way of achieving universal insurance 
coverage does not do justice to the plan. It includes provisions (including a restructuring of ex 
isting tax subsidies for employer-provided insurance) aimed at harnessing market forces to pro 
mote cost containment and quality assurance in health care.
3 A recent survey of the membership of the National Association of Manufactures (Higgms 
and Co 1989) found that 84 percent opposed mandated employer-provided health insurance, despite 
the fact that over 99 percent of the respondents were already providing health insurance benefits 
to their employees.
4. A national proposal by the National Leadership Commission on Health Care (1989) also has 
this feature.
5. Clearly this is true when workers are unionized, but even if not, it is in the firm's interest 
to provide a compensation package that is of most value to the worker for a given level of cost.
6. In the current environment, insurers usually insist on this to guard against the possibility that 
only bad health risks will choose to take coverage Under the kind of program being discussed, 
the state would not want to permit individualized decisions for fear that bad risks would be push 
ed into public coverage to keep the employer's private insurance costs low.
7. It should be noted, however, that there would be no adverse employment effects for very young 
low-wage workers if they are expected to get insurance coverage through their parents
8. Earnings and income figures in the March 1988 CPS are for 1987 I have updated them roughly 
to 1989 by increasing them by 6 percent Estimates of the cost of coverage are also updated to 1989.
9. In this quantitative analysis, taxes paid by the self-employed with sufficiently high incomes 
are counted as part of payroll taxes
10. In more detail, the classification scheme works as follows A family unit does not enter the 
new public program if it is- (a) a single individual in an existing public program, or with earnings 
sufficient to pay $800 annually in payroll tax, or with group health already in his or her own 
name, for which an employer bears at least part of the cost, (b) a two-adult couple in which one 
member has earnings sufficient to pay $1,600 annually in payroll tax, or each individually meets 
the conditions in (a), (c) a family with children in which the head or spouse has earnings suffi 
cient to pay $2,000 annually in payroll tax, or all members are currently covered, either by public 
programs or group health (for which an employer of the head or spouse pays at least part of the 
cost), or all but the head or spouse are covered by public programs and the remaining individual 
meets the conditions in (a)
11. This number is a good deal lower than that obtained from other recent waves of the CPS 
and may be an underestimate See discussion by Moyer (1989) and Swartz and Purcell (1989)
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5.1
Piecemeal Programs of Health 
Insurance for the Uninsured
Andrew J. Hogan
Michigan State University
The financing mechanisms of the U.S. health care system have 
developed in a piecemeal fashion over the last five decades to meet the 
needs of particular groups whose access to health care has differed 
significantly from the rest of the population at some point in time. These 
piecemeal programs are supplemented by individually purchased 
(nongroup) health insurance coverage. There is also a growing number 
of "free-riders" who do not maintain any insurance coverage and who 
lack the financial resources to meet the expenses of a serious illness. 
These uninsured "free-riders" account for a significant proportion of 
the uncompensated care hospitals are required to provide under emergen 
cy conditions.
This combination of piecemeal programs, nongroup coverage, and 
free-riding has, over the years, created a paradoxical stability for the 
current financing system, even as it appears to be spiraling toward col 
lapse. Proposals such as those reviewed in the previous chapter face 
an enormous financial inefficiency, in that to increase health care spend 
ing for the uninsured by $1, current financing of $3 to $7 must be 
reorganized. For example, Needleman, et al. (1989) estimated that to 
increase spending for the uninsured in Pennsylvania by $393M, expen 
ditures by employers would need to be increased by $779M, from in 
dividual insurance by $152M, from medicaid by $142M, with decreasing 
contributions by household out-of-pocket (-$334), charity care 
(-$189M), Medicare (-$74) and other government payments (-$82M). 
In total, $1,751M of health care spending has to be reorganized to in 
crease spending for the uninsured by $393M, or $4.5 reorganized for 
each $1 of incremental spending. In a similar vein, Thorpe and Siegel 
(1989) estimate sizable differences in public and private costs when a
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Medicaid expansion, a Medicaid Buy-In, and an employer-mandated 
approach are considered for adoption in different combinations.
Further piecemeal adjustments to the current system are significant 
ly more manageable than large-scale reforms, politically if not finan 
cially. It may be that such piecemeal reforms can only postpone an in 
evitable collapse of the current system and the necessity of a large-scale 
reform or an overtly two-tiered system. A state not able or willing to 
undertake a major reform, however, might analyze its health care financ 
ing system to identify the major points of destabilization: the working 
poor, children, nonworking adults, high-risk individuals, providers of 
uncompensated care. The state could then implement a program to 
minimize the destablization of those critical points. Such piecemeal 
measures might actually stabilize a state health care system, at least 
for a time.
One area where special needs may exist is in the employed single- 
parent household. In Michigan, almost one-third of the uninsured 
children live with employed single parents. These uninsured single-parent 
families tend to have lower incomes than full families. Single parents 
are faced with a choice of an individual or a full-family (two-parent) 
health insurance policy, which is often actuarially unfair to the single- 
parent family and often involves unaffordaly high premiums. A piecemeal 
approach to lower the cost of health insurance to single-parent families 
is to mandate that insurers offer a single-parent policy. Such a mandate 
should require little administrative effort beyond the normal insurance 
commission monitoring of policies. The State of Michigan Employees 
Health Plan offers a parent-child option with premiums less than those for 
the two (dual) adult option and only 60 percent of the full-family premium.
Before undertaking any of the programs described in the rest of this 
chapter, a state should consider using all existing programs to their fullest 
extent, especially the Medicaid expansion for children, pregnant women, 
and the working poor. Some of the Medicaid expansions enacted dur 
ing the 1980s include (National Health Policy Forum 1989):
  Deficit Reduction Act of 1984: coverage of children under age 5 where 
family income falls below AFDC eligibility thresholds; coverage of 
pregnant women who would become eligible if their children were 
born, and pregnant women who would qualify for the AFDC unem-
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ployed spouse program if the state were to offer it; automatic eligibility 
for infants born to Medicaid-eligible mothers.
  Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985: coverage 
of pregnant women with family incomes below state AFDC stan 
dards, even if not receiving AFDC, AFDC (unemployed), or SSI; 
60 days of post-partum coverage for women eligible for Medicaid 
solely due to pregnancy; option to enhance the benefit package for 
pregnant women; extended coverage for adopted children with special 
health needs; sanctioned use of Medicaid case-management services.
  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986: extended coverage to 
pregnant women, children under 5 years, aged and disabled with in 
comes below 100 percent of poverty line; use of "presumptive 
eligibility" where designated prenatal care providers can screen and 
qualify pregnant women for temporary Medicaid coverage 
immediately.
  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987: permitted coverage of 
pregnant women and infants (< 1 year) in families with incomes below 
185 percent of the federal poverty line; permitted coverage of all 
children under 8 years below poverty line.
  Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988: mandatory coverage 
of pregnant women and children under 1 year with incomes below 
the poverty line.
  Family Support Act of 1988: mandatory continuation of Medicaid 
coverage for next 12 months for families receiving AFDC in three 
of previous six months; mandatory AFDC unemployed spouse 
program.
Some proportion of the uninsured population can be reduced by full 
implementation of all of these Medicaid expansions and aggressive 
outreach to find eligibles not currently participating. The remaining sec 
tions of this chapter will discuss the major options available to states 
that are willing and able to do more without undertaking large-scale 
reform: small employer pools, Medicaid Buy-In programs, high-risk 
pools, and uncompensated care programs.
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5.2
Small Employer 
Health Insurance Pools
Andrew J. Hogan 
Stephen A. Woodbury
Michigan State University
Need for Small Employer Health Insurance Pools
Characteristics of Uninsured 
and Underinsured Employees
Almost 60 percent of nonelderly adults without health insurance are 
employed (Swartz 1989). Almost half of these employed uninsured adults 
live in families with less than 200 percent of poverty income, and nearly 
two-thirds of them are employed by small firms, generally earning low 
wages (Moyer 1989).
The Health Insurance Survey of Michigan (Figure 1) indicates that 
less than half of all employees of small firms (fewer than 100 employees) 
have adequate health insurance coverage. About 20 percent are underin- 
sured, in that physician's office visits are not covered or as evidenced 
by problems with inadequate coverage in the past year. Another 25 per 
cent have adequate insurance but are only marginally insured, in that 
they have either nongroup coverage purchased with after-tax income 
or their employers make no contribution toward their premium. Ten 
percent of employees of small firms have coverage that is both marginal 
and inadequate.
Employed persons with nongroup coverage are likely to relinquish 
that coverage when small employer pool group coverage is offered. 
Firms offering poor health benefit coverage may replace it with coverage 
offered by the pool. Further, many employees in small firms, who are 
currently covered under a spouse's health plan, may decide to switch 
to coverage in their own name through their employer from the pool.
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Figure 1
Adequacy of Health Insurance Coverage 
by Firm Size
<10 10-24 25-100 >100
firm size (# of employees)
adequate [ | underins marg/adeq marg/under
Source: Health Insurance Survey of Michigan
Key
adequate: good coverage with significant employer contribution
underins: underinsured, physician office visits not covered, or problems encountered 
during last year.
marg/adeq: good coverage, with no employer contribution or nongroup coverage 
marg/under: underinsured, with no employer contribution or nongroup coverage.
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Characteristics of Small Employer 
Health Insurance Market
A recent survey of Michigan insurance carriers revealed that small 
employers (< 100 FTEs) may pay premiums from 10 percent to 40 per 
cent higher than the 500 + FTE firm for equivalent coverage (Health 
Management Associates 1989). Interestingly, the employees of small 
firms tend to be younger (and perhaps healthier) than their medium- 
and large-firm counterparts (Hogan 1989), which could make small 
employer health insurance premiums even more actuarially unfair than 
the simple premium differential might indicate.
As health insurance premiums have become increasingly less afford 
able, both small firms and insurance carriers have developed strategies 
to avoid the risk of paying for adverse selection. In the small firm, one 
significant illness can lead to a very adverse loss ratio for the carrier. 
Carriers will attempt to avoid this risk prospectively by various under 
writing approaches: exclusion of pre-existing conditions, exclusion of 
employees with pre-existing conditions or even termination of the policy 
once serious conditions are identified.
Carriers not adopting these strategies would soon find themselves in 
undated by demand from excluded firms. The resulting adverse selec 
tion will quickly cause unfavorable loss ratios, leading to rising 
premiums. If the premiums are community-rated, then there will be 
a flight of small firms without significant risks to those carriers offer 
ing lower premiums with restrictive underwriting practices.
Over the years these strategies have led to an enormous churning in 
the small employer health insurance market. Small employers change 
carriers readily, and carriers selling to small employers offer limited 
products which are heavily underwritten and whose premiums often 
escalate quickly after a year or two. Many large carriers have aban 
doned the small employer market altogether. Larger employers have 
also abandoned the health insurance market to avoid sharing the risk of 
adverse selection and are now almost always under some kind of exper 
ience-rated or self-funded arrangement (Gabel et al. 1989). In summary, 
the employment-based health insurance market has come to rest primar 
ily on small and medium employers purchasing from small and medium
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carriers, all of whom have as a major strategy the management of adverse 
selection. In some states, such as Michigan, Blue Cross-Blue Shield 
plans are required to act as insurers of last resort and to insure a signifi 
cant number of small firms.
The high level of carrier-client churning has contributed to the high 
administrative costs in the small employer health insurance market. As 
turbulent as the small employer health insurance market is, it is not 
surprising that small employers have not organized themselves well to 
deal with one of the major forces in the health care financing in the 
1980s: cost-shifting. In the early 1980s, federal and state governments 
began enacting legislation and administrative rules to limit their liabili 
ty for health care cost inflation; this came after a decade of unsuccessful 
attempts to contain health care costs. The Medicare and Medicaid pro 
grams changed their reimbursement policies from cost-plus to fixed fees. 
After years of budgetary restraint, these fees are now significantly below 
those paid by private insurers (Thorpe, Siegel, Dailey 1989). Whether 
these fees have fallen below the cost of care is a matter of some dispute. 
However, once the separation was made between costs and payments 
for two large payers, other payers began to follow suit. Large employers 
have been able to leverage their size either with carriers and third-party 
administrators or through group purchasing arrangements to gain 
preferential treatment. The result has been that large employer premiums 
have been increasing at one-half the rate of small employer premiums 
(Kramon 1989). Small employers have been unable to defend their in 
terests in this process of cost-shifting.
Rationale for Small Employer Health Insurance Pool
The pool attempts to give small employers some of the advantages 
that large employers enjoy in the health insurance market: elimination 
of underwriting and exclusions, an organized response to cost-shifting 
and premium differentials, and an improved benefit design. By joining 
together, small employers can create a self-funded multiple employer 
welfare trust that should, over time, bring their health benefit expenses 
in line with actual costs. Such a self-funded plan can resist cost-shifting 
and will provide a reasonably stable source of insurance coverage for 
small employers.
Small Employer Health Insurance Pools 107
The major challenge for such a pool is the large number of "high- 
risk" individuals purchasing group or nongroup coverage who will rush 
into the pool if premiums are set at a level to entice "good risk" small 
employers not currently offering benefits to join. Adverse selection prob 
lems could be severe, and the small employer program could easily 
become a "high-risk" pool. In addition to adverse selection, the small 
employer pool will need to contend with the high level of employee 
turnover and financial instability of small firms (Health Management 
Associates 1989; Brown 1989). For these reasons, some public sub 
sidy will be required to offset the costs of the high-risk individuals who 
will join the pool in disproportionate numbers.
Given the large number of small firms currently offering benefits who 
are either paying a high percent of payroll for the benefit or who are 
purchasing an inferior benefit, a small employer pool is likely, upon 
offering a reasonably priced plan, to be inundated by small employers 
who currently offer benefits and who qualify for subsidies. Such a pro 
gram could spend substantial subsidies and not appreciably affect the 
number of uninsured individuals. A major policy consideration is the 
suggestion that the small employer pool be open only to employers who 
do not currently offer health benefits. In the long run, excluding 
employers who currently offer health benefits from participation in the 
program is probably unfair, but the approach may be workable as a 
transitional measure. 1
An additional policy issue is whether an employee must work some 
minimum number of hours per week to qualify for health insurance. 
Other things being equal, participation of part-time workers increases 
premium costs more than it increases payroll, resulting in more sub 
sidy payments if premiums are to be affordable.
Administration of Small Employer 
Health Insurance Programs
One approach is the creation of a small business health insurance pool 
open to all businesses with less than 25 employees, new businesses (< 1 
year) with less than 100 employees, and the self-employed. The state 
insurance bureau could annually determine actuarially fair premiums 
plus administrative loadings for the small business pool. Premiums
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should not be experience-rated to encourage coverage for high-risk 
employees, if subsidies can be obtained.
To make the purchase of health insurance more attractive to the small 
employer, premiums can be subsidized as a percent of total payroll. 
Eligible employers would pay full premiums as long as the total health 
benefit expense is less than, for example, 4 percent of payroll. Employers 
would pay 50 percent of the total premiums in excess of 4 percent but 
less than 8 percent of payroll, and they would pay 10 percent of total 
premiums in excess of 8 percent of payroll. To reduce free-riding, at 
least 75 percent of a firm's uninsured workers would have to be covered 
for a firm to receive such a subsidy. Employers providing evidence of 
financial distress could be allowed to delay or reduce premium payments 
up to one year. Employers may require employees to share in the pay 
ment of premiums, as long as the employee earns at least 125 percent 
of the federal minimum wage. 2 Employer premium contributions must 
at least equal employee premium contributions for the firm to receive 
a premium subsidy.
An alternative subsidy mechanism is to make subsidy payments directly 
to employees and to base the amount of the subsidy on the economic 
status of the employee and his or her dependents. Employees with 
household incomes less than 200 percent of poverty would receive 
premium subsidies to supplement their own or their employer's premium 
contributions. Eligible employers could pay full premiums for all 
employees whose family income exceeds 200 percent of poverty 
income. For those between 100 and 200 percent of poverty:
Premium share = Adjusted family income _ L 
Poverty rate income
A somewhat more modest alternative approach is to extend the Health 
Care Access Project (HCAP) being undertaken in Genesee and Mar- 
quette Counties in the State of Michigan (Smith 1989). The HCAP pro 
gram is one of 15 Robert Wood Johnson access demonstration projects. 
The program is open to employers who do not now offer health benefits 
and it uses existing insurance mechanisms (usually the local Chamber 
of Commerce area-rated group plans offered by Blue Cross-Blue Shield 
of Michigan). HCAP subsidizes up to one-third of the total premium
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contribution for eligible establishments. HCAP will further subsidize 
some or all of the employee premium contribution based on family 
income.
In spite of fairly generous premium subsidies, HCAP and other ac 
cess demonstration projects have been able to enroll only about 20 per 
cent of eligible employers contacted (Perry 1989). The chief advan 
tages of the HCAP-type approach are their reliance on existing insurance 
programs and the easily understood one-third subsidy. Subsidies based 
on health benefit expense as a percent of payroll or on family income 
better target the subsidy dollar and will probably produce higher par 
ticipation in the long run, but will be harder to understand and more 
expensive to administer in the short run.
Benefit Options
Selection of a small employer pool benefit package is, by necessity, 
market driven. The package must be acceptable to those who buy it, 
but it must not be so rich that it creates more health care cost inflation 
by causing the coverage offered by firms currently providing benefits 
to expand. Thus, the package selected is slightly below that typically 
offered by small employers.
Two possible benefit packages can be considered: a full benefit plan 
and a plan covering only outpatient services. Either policy offered by 
the insurance pool should cover employees and dependents. The full 
health insurance policy offered by the pool would cover inpatient hospital 
room and board, surgical care, diagnostic x-ray and laboratory, and 
emergency room care. Both plans will cover outpatient diagnostic 
and preventive services, laboratory and x-ray, physician office visits, 
prescription drugs and home health care. The plans should have modest 
deductibles and copayments for most services to maintain utilization 
within the financial means of low-income employees.
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NOTES
1. Under the Robert Wood Johnson-financed Health Care Access project (HCAP) demonstration 
in the Michigan counties of Genesee and Marquette, there is no incentive for an employer to drop 
current coverage in order to qualify for participation in the program because of the limited time 
frame of the demonstration and the uncertainties about the future. With a permanent program, 
an employer could more reasonably choose to drop health insurance in the short run to receive 
the long-term subsidies offered by the program
2. Employee premium contributions are not an effective cost-containment measure when there 
is only one plan to choose and should be used sparingly with poverty groups. Copayments and 
deductibles are more effective in limiting excessive health care utilization, but again the low- 
income levels of many of the uninsured make reliance on these cost-containment mechanisms 
onerous
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Appendix to Chapter 5.2
Small Employer Pool Percent of Payroll Subsidy
Figure A. 1 illustrates how the premium subsidy mechanism will work. Sup 
pose a small employer has one employee earning $1,000 per month in total 
compensation, $100 of which is used to pay for health insurance. The first 
4 percent of gross payroll ($40) is paid by the workplace (employer and 
employee may share this expense). The next 4 percent of payroll (from 4 per 
cent to 8 percent) is divided evenly between the workplace and the subsidy, 
$20 each. The last 2 percent of payroll (8 percent to 10 percent) is paid 90 
percent by the subsidy ($18) and 10 percent by the workplace ($2). The 
workplace expense is then $40+$20+$2=$62. The subsidy expense is 
$0+$20+$18=$38. If the worker were to earn only $500, the subsidy would 
grow to $0+$10+$54=$64. If the worker earns $2,000/month, the subsidy 
would fall to $0+$10+$0=$10.
Small Employer Pool Family Income Subsidy
All employees of small employers participating in the pool can apply for 
premium subsidies. For employees with incomes less than 200 percent of pover 
ty, subsidies will be provided, as is illustrated in Figure A.2.
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Figure A2
Premium Shares: Small Employer Pool 
by Income Category
100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 
INCOME AS % OF POVERTY INCOME
subsidy workplace
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5.3
Medicaid Buy-In Programs 
for Uninsured Children 
and Nonworking Adults
Andrew J. Hogan 
Stephen A. Woodbury
Michigan State University
Program for Uninsured Children
Characteristics of Uninsured Children
Children under age 19 without health insurance coverage comprise 
roughly 30 percent of the uninsured population (Short, Monheit, and 
Beauregard 1988). At least two-thirds of these children in Michigan 
live in families at less than 200 percent of poverty income and about 
half of these children live in households where no one has insurance 
coverage. Another quarter live in families where only the head has 
coverage. While noninfant children are fairly inexpensive to insure, their 
low family income levels make it unlikely that universal coverage can 
be achieved without substantial subsidies. Unfortunately, the existence 
of a Children's Medicaid Buy-In is likely to induce many small businesses 
now offering coverage for dependent children to drop that coverage. 
A few children have nongroup coverage, which their parents would 
almost certainly drop for the cheaper Buy-In-coverage. Even when a 
childrens' program is restricted to families where the parents are unem 
ployed or employed in firms eligible for the small business insurance 
pool, the number of potentially eligible children could expand beyond 
those currently uninsured.
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Rationale for Medicaid Buy-In
Many small businesses that offer health benefits provide at least the 
option for dependent coverage (SBA 1987; Hogan 1989). As noted 
above, however, a large percentage of Michigan children are uninsured. 
Given the likely low participation rate in any small business health in 
surance pool (Perry 1989), it may be desirable to promote insurance 
coverage for all children by offering a special Medicaid Buy-In pro 
gram, if their parents are unemployed, employed in a small business 
(<25 FTE), or not in the labor force.
Benefit Options
A modest benefit package with some copays and deductibles should 
cost about $50 per month (1988 dollars). l If infants (< 1 year) are ex 
cluded from the program, the monthly premium could be cut in half 
(Blue Cross-Blue Shield Association 1989a, 1989b).
Premium cost-sharing could be based on the family's ability to pay: 2
Premium share = Adjusted family income2 _ L 
Poverty rate income
Families above 200 percent of poverty would pay the full premium, 
while those below 100 percent of poverty would pay no premium (see 
Figure 1). Substantial subsidies may be necessary to finance the pro 
gram, since two-thirds of these children are from families with incomes 
below 200 percent of poverty.
The Unemployed Uninsured Adults 
Medicaid Buy-In Program
Characteristics of Uninsured Unemployed Adults
This group comprises about 10 percent of the uninsured. Fifty-three 
percent of this population live in families with less than 200 percent 
of poverty income. In households with at least on unemployed adult 
worker, approximately 70 percent of the adults and 95 percent of the 
children are uninsured.
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Figure 1
Premium Shares: Medicaid Buy-In Program 
(Nonworking Adults and Children's Pool)
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Rationale
It seems unlikely that subsidizing employees to purchase COBRA con 
tinuation coverage can be less expensive than the Medicaid Buy-In, since 
Medicaid payments are so modest. Further, this would be of assistance 
only to those persons who actually had coverage in their previous 
employment.
For the unemployed uninsured to buy into the Medicaid program, 
two options are examined: a subsidized and an unsubsidized program. 
Eligibility would be determined by the state unemployment insurance 
agency. Individuals applying for health insurance coverage would need 
to be actively looking for work, but they need not be receiving unemploy 
ment insurance benefits. The health benefit would act as an incentive to 
continue the job search. However, if large numbers of employers fail to 
offer health benefits, the unemployed job searcher is likely to remain 
unemployed for a longer period, and this may increase the cost of 
unemployment insurance. This will also act as an incentive for employers 
to offer insurance, at least during times of relative labor shortage.
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Benefit Options
The costs of this program vary according to the type of coverage of 
fered. If coverage is provided only to the job searcher, then costs would 
range from $60 to $100 per individual per month. A more difficult issue 
is the coverage of spouses and children of the unemployed uninsured. 
If health insurance coverage is not widely adopted by small businesses, 
uninsured employed spouses and uninsured children may try to receive 
coverage via their unemployed spouse/parent. This would create an even 
greater barrier to accepting a position without health benefits, prolonging 
unemployment and raising unemployment insurance costs.
Since not all unemployed persons are poor (about 47 percent live in 
families with incomes above 200 percent of poverty), we suggest for 
the subsidized option a cost-sharing arrangement in which the uninsured 
unemployed beneficiary pays a share of the total premium as specified 
in equation (1). Persons from families at or above 200 percent of poverty 
would pay the entire premium and persons from families at or below 
100 percent of poverty would pay no premium. The majority of 
unemployed persons will need to have their premiums subsidized, unless 
the nonpoor unemployed uninsured are charged an actuarially unfair 
premium sufficient to subsidize the poor (as was attempted with the 
ill-fated Medicare catastrophic coverage).
Uninsured Not-In-the-Labor-Force (NILF) Adults
Characteristics of Nonworking Adults
Roughly 20 percent of uninsured persons are neither employed nor 
looking for work. This is, in general, a poor population, with more 
than 70 percent of the uninsured living in families below 200 percent 
of poverty.
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Rationale for Medicaid Buy-In
A Medicaid Buy-In could be made available for persons not in the 
labor force. The lack of affordable child care causes many employable 
women with young children to withdraw from the labor force. If 
employment-based health insurance or insurance for the unemployed 
uninsured were not to cover adult dependents, then a significant popula 
tion group could be left without the opportunity for coverage (as much 
as 10 percent of the uninsured population). Other unemployed individuals 
with specific medical problems that make it difficult for them to obtain 
health insurance elsewhere also may represent a sizable uninsured 
population. Miscellaneous other individuals, such as the disabled who 
are not covered by Medicaid or Medicare, may also need health in 
surance coverage. We suggest a special program for a Medicaid Buy- 
In for individuals who cannot reasonably be expected to obtain 
employment-based coverage.
Benefit Options
Again, for the subsidized program, the premium share for individuals 
is determined by the family income level (see equation 1). The Medicaid 
Buy-In for normal health risk would cost between $60 and $100 per 
month. Since 73 percent of this population lives in families with in 
comes below 200 percent of poverty, substantial subsidies will be 
necessary to achieve reasonable participation rates. Again, high rates 
of premium subsidization in combination with low participation rates 
of emplooyers in a small employer health insurance pool may act as 
a significant employment disincentive. Selection of a benefit package 
under the voluntary approach is, by necessity, market driven. The 
package must be acceptable to those who buy it, but it must not be so 
rich that it creates more health care cost inflation by causing the coverage 
offered by firms currently providing benefits to expand, nor should the 
package be so rich that the unemployed have a disincentive to seek 
employment. Thus, the package selected should be slightly below that 
typically offered by small employers.
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Administrative Issues
A major difficulty with the voluntary Medicaid Buy-In options 
presented here is that the beneficiary premium share may need to be 
paid in after-tax dollars. For an employed population, firms could be 
asked to create flexible spending accounts into which employees can 
deposit pre-tax dollars, which then might be used to purchase coverage 
from the Medicaid Buy-In program. A similar arrangement might be 
possible for persons receiving unemployment insurance. However, 
unemployed uninsured who have exhausted their unemployment benefits 
and those not in the labor force may have to make their premium con 
tributions in after-tax dollars. Deductibility of health care expenses for 
federal income tax has been limited by recent tax law changes and is 
available only to itemizers. Other things being equal, to achieve some 
level of coverage in the currently uninsured population, more state sub 
sidies will be required to compensate for the after-tax cost of the coverage 
to the nonpoor.
NOTES
1. This premium estimate assumes that catastrophically ill infants would continue to "spend down"
to Medicaid eligibility
2 Adjusted for the value of the premium contribution and the expected deductlbles and copayments.
p h = (Family income - premium - expected copays and deductlbles)
Poverty income + premium
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5.4 
High-Risk Pools
Dianne Miller Wolman
Wayne State University
High-risk pools are created by states to expand the availability of 
private health insurance for individuals who have serious medical con 
ditions and have difficulty purchasing insurance. Such pools are relatively 
attractive politically as a mechanism for reducing the size of the unin 
sured population in a state and do, in fact, permit some medically (not 
economically) needy individuals to purchase health insurance.
There is a sizable and growing population of individuals with medical 
conditions or past medical experiences that indicate the potential for 
high medical bills in the future. Private insurance companies consider 
these people "bad risks" and may substantially increase their premium, 
exclude treatment for the pre-existing condition, or refuse to sell them 
insurance (Griss 1988, p. 43). Such actions make it impractical or im 
possible for some people to buy coverage, particularly if they are not 
part of a group plan. Estimates of the size of this population vary, but 
they are often in the vicinity of 1 percent of the total population or 1 
percent of the under 65 population (Bovbjerg and Koller 1986, p. Ill; 
Intergovernmental Health Policy Project 1988, p. 13). The Health In 
surance Survey of Michigan found that 1.5 percent of the state's total 
population had no insurance, ranked their health status as fair or poor, 
and/or felt they had a disabling condition (Bashshur, Webb, and Homan 
1989). There is agreement that, regardless of the precise size of this 
population today, it is growing and will continue to for the foreseeable 
future.
The numbers of the difficult-to-insure are growing for several reasons. 
First, early detection and medical treatments are increasing the survival 
rates for many diseases. Second, screening programs are detecting
This work was performed under the sponsorship of the Board of Governors of Wayne State Univer 
sity and the College of Urban, Labor and Metropolitan Affairs.
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diseases at earlier stages, before symptoms become evident (U.S. Con 
gress 1988a,b). Third, competitive pressures on insurers to hold down 
premiums lead them to reduce risks by taking action when possible 
against those with specific, known medical conditions. And, fourth, 
employers are under pressure to minimize their costs and are tempted 
to take corresponding actions against the same individuals. Future trends 
in medical technology and health care cost inflation point toward an 
expanding population of the medically uninsurable. High-risk pools ap 
pear to be an obvious answer to this problem.
What Is a High-Risk Pool and How Does It Work?
Organization
The general structure of high-risk pools is similar from state to state, 
although there is some variation in the details. The pool is created by 
state legislation, which forms an association of all health insurance com 
panies doing business in the state and establishes an independent govern 
ing board. Some states also require health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs) to participate. Self-insured plans are not included because of 
their exemption from state regulation under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The pool is governed by a board 
including representatives of the insurance industry, state government 
officials, and consumers. It is responsible for setting the package of 
benefits, recommending premium rates, and contracting with a private 
insurance company to administer the program on a daily basis as the 
lead carrier. Insurance agents receive a fee fixed by the pool for enrolling 
new members. It is less than a commission would be and provides some 
savings on administrative costs. The state insurance department pro 
vides oversight for the program.
Benefit Package
The enabling legislation generally requires the pool to offer insurance 
coverage of a full and traditional range of major medical services similar 
to that offered in large group plans. The benefits are not designed
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specifically to include all the providers and treatments often needed by 
individuals with chronic and/or handicapping conditions, just those stan 
dard for acute medical care. Where there are service limits, they tend 
to be relatively high and provider reimbursement is reasonable. There 
is a maximum limit on total dollar lifetime benefits and also annual limits 
on out-of-pocket spending (stop/loss). Copayments are usually at 20 
percent, and there are deductibles with amounts that vary from state 
to state. Some pools offer different deductible levels, depending on which 
option/premium level the enrollee chooses (see Table 1). Some states 
include in their benefit package some cost-containment mechanisms, 
such as utilization controls.
Premium
The state enabling legislation imposes a limit on the premiums that 
can be charged. The maximum is a percentage (generally 150 percent) 
of the average premium rates for standard health risks with comparable 
coverage (see Table 2). The premiums are rated for age and sex. While 
the pools start with premiums below the maximum, they rapidly in 
crease to the limit as the costs become evident.
Financing
Most pools operate at a loss because the utilization and health care 
costs of high-risk individuals are significantly greater than 150 percent 
of the average, but their premiums are capped. The losses most often 
are paid by the member insurance companies, based on their market 
share in the state. In a few states, the companies must treat this assess 
ment as part of the costs of doing business in the state. Elsewhere, the 
companies are permitted a credit against their state tax bills for the full 
assessment (see Table 2).
Eligibility
The pools are designed primarily for the medically "uninsurable" 
and require evidence from the applicant of that status. They reject the 
insurance concept of spreading the risk broadly across a heterogeneous 
population and anticipate the inevitable adverse selection. Even states
Table 1 
State High-Risk Pools: Eligibility and Benefit Structure
Benefit package for individual
State
Connecticut 
Florida
Eligibility
All residents ineligible for Medicare 
Resident ineligible for Medicaid, plus
Deductibles
($)
400-1,500 
1,000-2,000
Out-of-pocket 
annual limit
($)
2,000 
2,500-3,500
Lifetime 
maximum
($)
1,000,000 
500,000
Rejected by 2 insurers,
Received notice of benefit reduction, or
Premium increase exceeded pool rate 
Illinois Residents ineligible for Medicaid, plus 250-1,500
Rejected by 1 insurer,
Premium increase exceeded pool rate, or
Certain medical conditions covered automatically
Also, groups of 10 or less if 1 or more meets
above criteria 
Indiana Residents ineligible for Medicare, plus 200-1,000
Rejected by 2 insurers,
Received notice of benefit reduction,
Premium increase exceeded pool rate, or
Certain medical conditions covered automatically
Iowa Residents ineligible for Medicaid, plus 500-1,000
Rejected by 1 insurer,
Premium exceeded pool rate, or
Certain medical conditions covered automatically
Maine Residents ineligible for Medicare or Medicaid, 500-1,000 
plus
Premium exceeded pool rate
1,500
1,000-2,000
1,500-2,000
5,000
500,000
none 
50,000 limit on
mental and 
nervous disorders
250,000
250,000
Minnesota
Montana
Nebraska
New Mexico
N. Dakota
Tennessee
Washington
Wisconsin
Rejected by 1 insurer, 
Restrictive rider limits coverage, 
Premium exceeded pool rate, or 
Certain medical conditions covered automatically
Rejected by 2 insurers, or 
Restrictive rider limits coverage
Residents ineligible for Medicare or Medicaid, 
plus 
Rejected by 1 insurer, 
Restrictive rider limits coverage, or 
Premium exceeded pool rate
Residents ineligible for Medicare or Medicaid, 
plus 
Rejected by 1 insurer, 
Restrictive rider limits coverage, or 
Premium exceeded pool rate
Rejected by 1 insurer, or 
Restrictive rider limits coverage
Residents ineligible for Medicaid, plus 
Rejected by 1 insurer
Residents ineligible for Medicaid, plus 
Rejected by 1 insurer, or 
Restrictive rider limits coverage
Residents ineligible for Medicaid, plus 
Rejected by 1 insurer, or 
Received notice of benefit reduction, or
Premium exceeded pool rate
500-1,000 3,000
500-1,000 5,000
250-1,000 5,000 
(10% co-insurance)
500-1,000 1,500-2,000
150-1,000 3,000
500-2,000 1,500-2,500
500-1,000 1,500-2,500
1,000 500-2,000 
(deductible 
subsidized for
low-income 
individuals)
500,000
250,000
500,000
none
250,000
500,000
500,000
500,000
SOURCES: Communicating for Agriculture, Inc 1988; Intergovernmental Health Policy Project 1988, p. 5; and U S General Accounting Office 1988, 
pp. 11-14.
Table 2 
State High-Risk Pools: Financial Features, 1989
State, 
date 
operational
Connecticut
1976
Florida
1983
Illinois
1989
Indiana
1982
Iowa
1987
Maine
1988
Minnesota
1976
Enrollment
2,127
4,849
2,560
2,610
1,495
109
(300 enrollees
maximum set by
legislature)
14,386
Premium 
cap 
(percent)*
125-150
150-200
135
150
150
125
125
Premiums 
collected
($)
3,460,000
4,618,650
NA
5,607,908
1,197,800
15,178
14,197,219
Claims 
paid
($)
6,565,000
8,582,000
NA
9,640,519
1,250,000
0
27,098,596
Pool funding mechanism
-insurers assessed; tax credit
-insurers assessed; tax credit removed
1989
-limit on assessments: < 1 % of health
insurance premiums written in state
-legislative appropriation of general
revenues
-insurers assessed; tax credit
-insurers assessed; tax credit
-new tax of up to .0015% on hospital
gross patient services revenue
-insurers and HMOs assessed; no tax
credit since 1987
S
sr
25'
9? 
I
en
Montana
1987
Nebraska
1986
New Mexico
1988
N. Dakota
1982
Tennessee
1987
Washington
1988
Wisconsin
1981
109 150^00
1,750 135-165
698 150
1,551 135
3,933 135-150
1,153 150
4,497 150
(premium subsidy
for low-income
individuals)
97,026
6,005
233,053
1,197,903
2,794,650
385,100
4,056,671
65,374
185,000
127,399
3,340,441
2,807,000
18,680
5,518,189
-insurers assessed; tax credit
-insurers assessed; tax credit
-insurers assessed; no tax credit until
member's assessment > $75 ,000,
then 30% credit allowed for excess
amount over $75,000
-insurers assessed; tax credit
-insurers assessed; tax credit
-state cap of $3 million/yr. on state
funds to pay pool costs
-insurers assessed; tax credit
-insurers assessed; no tax credit
-$200,000 tax relief from general
revenues as of 1/1/88 Iera"
N4P*
SOURCES: Burda 1989, p. 54, Communicating for Agriculture, Inc. 1988, Intergovernmental Health Policy Project 1988; Marvin 1990; and Tnppler 1990. 
These percentages represent the limit on pool premiums relative to the average premium charged in the state for comparable policies for standard health nsks.
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that permit normal-risk applicants to enroll expect primarily high-risk 
individuals. Adverse selection tends to have a snowball effect and even 
tually drives out normal-risk individuals who can find lower premiums 
elsewhere.
What Has Been the Impact of High-Risk Pools?
Historical Growth
The first high-risk pools were created in Connecticut and Minnesota 
in 1976, and since then 17 more states have passed enabling legisla 
tion. Of those 19, 5 are not yet operational California, Georgia, 
Oregon, South Carolina and Texas. Many states are currently considering 
such legislation (Marvin 1990). The concept is popular politically because 
the high-risk pool appears to serve a needy and deserving population, 
is operated through the private sector, and provides an indirect and seem 
ingly limited role for the state government. However, while there may 
be no public discussion of a sizable appropriation to fund the pool's 
deficit, legislators are becoming more aware of the financing limita 
tions of the traditional pool concept and the implications of the tax credit.
Costs and Losses
As pool enrollments grow, so do their losses. This may not be a serious 
problem during the first years of a program, in part because of pre 
existing conditions clauses and the normal time lag of medical bills. 
Also, the total deficit starts out relatively small because there are few 
enrollees. However, the average enrollee generates greater costs than 
the premium he or she pays even in Connecticut, where more normal 
risks are included in the pool. The 14 pools operating in 1988 showed 
a total of more than $65 million in claims paid compared to $39 million 
in premiums collected (Burda 1989, p. 54). (See Table 2.) Administrative 
costs of 12 to 15 percent of total pool spending increase the deficits 
even more (Bovbjerg and Roller 1986, p. 118).
The claims costs per enrollee vary widely, depending in part upon 
the maturity of the program and the medical cost index in each geographic
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area. Minnesota found that 1 percent of its enrollment generated 30 per 
cent of its claims costs. Such data are unavailable for other states. Since 
Minnesota has less adverse selection than some states because of its 
relatively low premiums, it may have a relatively large group that 
generates few claims. Nonetheless, it is likely in all pools that a small 
portion of enrollees generate a disproportionately large share of the costs 
(Trippler 1990).
Cost Burden
It is not entirely obvious who bears the costs of the high-risk pools. 
The premium, which is itself only part of total costs, is normally paid 
by the enrollee (except in Wisconsin and Maine, where the state pro 
vides a direct subsidy of premiums for low-income enrollees). However, 
some enrollees have their premium paid by their employers. In some 
states, there are indications that 15 to 20 percent of the pool's enrollees 
may have such an arrangement. This means that employers and perhaps 
their group insurers are taking advantage of the existence of a high- 
risk pool to off-load their high-risk employees and to keep their group 
plan costs at a more reasonable level. The employer and other employees 
benefit because the premiums will be lower without high-cost employee 
members. Also, high-risk workers seeking employment do not have 
to fear discrimination in hiring based on employers' fears about high 
group medical costs.
On the other hand, the state is usually picking up the deficits from 
those high-risk employees who previously had been covered privately. 
Certainly, many pool boards are very concerned about this phenomenon 
(Marvin 1990).
Since the premium covers substantially less than the full program costs, 
who pays the deficit? In the states that permit the insurance companies 
to offset their assessment as a tax credit, the result is a dollar-for-dollar 
reduction of general revenues. It represents a tax expenditure and its 
effect is the same as a direct appropriation. Hence, the taxpayers in 
the state bear that burden. Tennessee's recently passed legislation places 
a limit of $3 million on annual pool costs to the state. In states such
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as Minnesota, which eliminated the tax credit for pool deficits, the in 
surers bear the deficits as a cost of doing business. Thus, the insurance 
companies' owners and/or customers (employers, employees and private, 
nongroup enrollees) pay the extra costs. Members of self-insured plans 
are unaffected. Those plans are growing in popularity, to some extent 
because of their competitive advantage. Illinois and Wisconsin recent 
ly passed legislation to fund all or part of the deficit through an ap 
propriation of general revenues, and thus the burden is spread broadly 
across all taxpayers. Maine funds its deficit by a new tax on hospital 
gross patient services revenue, so the cost is shifted to hospital users 
who pay their own bills and to third parties and their enrollees.
Enrollment Growth
Although there have been fluctuations in enrollment within pools, in 
total, there has been steady, moderate growth over the years. The latest 
enrollment figures show almost 42,000 individuals covered nationally 
(Burda 1989, p. 54). (See Table 2.) That is a small fraction of the medi 
cally uninsurable population, an estimated two to three million in the 
U.S. It is also much less than those who could afford to join (Fraser 1988, 
p. 202). Clearly, annual premiums of several thousand dollars are a 
barrier to all but those with middle- to upper-level incomes. And only 
30 to 40 percent of the uninsured have incomes above $20,000. Never 
theless, the participation of those with sufficient income is also low, 
perhaps because the marketing of the pools has not been very effective.
While the total enrollment of 42,000 seems low, it underestimates 
the total number of individuals served, since it is reflective of only one 
point in time. More individuals are served during the year as many move 
in and out of the program. For example, a high-risk individual would 
drop out if he or she became eligible for group coverage from a new 
job. The exact turnover rate in various pools is unknown, since most 
pools collect very little administrative data.
Cost-Containment
By definition, the high-risk pools suffer from adverse selection and 
have a relatively large share of heavy users of health services. Given
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their high volume and cost of services, cost-containment mechanisms 
are crucial to high-risk pools. Unfortunately, only half the pools have 
used cost controls as a standard part of their administrative practices 
(U.S. General Accounting Office 1988). They have adopted a few 
selected cost-containment measures, such as preadmission certification 
for hospital care and second surgical opinion programs. However, much 
remains to be done in all the pools to initiate efforts to ensure effec 
tively and efficiently run programs.
What Are Policy Issues to Consider 
Before Initiating a Pool?
Is There an Insurer of Last Resort in the State?
Eleven states and the District of Columbia require Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield plans to offer open enrollment for individual (nongroup) coverage. 
The plans are not permitted to discriminate according to health status. If 
the premiums charged for this coverage are state-regulated as closely as 
would be a pool's premiums, there would be little need for a separate 
high-risk pool. If the state does not have an open enrollment regula 
tion, it might be worth examining the operation of this regulation in 
other states to determine whether it might be feasible and preferable 
to a high-risk pool. It is important to consider how and by whom the 
excessive costs of high-risk members would be covered in such an ar 
rangement. Note that the existence of an open enrollment requirement 
does not provide a total solution to the medically uninsurable problem. 
It has the same limitation as does the pool expensive premiums.
How Does the State Regulate 
Insurance Underwriting Currently?
The medically uninsurable population is defined, to some extent, by 
the insurance industry, which is regulated by the state. The existence 
and nature of restrictions placed on underwriting practices, methods 
for defining group plans, and so forth, can affect both the population 
left without coverage and the reaction of employers to the creation of
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a high-risk pool. For example, can employers and/or insurers define 
the members of a group plan based on the health status of individuals? 
Are insurers limited in the medical screening they can do? Can pre 
existing conditions be excluded from coverage when an employer 
switches plans?
Who Would Pay the Pool Losses 
and How Visible Should the Mechanism Be?
Ultimately this will be a political issue, but it is also useful to analyze 
it explicitly during the development of the proposal. It must be recognized 
from the start that losses are inevitable and will grow as the pool more 
successfully serves its target population.
How Can the State Promote Equitable Treatment 
of Both Private Insurance Plans and Self-Insured Groups?
The choice of financing mechanisms will affect the balance. Until 
federal legislation is passed to change the ERISA exemption, indirect 
methods and taxes may be necessary if the state wants to tap a broader 
funding source than just the private insurance plans.
What Should Be the State's Position Concerning 
the Shift of High-Risk Individuals from 
Employer Plans to the High-Risk Pool?
If the state is aware of the advantages and disadvantages of such shift 
ing from the private sector to the public, it could design pool details, 
such as regulatory controls, monitoring mechanisms, or employer taxes 
to create an equitable impact. Basically, is it preferable for the costs 
of employed high-risk individuals to be covered privately through 
employer groups or publicly through the pool's premium and deficit? 
What are the state's broader goals concerning private employer coverage?
What Cost-Containment Mechanisms 
Could Help Limit the Pool's Losses?
The state could look to efficiently run private and Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield insurance plans in its area, as well as to the current evaluation
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literature to see what mechanisms work and might be suitable to its 
population, medical providers, and so forth. Some administrative pro 
cedures and controls might be built into the benefit package and ad 
ministrative program during development, while others require a critical 
mass of enrollees in order to be practical.
Are the Pool Costs (Losses) Worth the Benefits 
in Terms of State Health Priorities and Population Needs?
Is a high-risk pool just a politically attractive, "doable" program com 
pared to other proposals for the uninsured, or is it really serving high- 
priority needs? Are the higher-priority programs not feasible at the mo 
ment and does the pool appear worthwhile even if of limited impact 
on the numbers of uninsured? Could the pool's deficit dollars be better 
spent on Medicaid expansion or a public health service program for 
poor children? Would those dollars be available for these possibly higher- 
priority populations?
Could the High-Risk Pool Be Adapted 
to Serve Other Priority Needs?
What kind of premium subsidies would be necessary to serve the 
medically uninsurable of low-to-moderate income who are not covered 
by Medicaid? Where would the money come from? Could the premiums 
be reduced by opening the pool to the uninsured of normal risk, and 
what changes would be necessary to attract them?
Conclusions
High-risk pools have been in operation since the late 1970s. None 
have failed. All have grown and are successfully making private health 
insurance available to those who can pay the premium. However, their 
costs to the public are not insignificant, though they are frequently not 
obvious. Also, while the program serves a politically attractive popula 
tion, it may not be meeting a high-priority policy need. The political 
and administrative costs as well as financial costs and time necessary
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to create and operate a high-risk pool should be weighed against the 
expected benefits from such a program. If it is a useful program for 
the state, care should be taken in the policy development process to 
incorporate effective cost controls, premium subsidies if necessary to 
serve priority populations, and an equitable financing mechanism.
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5.5 
Uncompensated Care
What States Are Doing
John M. Herrick 
Joseph Papsidero
Michigan State University
Since the early 1980s, the problem of providing access to health care 
for those who cannot afford it has received considerable attention. 
Nonuniform Medicaid eligibility policies across states have resulted in 
less than 40 percent of those below the federal poverty line being eligi 
ble for Medicaid (Bautista 1986; Burwell and Rymer 1987; Jones 1989). 
A population estimated to number as many as 37 million is without health 
insurance (Bashshur and Webb, chapter 2 in this volume). The absence 
of inclusive federal policies and programs to provide health care ac 
cess for at-risk populations has left the states with the responsibility 
of addressing the problems of access to care for those who cannot pay.
Hospitals have traditionally provided uncompensated care, defined 
as charity care and bad debt losses, and shifted the costs of such care 
to patients who had private insurance or Medicare (Say well et al. 1989; 
Hadley and Feder 1985). It has been estimated that because of cost- 
shifting, private payers paid an average of 10.6 percent more for hospital- 
based care in 1982 (Hadley and Feder 1985; King 1989). Today, cost- 
shifting has become more difficult since payers have instituted various 
cost-containment procedures. But uncompensated care has continued 
to be provided by many hospitals, and its costs have escalated.
Measuring the volume of uncompensated care is problematic because 
of ambiguities in defining what is uncompensated and difficulties in deter 
mining the actual costs of care. Estimates of dollar amounts of uncompen 
sated care have often not distinguished between provider charges for 
care and the actual costs of that care, resulting in nonuniform estimates. 
Nonetheless, one estimate of the cost of care for which hospitals were
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not compensated directly and which was not covered by government 
appropriations indicates that it climbed from $2.8 billion to $7.2 billion 
between 1980 and 1987 (King 1989). In 1988, the American Hospital 
Association (1990) estimated that 6,438 nonprofit and state and local 
government hospitals provided a total of $14.6 billion of uncompen 
sated care.
Hospitals, in a competitive environment, adopt cost-containment 
strategies which may include limiting or eliminating uncompensated care 
to those without financial access. The American Hospital Association 
found in 1981 and 1982 that nearly 15 percent of hospitals surveyed 
limited the amount of charity care they provided. That included 26 per 
cent of public hospitals that were members of the Council of Teaching 
Hospitals (Glenn 1985; Jones 1989). Financially stressed hospitals, in 
order to control costs, may engage in "patient dumping," leaving public 
hospitals and those with historic commitments to serve the poor with 
the challenge of trying to provide quality care to those who are unable 
to fully pay for services received. The net result is increased risk for 
those who are uninsured or underinsured.
State Responses
State responses to the issue of uncompensated care vary. The following 
examples demonstrate some of the differences in state initiatives.
Florida
Florida attempted to deal with uncompensated care in its Health Care 
Access Act of 1984 (HCAA). The Act established a medically indigent 
pool funded by an assessment on hospital net operating revenue and 
a state contribution. This pool would provide the nonfederal match for 
expanding Medicaid. Hospitals were not targeted directly for uncompen 
sated care reimbursement, since it was felt that in reporting amounts 
of uncompensated care they could include bad debt, charity care, con 
tractual allowances, professional "courtesy" care and third-party dis 
counts, making estimates of revenues lost because of care for the un-
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insured or underinsured unreliable. The unreliability of such data con 
tributed to the political decision to focus on consumers by expanding 
Medicaid and medically needy programs, and by committing funds to 
primary health care programs (Jones 1989; Lewin 1985). Hospitals that 
chose to serve patients covered under these expanded programs could 
attempt to recoup revenues lost through the assessment. Evaluations 
of the Health Care Access Act reveal it did not solve the problem of 
provision of uncompensated care. Certain hospitals admitted more 
Medicaid patients but continued their practices of denying access to those 
who were uninsured (Jones 1989).
In 1987, Florida passed the Indigent Care Bill to provide financial 
support to hospitals providing disproportionate amounts of care to the 
poor. It attempted to establish an equitable method for distributing the 
burden of indigent care among providers. It also provided higher rates 
of reimbursement to physicians for certain procedures, such as obstetrical 
services, in an attempt to improve access to care for the poor using 
some of the funds collected by the assessment on hospital net revenues. 
Florida has seen an increase in the demand for uncompensated care, 
resulting in heavier burdens for financing and delivering uncompen 
sated care for a decreasing number of providers as alternative medical 
care delivery modalities increase. Jones (1989) suggests the need for 
better long-term public and private insurance solutions to the uncompen 
sated care problem, as well as a physician "tax" raised by a surcharge 
on licensing fees as a means of providing funds to support indigent care 
programs.
Florida's efforts are attempts to equitably distribute financing of in 
digent care without the regulatory approach of an all-payer system. It 
employs hospital assessments, Medicaid expansions, use of medically 
needy and medically indigent programs, and an experimental effort to 
make health insurance accessible to small employers (Jones 1989).
In contrast to Florida's mixed-approach, other states have addressed 
uncompensated care through "all-payer" and other approaches. A brief 
overview of actions taken by these states to deal with uncompensated 
care follows. A basic assumption of all-payer systems is that the state 
assumes control of hospital costs by instituting rate-setting, and that 
all purchasers of care at a particular hospital are to pay the same rates.
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Maryland
Since the early 1970s, hospital reimbursement rates have been 
regulated in Maryland. In 1977, the state requested and was granted 
all-payer waiver status by the federal government. This was part of a 
state strategy to improve access to health care while at the same time 
attempting to control health care costs. The Maryland Health Services 
Cost Review Commission was charged with establishing prospective 
rates for specific services and procedures. Hospitals were to be reim 
bursed for provision of uncompensated care after review of their re 
quests. If the request was approved, the costs of uncompensated care 
became part of the rates that all payers were required to pay for ser 
vices at that hospital. This process assures that all payers for hospital 
services share the reasonable costs of uncompensated care (Salkever, 
Steinwachs and Rupp 1986). In effect, this approach spread the costs 
of uncompensated care among all payers, thereby increasing its political 
feasibility. Davidson (1985) admits Maryland's approach has its critics, 
but argues that it does seem to provide access to health care for 
Maryland's residents, including those whose care had previously been 
uncompensated. He found that in 1983, nearly all Maryland inner-city 
hospitals providing relatively large amounts of uncompensated care were 
profit making. Medicaid patients may also have gained access to more 
providers than previously, thereby offering greater freedom of choise. 
Thus, Maryland's all-payer system, despite problems, may have gone 
far towards finding a workable method for dealing with the problem 
of uncompensated care for the poor and uninsured.
New Jersey
New Jersey's all-payer rate-setting system began in the 1980s. In order 
to provide access to health care for those without insurance, the state 
allowed hospitals to include charity care and bad debt losses as reim 
bursable costs, thereby providing incentives for hospitals to treat the 
uninsured. Rosko (1990) found that New Jersey's all-payer system has 
increased access to inpatient and outpatient hospital care to the unin 
sured. It has also provided needed financial support to inner-city and
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teaching hospitals, which have historically provided considerable 
amounts of uncompensated care (Halpern 1985). There are many ques 
tions regarding the financial impact of all-payer systems on hospitals 
that can be addressed but that are beyond the scope of this brief 
overview. 1
New Jersey's hospitals share in the total cost of uncompensated care. 
Insurance premiums, paid by employees and private-pay patients, in 
clude payment for uncompensated care. In 1988, it was estimated that 
New Jersey's uncompensated care costs were nearly $400 million. Under 
New Jersey's all-payer system, most third-party payers cover the costs 
of uncompensated care in the rates they pay for hospital care. In effect, 
a surcharge is added to hospital bills. Excess revenue goes to the state's 
Uncompensated Care Trust Fund, administered by the New Jersey 
Department of Health, which then pays hospitals that provide above 
average amounts of uncompensated care. Medicaid also assists in fund 
ing uncompensated care, since federal law requires state Medicaid agen 
cies to provide additional amounts to hospitals with relatively large 
amounts of uncompensated care (New Jersey 1989; Rosko 1989).
New Jersey has found that total uncompensated care expenses have 
risen recently (Rosko 1990). It has been suggested that this may be 
because of hospitals opting not to aggressively collect on bad debts, 
since they can seek reimbursement from the uncompensated care fund. 
If New Jersey's approach to dealing with uncompensated care is to con 
tinue, it must maintain political viability, which could be weakened if 
uncompensated care costs became viewed as unmanageable. New 
Jersey's system has improved access to hospital care, but it does not 
guarantee that all uninsured persons will in fact receive such care. In 
dividuals may still be unable or unwilling to attempt to gain access to 
hospitals because they may seem inaccessible and forbidding. The ac 
ceptability of medical services to potential patients is another impor 
tant factor in determining access to services.
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Massachusetts
Massachusetts also developed an all-payer system which attempted 
to reimburse hospitals for uncompensated care in the early 1980s. When 
Massachusetts initiated its all-payer program, it hoped that medical costs 
could be controlled and that hospitals that were at risk financially and 
that may have been providing large amounts of uncompensated care 
would benefit by plans to reimburse a portion of the costs of that care. 
Rosenbloom (1985), in assessing the Massachusetts all-payer system, 
concluded that its main purpose was to benefit at-risk hospitals, not 
necessarily to create a program of guaranteed access to health care for 
the uninsured. Consequently, he cautioned that the system could be used 
to shield inefficient hospitals, such as those with excess bed capacities.
Many controversial issues arose in Massachusetts in the mid-1980s 
as the debate over how best to finance uncompensated care intensified. 
Hospitals providing uncompensated care for the uninsured felt they were 
competitively disadvantaged, compared to free-standing clinics or 
surgery centers. In 1985, the Massachusetts Hospital Association argued 
against continuing the federal waiver which allowed Medicare participa 
tion in the all-payer system. Hospitals feared federal limitation on 
payments, which would increase their financial problems. Eventually, 
the all-payer approach was discarded. A bad-debt free-care pool was 
established to reimburse hospitals for uncompensated care. As special 
interests clamored for or against regulation of health care, the 
Massachusetts legislature and Governor Dukakis passed the 
Massachusetts Health Care Security Act in 1988. It intended to pro 
vide access to health care for all residents through health insurance. 
A health insurance trust fund was to be established to provide coverage 
for the uninsured. The Massachusetts plan will be financed by requir 
ing most employers to pay a surcharge on employees' wages, which 
will go into a state health insurance trust fund. A new state department 
will provide health insurance for many uninsured residents. Since 1988, 
the financial problems of Massachusetts have worsened, leaving uncer 
tain its ability to finance a universal access plan (Goldberger 1990).
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New York
New York's approach to the provision of uncompensated care is com 
plex. Like Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Maryland, it utilized an all- 
payer rate-setting program aimed at controlling hospital costs, financ 
ing uncompensated care, and reducing cost-shifting. Eventually, New 
York developed an insurance-pool approach to promote health care ac 
cess. Uncompensated care pools, financed through hospital rate-setting, 
were created to provide access for the uninsured (Berman 1985). 
Hospitals seeking reimbursement for uncompensated care must 
demonstrate reasonable efforts to collect bad debts (Meyer 1986). Pro 
vider reimbursement for uncompensated care has sometimes proven to 
be a complex and cumbersome process. Thorpe (1988) analyzed New 
York's experience and found a "leaky basket effect" in which money 
earmarked for reimbursement of uncompensated care was used for other 
purposes. Nevertheless, New York's approach has provided improved 
access to health care (Rosko 1990).
Summary
Early evaluations of the Maryland and New Jersey all-payer systems 
suggest they are able to control overall provider costs at least as well 
as partial-payer systems. Funding mechanisms for uncompensated care 
reimbursement also promote access to health care for the uninsured. 
Rosko (1989) found these all-payer systems provide important finan 
cial relief to hospitals that provided disproportionate amounts of un 
compensated care. Cost-shifting was also reduced. New York's com 
plex system appears to have produced similar results (Thorpe 1987).
All-payer systems are not without potential problems. 2 Service utiliza 
tion, unless carefully scrutinized, might escalate under such plans, 
thereby driving overall health care costs upward. All-payer systems 
should not inadvertently discourage efficient financial management by 
providers (Wilensky 1986; Meyer 1986). Maryland and New Jersey 
require hospitals to vigorously attempt to collect on bad debts.
As Feingold (1988) has argued, both quality of care and cost effi 
ciency should be goals of any reimbursement system established to deal 
with uncompensated care. All-payer systems are attractive, since all 
insurers or payers would pay identical rates for services offered at
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specific hospitals. Payment rates can be determined by the state work 
ing with providers, consumers and other interested parties. Reimburse 
ment rates can foster payment for the amount of uncompensated care 
done by a specific hospital.
Among the all-payer systems implemented, there have really been 
two different stategies used to pay for uncompensated care. One ap 
proach builds the costs of such care provided by a particular hospital 
into the rates that hospital charges and requires all payers using that 
hospital to pay those rates. This strategy has the apparent disadvantage 
that hospitals providing a great deal of uncompensated care will need 
to charge high rates and may have difficulty attracting paying patients 
in a competitive environment.
The other approach includes a uniform surcharge on rates at all 
hospitals, with the revenue pooled and redistributed to hospitals pro 
viding uncompensated care. It is important to note that, while this strategy 
has been associated with all-payer systems, it does not, in principle, 
require such a system. All-payers might pay a uniform surcharge without 
necessarily paying the same rates for hospital care.
Concluding Remarks
In the absence of a federal program to guarantee access to health care 
for the uninsured, it is clear that it will be a state and local government 
responsibility to deal with the problem. Short of establishing a state 
program of universal coverage, it is also clear that the provision of reim 
bursement for uncompensated care will be a necessary component of 
those solutions.
Whereas the foregoing has addressed uncompensated care provided 
by hospitals, another important aspect is that of uncompensated care 
provided by physicians. Issues related to uncompensated care by physi 
cians have received relatively little attention in state initiatives. A review 
of available knowledge about the provision of uncompensated care by 
physicians showed that there is very little useful data. Available na 
tional estimates are limited. However, if these crude estimates are 
applied at the state level, the contribution of uncompensated care by
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physicians could be substantial. In contrast to hospitals, which have 
received some support from insurers to cover the costs of uncompen- 
sated care, it appears that such support is not explicitly reflected in 
payments to physicians.
The lack of useful information may be one of the reasons why un- 
compensated care by physicians is minimally recognized in state 
strategies, where the main attention is upon uncompensated care pro 
vided by hospitals. Information systems that collect hospital-based data 
are available, and these sources can be used to derive estimates of the 
magnitude of uncompensated care. In contrast, there appear to be no 
information systems for the collection of physician-related data on which 
to make such estimates.
Our experience in a small preliminary survey indicated that there is 
great variability in the way physicians report uncompensated care in 
terms of both "charity care" and "bad debts." Since most physician 
offices do not appear to have computerized records, the tendency to 
make rough estimates contributes to the variability and unreliability of 
such reports. Methods that provide improved information are needed 
in order to understand uncompensated care provided by physicians.
NOTES
1. See Hsiao and Dunn (1987) for discussion of the impact of New Jersey's all-payer DRG system 
on hospital costs.
2. Indeed, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York have all allowed the Medicare waivers 
for their all-payer systems to expire.
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When states consider "universal" health plans or plans serving more 
limited populations, the definition of covered benefits plays a key role 
in determining the plan's feasibility. In this chapter, considerations about 
benefit packages, limitations of coverage, cost-sharing characteristics, 
and covered services are discussed, and a method for estimating pro 
gram costs is presented.
Types of Benefit Plans
There have traditionally been three main types of health benefit plans: 
indemnity plans, service benefit plans, and prepaid or capitated plans 
(Donabedian 1976). Although all three types of plans can provide 
coverage for the same range of health care services, there have been 
significant differences among them in how they function and what they 
ultimately cover.
An indemnity plan is one in which the insured individual pays a regular 
premium to an insurance company in return for a promise of cash 
payments should certain defined, insurable events occur. For instance, 
the insurance company will agree to pay a certain amount for each day 
of hospitalization, a certain amount for a given outpatient procedure, 
or a certain amount for a routine office visit.
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The agreement is only between the insured individual and the insurance 
company. The individual is responsible for making payment to the 
hospital, physician, or other provider for services rendered, and the 
insurance company provides reimbursement to the insured individual 
according to the terms of the contract. The amounts of payment are 
part of the contract, and the individual is responsible for any bills in 
excess of the agreed upon amounts.
In a service benefit plan, the arrangement is slightly more complex. 
In return for the premium, the insured individual is entitled to a defin 
ed set of health care services (that is, days of hospitalization, outpa 
tient treatments, or prescription drugs). The range and level of services 
are spelled out in the insurance contract, but no fixed dollar amount 
is assigned to each. To meet its obligation, the insurance company must 
have another set of agreements in place with providers (hospitals, physi 
cians, and other providers) to actually perform the services that repre 
sent the policy's benefits. The insurance company reimburses the pro 
viders for services rendered. Providers may or may not bill patients 
for balances of charges over what the insurance company will pay.
In a prepaid or capitated plan, insured individuals pay a fixed premium, 
or membership fee, in return for access to virtually all necessary health 
services provided by members of an organized provider network. De 
pending on the nature of the relationship between insurer and providers, 
there may be varying degrees of financial risk on the part of providers. 
At one extreme, all the members' payments go directly to the provider 
organization, which.in turn is obliged to provide all necessary care and 
absorb any losses due to excess of expenses over revenues. At another 
extreme, providers continue to receive fee-for-service or per diem 
payments for services rendered, and the insuring entity takes on the 
full risk of gain or loss. From the patient perspective, these arrangements 
are relatively transparent, since patients are not responsible for any 
payments beyond the premium or membership fee.
These three types of benefit plans have different sets of advantages 
and disadvantages in terms of administrative overhead, freedom of choice 
of providers, and sharing of risk among patients/members, insurance 
companies, and providers. Very broadly speaking, capitation plans usual 
ly provide the broadest coverage, most restrictions on choice of
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providers, least amount of administrative overhead, and least risk of 
out-of-pocket expenses for the patient. Indemnity plans typically pro 
vide much more freedom of choice among providers, but higher 
administrative costs, more restricted benefits, and higher risk of out- 
of-pocket expenses in the event of very serious, expensive illness. Ser 
vice benefit plans share some of the features of indemnity plans, but 
may have even higher administrative overhead because of the need to 
process claims information among three parties the company, the 
patient, and the provider.
A state-run health care plan could conceivably be based on either of 
the three basic benefit models, some combination of the three, or perhaps 
some new model entirely. Choice of model involves some purely 
technical decisions about how a set of benefits is to be provided most 
economically, but also involves more value-laden decisions to be made 
in the political arena. These decisions include: how much choice of pro 
viders beneficiaries will have; how much of the current claims-processing 
infrastructure of existing insurance companies is to be maintained; and 
how much financial risk is to be the responsibility of the various par 
ties involved in the benefit program.
Benefit Limitations
The design of a health care benefit package must include considera 
tion of what type of limits will or will not be imposed. Some examples 
of limits in a benefit package include total dollar amount limits, limits 
on the number of inpatient days, and limits on the number of outpatient 
visits. Limits are typically imposed to deter overuse of the system by 
both the patient and provider and to put a ceiling on the financial risk 
of the insurer. However, due to extreme cases and unique individual 
circumstances, limits do not always control use and costs.
In choosing to impose limits in a state program, policy makers must 
consider consequences not only in costs, but also in overall utilization 
patterns and health status. For example, limits on the number of covered 
outpatient visits could control costs in that area but yield sicker patients 
upon admission to a hospital. Limits on the number of inpatient days
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and/or dollar amount limits could lead to earlier discharges and an in 
creased number of outpatient visits. As Donabedian (1976, p. 379) 
pointed out, "a long list of services is not a sufficient indication of com 
prehensiveness; stringent limits on the amount of each benefit can cripple 
the effectiveness of the whole."
In addition, dollar limits on benefits will affect the willingness of pro 
viders to render services. Physicians may refuse to offer any services 
to those with severely restricted benefits without assurance that the pa 
tient will be able to pay for any needed care additional to that included 
in the plan (Donabedian 1976, p. 386). Medicaid, an example of a very 
comprehensive benefit program in most states, often imposes a strict 
dollar limit on the amount paid to physicians and hospitals. This type 
of limit has been shown to lead to patient access problems (Donabe 
dian 1976, p. 264).
Cost-Sharing: Copayments and Deductibles
Health care cost-sharing means patients pay part of the cost of covered 
services through copayments and/or deductibles. A deductible is an 
amount of money the beneficiary must spend on health care before 
eligibility for health insurance benefits begins. Deductibles reduce the 
claims costs for insurers and may induce patients to avoid seeking care 
until they have serious symptoms or unless they are confident that they 
will exceed the deductible amount during the policy period, usually a 
year. Copayment, or coinsurance, is either a dollar amount or a percent 
age of a fee that the beneficiary pays at the time of each service. It may 
create the incentive to avoid prolonged, continuous, or intense care and 
perhaps to avoid the initiation of care as well (Donabedian 1976).
Cost-sharing helps insurers compensate for "moral hazard," or the 
tendency for the presence of benefits to change beneficiary behavior 
in a way that increases use of covered services, by making consumers 
of care somewhat responsive to its cost. Cost-sharing also reduces the 
cost of the benefit package and, presumably, the premium. Copayments 
and deductibles can reduce the administrative costs of claims handling 
because of fewer claims and because the insurer does not have to pay
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for any services until the beneficiary spends the deductible amount. Cost- 
sharing may increase costs for the provider, who may have to collect 
fees from two sources the patient and a third party (Donabedian 1976).
In a prepaid group practice (PPG), cost-sharing has been shown to 
affect the use of primary care but have less effect on the types and 
amounts of other types of office visits used (Gherkin, Grothaus, and 
Wagner 1989). Copays can reduce the inappropriate use of emergency 
rooms and unnecessary doctor's office visits. Even very low copayments 
can effectively prevent unnecessary use (Donabedian 1976; Shapiro, 
Ware, and Sherbourne 1986). Of course, there is a risk of causing the 
avoidance of appropriate use among the poor, particularly if copayments 
are too high, or avoidance of services such as preventive care that are not 
the result of an acute need. In addition, any delay in seeking care may 
result in patients being more sick when they do seek care and therefore 
requiring more intense and expensive treatment (Donabedian 1976).
The effects of cost-sharing measures depend somewhat on the method 
of provider payment. Since physicians influence the demand for their 
services and for health care services in general, the incentives they face 
will also affect utilization. To the extent that physicians consider costs 
to the patient in determining the appropriate course of treatment, pa 
tient cost-sharing may affect physician decisionmaking as well (Donabe 
dian 1976). The effects of cost-sharing in a capitated payment situation 
outside a PPG are not clear, although one might predict that they would 
depend on the sum of the incentives present. When physicians have an 
interest in the financial outcome of the plan, they might behave as PPG 
physicians. Similarly, under a prospective payment system for hospital 
inpatient care, patient incentives may be immaterial once the patient 
is hospitalized.
Cost-sharing has other characteristics. A given deductible or copay- 
ment amount will have a greater impact on someone with a lower in 
come than on someone with a higher income in terms of percentage 
of income spent. Similarly, the burden of copays is obviously greater 
on the ill. These redistributive effects, to use Donabedian's term, are 
the opposite of those we might endorse, if we would endorse any. When 
deductibles and copayments are substantial and/or when coverage is
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not comprehensive, total out-of-pocket expenditures by beneficiaries 
can be limited to a maximum dollar amount or a percentage of income 
by a catastrophic coverage provision. This would prevent financial ruin 
for the families that have a single or series of major medical events, 
the copayments amounts or uncovered expenses of which they would 
otherwise be unable to pay (Donabedian 1976).
Any discussion of appropriateness of use presumes that what is ap 
propriate can be satisfactorily defined, which is not necessarily the case. 
Most studies of the effects of these incentives measure use rates relative 
to another group. When health risk or health status is the criterion in 
stead, among adults the presence of cost-sharing mechanisms has a 
negative effect only for the sick and particularly the sick poor (Brook 
et al. 1983). Children's health has not been found to be affected by 
the presence of cost-sharing when total out-of-pocket spending is limited 
to a relatively small amount (Valdez et al. 1985).
The distribution of cost-sharing across a benefit package will influence 
the mix of services used, particularly in a fee-for-service payment en 
vironment. Even very small cost-sharing connected with ambulatory 
services is associated with lower use of these services and a high rate 
of hospitalizations among the poor, so that any cost savings on the am 
bulatory side may be overcome on the inpatient side (Roemer et al. 
1975). This type of manipulation of preferences may be helpful if the 
insurer wishes to encourage certain types of services it feels are relatively 
economical and/or effective, or to avoid services that may be the op 
posite. If this were to be done effectively, it would probably require 
the constant monitoring of the cost and effectiveness of various therapies, 
settings, and types of providers to assure the most appropriate ones are 
encouraged, and periodic adjustments to the cost-sharing mechanism. 
Such a program would probably not be necessary in a PPG, where the 
most cost-effective therapies are likely to be sought and utilized anyway. 
Prepaid group practices tend to provide more preventive care and have 
lower rates of hospitalization (Manning et al. 1984).
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Determining Covered Services
The services covered by a benefit package will influence the cost, 
health benefit, and acceptability to beneficiaries and providers of the 
health care program. This section will discuss issues surrounding the 
overall design of the coverage and particular benefits.
There are three main goals in designing a state health care program: 
to provide adequate access to services for the target population and en 
courage the appropriate utilization of them; to ensure that the quality 
of the care received is adequate; and to do so in the most economical 
way possible. These goals are not independent but interrelated, and the 
first two may conflict with the last. The resolution of this conflict is 
not objective or scientific, but political. The determination of what is 
adequate access and appropriate use is made in the public policy arena, 
in a context of cost, moderated by the concern with quality.
Access is achieved by having needed services available, in an accep 
table way, at an acceptable cost, and within an acceptable distance 
and time (Penchansky and Thomas 1981). What is "needed" is a mat 
ter for debate, but what consumers demand or perceive to be needed 
must be considered. Acceptability is also a flexible concept that must 
consider costs (both to society and the consumer), quality, and equity. 
The criteria by which a particular subpopulation should accept or be 
found to require a different standard of access from others need to be 
identified and examined. The payment and participation rates of pro 
viders and their geographic distribution will affect access. What benefits 
are covered and at what cost to the consumer are issues that will affect 
the consumer's perception of access, which will in some cases affect 
care-seeking.
Appropriateness of use of health care services can be measured by 
health outcomes such as infant mortality rates, life expectancy, disability 
days, and quality-adjusted life years (QALY). Of course, these outcomes 
are affected by other factors such as the quality of the services, genetics, 
lifestyle, age, the environment, socioeconomic status, and public health 
measures, so their value in evaluating health care itself is limited. We 
know that insurance coverage increases use of health care services, 
especially among the poor and the sick poor (Davis and Rowland 1983;
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Newachek 1988; Wilensky and Berk 1983), although the determina 
tion of an appropriate use rate or set of use rates remains normative.
Restricting Use
Plan features restricting use are intended to reduce wasteful or harmful 
care and control costs. A benefit package can be designed to limit the 
use of some providers, such as chiropractors or podiatrists, or of some 
modes of care, such as home care or nursing home care. Insurers may 
use these restrictions to control their costs, which allows them to main 
tain competitive prices, market shares, and acceptable margins. This 
also has the effect of creating and/or maintaining monopoly power and 
markets for some providers and types of care at the expense of others.
The abhorrence of the idea of rationing health care by ability to pay 
is one reason for the interest in the financing of health care services 
for those now uninsured. This interest results from the evolving notion 
of health care as a right rather than a market good (Callahan 1988; 
Reinhardt 1986). Credible proposals to make rationing on the basis of 
age an explicit public policy have been made (Callahan 1987; Aaron 
and Schwartz 1984) and public debate has begun, but resolution of this 
issue does not seem near by any means.
The effect of the breadth and depth of the benefit package, or its com 
prehensiveness, on demand for and use of services is important. If the 
package is not broad enough (i.e., doesn't have a wide spectrum of 
covered benefits), it will not encourage efficiency and the types and 
amounts of use that will maximize the beneficiary's health, well-being, 
and productivity. There will be a tendency, on the part of providers and 
beneficiaries, to utilize covered services and avoid services not covered, 
even if the covered services are inefficient or less effective substitutes 
for the preferred therapies. This issue is probably more important to 
states than to private insurers because the states are traditionally respon 
sible for supporting the disabled and medically indigent. Also, if the plan 
does not protect participants and providers from financial ruin in the 
event of illness or injury, no matter how catastrophic, it will not be 
doing what health insurance in its most basic form is supposed to do.
One problem with offering a broad benefit package is that, as costs 
rise, there is financial pressure to reduce the number of people covered.
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This is because the total program costs equal the price of the services 
offered times the number of services delivered. As costs of the Medicaid 
benefit package have increased, for instance, most states have adjusted 
eligibility requirements so those benefits are provided to a population 
small enough not to exceed budget limitations.
Oregon is trying to reverse this process by limiting the benefits they 
provide to a predetermined population (Beck, Joseph, and Hager 1990). 
They have attempted to determine an appropriate and acceptable benefit 
package by prioritizing covered services according to the expressed 
preferences of state residents. Through a series of 50 meetings held 
around the state, over 1,000 residents learned about and expressed their 
preferences with regard to different therapy options for diseases and 
their outcomes (Crawshaw et al. 1985). The results of these meetings 
were tabulated by computer to generate a list of services that could be 
covered, from highest to lowest priority.
Once this list is finalized, the state legislature intends to determine 
the cost of coverage for the population they will cover and, using 
budgetary constraints, to draw a line through the list, which will then 
define the extent of the benefit package (Beck, Joseph, and Hager 1990). 
While this process has not cleared all of its administrative hurdles- 
most important, the receipt of a waiver from the Health Care Financ 
ing Administration so it can continue to receive federal contributions 
to its Medicaid program costs it represents an innovative and impor 
tant step toward the rationalization of health care benefits package and 
program design.
Specific Benefits
Vision and Dental Care
Vision and dental care benefits are often omitted from health care 
plans to cut costs, on the assumption that their absence will have little or 
no impact on the general health of the patient. The importance and value 
of these benefits may not be appreciated. "People seldom die for lack of 
dental care, but the quality of their lives can be compromised by lack 
of appropriate care" ("Dental Coverage Affects Usage, Expenditures"
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1989). Another reason these benefits are absent from most health care 
benefit packages is that vision and dental care costs are largely 
foreseeable and can be planned for (Bell 1980).
The results of partial coverage or no coverage of vision care under 
a universal health plan will not impact the entire population. However, 
in design of a universal plan, the fact that half of the population in the 
United States wears corrective prescription lenses must be taken into 
consideration ("Vision Care Plans" 1981). For those persons who are 
unable to afford corrective lenses, partial coverage or a lack of coverage 
may result in going without glasses or postponement of needed exams, 
and thus the eye condition may worsen. On the other hand, inclusion 
of vision care in a universal plan can yield important benefits. The Rand 
Health Insurance Experiment demonstrated that free vision care resulted 
in improved vision by increasing the frequency of eye examinations 
and lens purchase. It is probable that the increased visit rate on the free 
care plan resulted in increased detection of diseases (Lurie et al. 1989).
In the design of a universal health care plan, the question of cover 
ing dental care is difficult. "Dental care may be assumed to have main 
tained its traditional positive relation to income because it has been 
regarded by individuals and by society as a more discretionary item, 
more akin to a luxury than a necessity" (Donabedian 1976, p. 24-25).
Dental plans in general are purchased separately from health insurance 
plans. The need for dental care is usually predictable and ongoing, rather 
than episodic like acute health care. According to the American Dental 
Association, dental benefits differ from medical plans in that dental 
disease is preventable; early intervention is most efficient and least costly; 
and the need for care is ongoing and universal ("Coalition, ADA Set 
Standards for Dental Plans" 1989).
Both dental and vision care are benefits that can be excluded from 
a health insurance plan with little or no impact on an indicator such 
as mortality, but could have significant impact on health status/quality 
of life. However, it may be more cost-efficient to include preventive 
services in both dental and vision care, thus preventing more expen 
sive treatment in the long term. While health benefits result from in 
cluding these services in a health care benefit package, the relationship
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between the benefit and the cost to the state, or any purchaser, is not 
clear.
Mental Health and Substance Abuse
Use of mental health and substance abuse services by employees and 
dependents is soaring. According to the National Institute of Mental 
Health, one of every five Americans now needs professional mental 
health services, where only one in eight needed such professional help 
in 1960 (Montgomery 1988). The stigma that was once associated with 
seeing a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer as apparent today. 
Thus, an increase in usage of behavioral health services has caused 
employers and insurers to look more closely at the cost implications 
of enhancing coverage that presently exists or including such benefits 
in a current plan.
Along with an increase in usage, there has been a definite increase 
in health care dollars being spent on these benefits. Mental health and 
chemical dependency treatment costs are increasing by more than 15 
percent each year (George-Perry 1988). Mental health and substance 
abuse treatment coverage in health insurance plans have typically been 
for expensive inpatient care. To deter some of these increasing costs, 
plans are moving towards more and/or better coverage of outpatient 
treatment in both of these areas (Frabotta 1989). Outpatient care has 
been shown in some studies to be less expensive in the long term and 
to have results that are equal if not better than inpatient care. "Rather 
than spending $6,000 to $8,000 for an inpatient stay, employers may 
only have to spend $2,000 to $3,000 for a well-structured, medically 
supervised outpatient program, while keeping the patient on the job" 
(Frabotta 1989).
Lack of coverage or partial coverage for behavioral health services 
will not keep people from being seen in the system. Prior to introduc 
tion of specific coverage, and even now with insured groups without 
coverage, alcoholism was sometimes treated under other "surrogate" 
diagnoses covered by insurance (Morrisey and Jensen 1988). This type 
of surrogate treatment is seen with both mental health and substance 
abuse services.
164 Benefit Package Considerations
Various studies have shown that benefits such as mental health and 
substance abuse actually reduce medical care utilization. "The 
longitudinal pattern of total health care costs illustrates that a marked 
increase in such costs among individuals with mental health problems 
can be expected over the 36-month period prior to initiation of treat 
ment. A decrease in total health care can be expected following the start 
of mental health treatment even when costs of this treatment are in 
cluded" (Holder and Blose 1987). A four-year longitudinal analysis 
of federal employees showed a decline in health care costs after initia 
tion of treatment. After examining the claims of nearly 1,700 treated 
alcoholics and their families, one study found that, after an increase 
in costs associated with treatment, cost for many alcoholics eventually 
declined to a point comparable with the lowest pretreatment levels 
(Holder and Blose 1986).
The inclusion of such benefits in an insurance plan may decrease total 
health care costs and be beneficial; however, it may be necessary to 
implement limits to have some type of control on utilization of these 
services. The open-ended nature of psychiatric treatment frequency in 
vites continuation of outpatient contact with the therapist far beyond 
the point of symptom remission (Montgomery 1988).
Prescription Drugs and Contraceptives
Prescription drugs are covered under many health insurance plans 
with little or no copayment. However, prescription coverage, once view 
ed as a small investment that brought about large returns, is now being 
reconsidered, and tighter controls are being implemented. The reason 
is that the cost of coverage is rising. For many companies, the cost of 
covering prescription drugs has risen faster than any other component 
of their health benefits package except mental health and substance abuse 
treatment (Vibbert 1989). Covering prescription drugs without any type 
of utilization control mechanism can result in high costs under a universal 
plan. On the other hand, not covering prescription drugs under this plan 
may have effects on health. The lack of prescription drug coverage could 
affect some persons more than others for example, those below a certain 
income level who just cannot afford such "extras" as prescription drugs.
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In many plans, contraceptives fall under the category of prescription 
drugs; however, they may be viewed as a separate benefit in the design 
of a health insurance plan. Many insurance plans are beginning to drop 
coverage of contraceptives due to the cost that this coverage adds to 
the premium (Muller 1978). Offering coverage of contraceptives as 
prescription drugs will add to the cost of a plan in the near term, however, 
in the long term it may decrease utilization of obstetrical and pediatric 
health care services.
Experimental Procedures
Treatments and procedures considered experimental are generally ex 
empted, or not covered, by health care plans (Ham 1989). The deter 
mination of whether or not something is experimental is made in several 
ways, but it is common for insurers to follow the example of the Health 
Care Financing Administration, which makes this determination for the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs. If exempted, a procedure may be 
available to those who have the ability and willingness to pay for it out- 
of-pocket or to those who can find and are eligible for participation 
in a funded research project that will pay for it. The rationale for not 
covering these treatments is that their efficacy and safety have not been 
proven, and their use is not widely accepted. In addition, they tend to 
be expensive. Since these therapies are not widely available, states should 
have little problem exempting them from the benefit package. There 
is not an equity issue since others do not have access either, and there 
is a cost and quality interest in not covering care until it is shown to 
be safe and have a useful place in the medical armamentarium.
Transplants
The coverage of organ and tissue transplants has received considerable 
attention. Both Arizona and Oregon have restricted coverage of 
transplants for their Medicaid recipients. Considering the high costs 
and the poor cost-effectiveness of some of these life-saving or sustain 
ing procedures compared to other potential uses of funds, noncoverage 
may be a rational choice (Durbin 1988). On the other hand, since most 
private insurance plans cover at least some and usually most of the costs
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of such procedures, and some transplants may be more cost-effective 
than the alternative therapies for the afflicted individuals, noncoverage 
raises equity and discrimination issues (Durbin 1988). In the context 
of a universal plan, these issues would be less potent because the same 
coverage would apply to everyone. When participants in the plan are 
disproportionately of a particular socioeconomic status or racial or ethnic 
group, special effort may be needed to avoid the appearance or fact 
of discrimination.
New Technology
One of the effects of a "free market" medical system has been the 
development of new technologies, especially in the areas of phar- 
maceuticals, surgical procedures, biotechnology, and imaging. 
Treatments constantly emerge for conditions previously considered un- 
treatable, and new and innovative treatments replace old (McGregor 
1989). This march of technology is a source of both pride and con 
cern. While these technologies are largely responsible for our health 
care system being seen as the best in the world, they also are a central 
reason for the tremendous costs and inflation experienced in the health 
care sector. They also tend to shift resources away from prevention 
and primary care (Somers 1984). That private insurers generally pro 
vide coverage for new technologies only on the basis of efficacy and 
availability without regard to costs certainly contributes to this dilem 
ma (Ham 1989). While not all of these technologies are as expensive 
as Positron Emission Tomography or AZT, they all contribute to the 
health cost spiral (Moloney and Rogers 1979).
When sick, Americans expect access to the latest and most innovative 
technology, even when its cost outweighs any incremental benefit that 
may be achieved over the technology it replaces. An example is elec 
tronic fetal heart monitoring, which is widely if not routinely used, even 
though its benefits are unproven (Shy et al. 1990). For this reason, it 
would be difficult to exclude coverage of new technologies in a com 
prehensive state benefit package. There are several strategies for con 
trolling the use of these technologies. One approach would be to re 
quire prior approval for the use of specified procedures on a case-by- 
case basis. This could operate similarly to prehospitalization certification
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programs whereby the payor must approve any nonemergency hospital 
admission. Copayments and/or deductibles could also be attached to 
discourage overuse. Still another strategy would put the provider at finan 
cial risk for the use of the procedure or technology through a capitated 
or case-based payment system (Moloney and Rogers 1979). The use of 
cost-effectiveness analysis remains an untried and potentially potent basis 
for such allocative decisionmaking (Emery and Schneiderman 1989). 
It would be a mistake, however, to take the view that it is only new 
or high technology that is responsible for an increase in costs of 
treatments. Increases in the use of existing technology, such as X-ray 
examinations and laboratory tests, are as likely to be culprits. Strategies 
to limit the use of technology are best if they apply to any type. Ex 
amples could be capitation of case-based payment or broad-utilization 
review (Moloney and Rogers 1979).
Rehabilitation
After a disabling injury or illness, such as an auto accident or a stroke, 
patients may be discharged from the hospital without need of continu 
ing medical care but still unable to resume life as before. Although many 
of these individuals ultimately will be unable to recover fully, they may 
still be able to lead personally fulfilling and socially productive lives, 
provided they receive the rehabilitation services required. There are 
other sources of financing for rehabilitation services. In some states, 
the no-fault auto insurance program may include this coverage in the 
event of an auto accident. Workers' compensation insurance provides 
this coverage for injuries that occur in the workplace. Still, there are 
circumstances outside of these environments, such as strokes, and ac 
cidents other than motor vehicle, when the services necessary to max 
imize a patient's potential is not accessible due to lack of financing. 
This is a particularly important issue for states, which, unlike private 
insurers, are traditionally responsible for the welfare of their citizens, 
have a potential tax-generating workforce in need of services, and have 
to pay a proportion of Title XIX program costs of those who remain 
disabled. If states already have a rehabilitation program in place, the 
effect of this coverage on its costs should be considered.
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Rehabilitation services can be rationed in several ways. A common 
method is to set a time limit after which services would no longer be 
covered or a set number of services or amount of dollars allowed. This 
can be seen as discriminatory against those who, while significant 
recovery is expected, have injuries that necessitate longer or more in 
tensive rehabilitation. Another way would be to provide coverage for 
only a specific set of services based on the prognosis, or to make a deter 
mination of coverage based on the prognosis and the expected rehabilita 
tion time or expense. Someone whose rehabilitation would take a shorter 
time and who is expected to make a more complete recovery would 
have services covered, while others may not. Prognosis accuracy would 
be important in both of these situations, which may be a problem. Age 
and social role could also be considered in such decisions.
The costs associated with transplants, new technology, and rehabilita 
tion may be most appropriately managed in the context of a program 
for catastrophic health care cost protection. These rather extreme sources 
of high costs are singled out, perhaps because they affect a very small 
number of people. Chronic disease treatment and intensive care also 
involve very high expenses, but there is no suggestion that they be ex 
cised from the health care package. On the contrary, they are impor 
tant reasons for having coverage. Efforts to control costs may be more 
effective and fair through a systemwide approach to efficiency, utiliza 
tion management, and prevention than by the narrowing of the benefit 
package at its margins where those with great need are denied and emo 
tional responses and inflammatory press coverage are likely.
Home Health Care
Home health care has become an important low-cost substitute for 
hospital and nursing home care. Therapies that were once considered 
strictly inpatient, requiring high levels of nursing skill, have found their 
way into the realm of home care. Patients can be safely discharged home 
from the hospital earlier when regular skilled nursing care is available 
in the home (American Medical Association Council on Scientific Af 
fairs 1990). This can bring considerable cost savings to the pay or while 
improving outcomes (for instance, through the avoidance of nosocomial 
infections) and patient satisfaction. Additional costs can occur, however,
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when home care is sought that is not a substitute for other medical care. 
This is an example of the effect of "moral hazard," because demand 
seems to come as a result of the provision of coverage. It is not clear 
in these circumstances whether this demand represents substitution for 
family care or for impending medical care. If it is a substitute for future 
hospital care, it may represent a source of additional savings in the long 
run, rather than a liability.
The use of home health care can be restricted, for instance, by only 
covering services provided after a hospitalization, and then for a limited 
time, as Medicare does, and/or by attaching cost-sharing provisions. 
Requiring prior approval by the payer would be another strategy. Home 
health care is such a valuable and efficient model of care that its coverage 
should probably be considered essential to even a basic health plan, 
even if restrictions are attached.
Durable Medical Equipment
Like home health care, durable medical equipment (DME) is a 
valuable service for beneficiaries that can reduce the cost of care but 
has potential for overuse or abuse. By providing respiratory therapy 
equipment, wheelchairs, walkers, special beds, and appliances, the well- 
being and quality of life of patients can be enhanced. In some cases, 
these services represent less intensive treatment methods than would 
otherwise be employed, and thereby represent a cost savings. When 
improved comfort and well-being improves health and avoids the need 
for other forms of care, additional savings may accrue, although this 
has not been quantified. The downside is that these services may be 
used unnecessarily just because they are available, or as substitutes for 
goods or services that would have otherwise been paid for out-of-pocket. 
Cost-sharing may also be applied here, as well as utilization manage 
ment or risk-assumption by the provider.
Estimating Costs of a State Health Care Program
With the above considerations in mind, estimates of costs for a benefit 
package to be offered under a state-sponsored plan can be generated. 
Estimates are useful for considering the effects of variations in a benefit 
package and other elements of a program on its overall costs. As an
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example, we estimated the cost of covering Michigan residents under 
65 with a comprehensive package for implementation in 1990 or 1991.
Data Sources
One way to estimate costs would be to estimate utilization rates bas 
ed on known averages and apply a per-service cost model to calculate 
overall costs. This requires realistic estimates of costs, which are dif 
ficult to obtain, and assumes that patterns of use will not be affected 
by a new program. Another way to estimate costs would be to use known 
per-patient costs and apply them to the target population.
We found data on the latter to be readily available through a state 
health maintenance organization (HMO) regulating agency. Few non- 
HMO plans provide a comprehensive set of benefits, particularly for 
outpatient care and preventive services. HMO plans provide the best 
and most current data on the costs of this type of package.
While Medicaid also offers a comprehensive benefit package, its 
unique demographics, the large concentration of elderly and disabled, 
possible differences in utilization (for example, lower use of services 
because of access problems), lack of controls on utilization, and 
unrealistic provider payment make its experience a poor basis for cost 
projections to the whole population.
We estimate the costs of benefits with data from the 1989 rate filing 
of Blue Care Network (BCN), Michigan's second largest HMO. This 
HMO's data were used because:
1. This large HMO has subscribers throughout most of Michigan. Its 
cost experience may be more typical of what could be expected under 
a statewide plan than that of HMOs that serve a limited geographic 
area or have very small enrollments.
2. The division of the plan into geographically defined subunits allows 
a comparison of costs of care in different areas of the state.
3. Comparisons of BCN and other HMOs showed that it is typical in 
having neither the highest nor lowest per-member per-month (PMPM) 
costs.
4. These data reflect managed care delivery as proposed for the Michigan 
plan. BCN is typical of the sorts of plans offered if consumers are
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allowed to choose from among several certified health care plans. 
As a network-model HMO, Blue Care Network does not have all 
the cost-containment features of staff- or group-model HMOs, but 
has some not found in purely fee-for-service plans. Its experience, 
therefore, is a middle ground between the most and least efficient 
financing and delivery system models.
5. BCN subscribers are diverse. The plan is not restricted to white- or 
blue-collar employees, and most age and economic groups are 
represented.
The benefit package used is summarized in Table 1. Using specific 
health plan data requires caution. Some caveats and issues we considered 
are:
1. Projections were based on 1988 data. Utilization rates and costs per 
unit of service or the data itself may have been anomalous for some 
reason that year. More precise forecasts using these data would con 
sider the relationship of the 1988 data to both 1987 and 1989.
2. We did not usually have information on exactly what costs are 
reflected in the costs per unit of service that are a part of the monthly 
cost estimate. These are provider costs that may change in a number 
of unpredictable ways under a state health plan. There might be reduc 
tions in inpatient care costs due to eliminating uncompensated care, 
reduced billing costs, or lowered malpractice costs.
3. Dentaland vision care costs do not come from Blue Care Network. 
The costs of dental coverage are from 1988 information for Blue 
Cross-Blue Shield. The costs of vision coverage are from the 1988 
rate filing of Comprehensive Health Services of Detroit, a Detroit 
HMO. In both cases the costs represent an approximation of a me 
dian cost estimate neither the highest nor lowest cost for this benefit.
4. The average cost figure shown for the benefit package is an un 
weighted average of the costs of these benefits from six BCN regional 
plans. The average was not weighted for the size of the enrolled 
population because the largest plan occasionally had specific benefit 
costs that were unusually high or low when compared to either the 
other Blue Care Network plans or other HMO rate filing information.
172 Benefit Package Considerations
Table 1 
Summary of Benefit Cost Findings
1989 costs 
Benefit Copay (PMPM)*
Inpatient
Hospital charges (unlimited days, semi- 
private room, and specialized units) $23.82 
Professional services 8.30 
Outpatient 
Office visits (including preventive, urgent
and specialist care) $5.00 16.87 
Diagnostic services (X-ray and lab work) 7.52 
Outpatient surgery 4.31 
Allergy testing/serum 50% 0.15 
Other outpatient services $5.00 1.49 
Reproductive health
Adult sterilizations 50% 0.15 
Elective terminations 50% 0.07 
Mental health
Inpatient mental health 1.30 
Inpatient substance abuse 50% 0.80 
Outpatient mental health 50% 1.42 
Outpatient substance abuse 50% 0.53 
Emergency care
Emergency care $25.00 2.71 
Ambulance 0.47 
Other
Skilled nursing facility (up to 45 days) 0.08 
Home health agency $5.00 0.35 
Durable medical equipment 20% 0.27 
Pharmacy (including needles, syringes
and birth control) $3.00 9.51 
Other services 1.05 
Dental 10.51 
Vision 1.77 
Benefit total $93.48 
Reinsurance 1.15 
Administration and retention (16%) 15.14
TOTAL $109.77
*per member per month.
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An unweighted average seemed more likely to yield a conservative 
estimate of the future cost of benefits.
5. Not all benefits were offered in all plans in most cases because ser 
vices were offered under one of the other benefit categories (for ex 
ample, urgent care could have been a separate category or included 
under an office visit category). Most of these differences are resolv 
ed by combining the categories into a single benefit, others by leav 
ing zeroes out of average cost calculations. The result is an average 
that is slightly higher (or more conservative) than the average that 
would have been calculated from each of the plans' total costs.
Adjustment in Estimates to Project Costs 
for a State Program
Before data from an existing plan are used to project costs for a state 
program, it is necessary to determine if there is a selection bias present 
in the plan membership that would affect cost projections. The member 
ship of the plan used to model costs must match the population to be 
covered by a new program in factors that predict utilization and costs 
or be adjusted to compensate for differences. Table 2 summarizes 
demographic differences between the 1988 BCN enrolled population 
and the 1990 projections for the entire State of Michigan. There are 
only minor differences in the age and gender composition of the 
populations.
Based on the small differences between the BCN and Michigan popula 
tions, no adjustment appeared necessary. Variations seem to have ef 
fects on health care costs that would balance each other. BCN has more 
women of childbearing age and adults between 55 and 64 (higher costs), 
but also more children (lower costs). Therefore, based on the age and 
sex distributions of its membership, this plan seemed to be a reasonable 
basis for projecting overall costs for the state of a universal plan.
Variation in Costs by Region of the State
An important issue to be worked out during discussion of a state plan 
is the extent to which the state will wish to adjust its contribution on 
the basis of geographical variation in costs. Our estimate for all of
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Michigan would be reasonable if a single, statewide plan were im 
plemented. If, however, individuals were allowed to choose from among 
several plans that may serve limited areas, state contributions or 
allowable premiums may be adjusted for regional variation in costs. 
In a previous analysis we found rates for a large commercial insurer 
varied by area within Michigan as shown in Table 3. There was much 
less cost variation between BCN regions, and the Southeast region 
(Detroit and its suburbs) did not have the highest projected costs. Since 
costs of coverage are a function of several factors, including 
characteristics of the enrolled population, use rates, costs per unit of 
service, and costs of plan administration, it is difficult to do further 
analysis of cost variations within the state for a universal plan until more 
specific information is available. It may be that the lower costs of benefits 
in areas such as the Upper Peninsula may be balanced by higher ad 
ministrative costs there due to low population density.
Table 3 
Regional Variations in Premiums
Area Rate multiplier
Upper Peninsula, some Northern Lower 1.00
"Outstate" Lower Peninsula 1.07
Lansing, Kalamazoo, "Downriver" areas 1.14
Macomb, Oakland, Washtenaw counties (suburban Detroit) 1.25
Wayne County (includes City of Detroit) 1.38
Costs of Individual and Family Coverage
Our best current estimate is that a figure of approximately $110 per 
month per person would be a reasonable projection of the 1989 costs 
of a comprehensive health care plan for a large group with demographics 
like those of the Michigan population (including children, not including 
individuals over 65). Projected premiums for single adults and families 
are determined by applying multipliers to the average PMPM cost ac 
cording to how costs are to be distributed across these groups. An ex 
ample is shown in Table 4.
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Table 4 
Determining Premiums for Beneficiary Groups
Group
Base (Average PMPM) 
Single adult 
Couple 
Family
Multiplier
=Base x 1.25 
=Base x 2.88 
=Base x 3.26
Premium
=$109.77 
=$137.21 
=$316.14
=$357.85
Precision of Cost Estimates
The accuracy of estimates of the costs of coverage for a proposed 
program depends on several factors for which our data were incomplete:
  health status and utilization patterns of group to be covered
  delivery system(s) in which care is to be provided
  whether payment will be based on premiums charged by insurers, 
including all administrative expenses, or a reduced premium which 
does not allow recovery of all insurer costs, or a rate pegged more 
closely to the costs of providing care
  whether providers will be reimbursed on a charge basis, an ' 'allowable 
fee" basis, a capitation basis, or some sort of partial recovery basis 
less than full costs
  additional cost-containment features that may be built into the design 
of the plan.
There are some clear tradeoffs between costs of coverage, extent of 
coverage, and the administrative and delivery system structures 
associated with any plan. In our example, $110 per-person per-month 
can purchase very extensive coverage in most areas of the state under 
circumstances exemplified by Blue Care Network. It will purchase much 
less extensive coverage in a high-cost area of the state and/or under 
plans with higher administrative costs (for example, individual or small- 
group coverage).
Finally, it must be considered that implementation of a state plan may 
itself affect costs. Here are some ways that the plan can distort its own 
costs.
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1. As uninsured individuals become covered, a short increase in de 
mand for services could occur, resulting in higher-than-normal costs 
due to "pent-up" demand.
2. The burst of demand may meet some serious shortages of health care 
providers, particularly nurses in acute-care settings and physicians 
in areas that are currently underserved. Not all individuals seeking 
care and covered by the state plan will be able to get it quickly. The 
increase in use will therefore be moderated in the near term, but will 
last as long as there continues to be a demand backlog.
3. If features of a state plan create a significant restriction on physician 
incomes, an exodus of physicians may occur if it is not countered 
by fother changes making practice in the state more desirable. Any 
migration will affect access to care and in turn program costs and 
the program's ability to meet its objectives.
There are other possible effects of implementation that are impossi 
ble to predict with any certainty until the features of a plan are made 
more specific. As discussion and planning move forward, it will be possi 
ble to adjust cost estimates to reflect how plan features relate to utiliza 
tion and costs per unit of service.
It is difficult to accurately predict how changes in some of these fac 
tors will affect costs of providing care. Our estimates of the costs of 
providing services under managed care conditions in the Blue Care Net 
work environment are based on patterns of use and costs of providing 
services specific to BCN. If conditions change drastically under a state 
plan, simple linear projections of past trentis to future costs, while they 
may be the best estimates available, will be subject to more than the 
usual amount of error. The purpose of these analyses is to roughly 
estimate the effects of various benefit combinations on the overall pro 
gram costs to a state. They are not intended to be the basis for budgeting. 
As plans move closer to implementation, more precise and actuarially 
sound cost calculations must be performed.
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Conclusion
The design of a benefit package will affect every aspect of a pro 
gram: its success at meeting its health and social objectives, such as 
financial equity for providers, income redistribution, and improvement 
in the health status of target populations; its costs and their distribution 
between payors, patients, and providers; and (therefore and inevitably) 
its political viability. A well-conceived benefit package can remove am 
biguity about the goals of a program and its expected costs and 
advantages.
Accomplishing this requires that knowledge of the effects of benefit 
features be injected into a process of values clarification about program 
goals that is essentially political. Priority-setting with regard to 
beneficiaries (providers, payors, and patients), and benefits (consider 
ing implicit rationing from restricted coverage) can be assisted by the 
provision of information about the costs and effects of specific benefit 
changes.
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Public Financing Approaches 
to Improve Access to Health Care
Alternative Revenue Sources 
John £. Anderson
University of Nebraska
Improved health care access is not free. States wishing to provide 
improved access must address the question of how to pay the added 
costs involved. If the cost of improved access is to be funded through 
a general tax mechanism, the questions to be asked are: What tax sources 
may be tapped and what revenues may be reasonably expected? In ad 
dition, it is important to question both the equity and efficiency aspects 
of the proposed tax sources of funding. We need to know both who 
will pay the tax and how the tax will affect economic decisions and 
the allocation of resources. The goal of tax policy is to design tax 
mechanisms that are fair and nondistortionary.
Tax policy changes which could fund health care access are iden 
tified in this chapter for each of the typical state's major taxes sales 
and excise taxes, personal income or payroll taxes, and business taxes. 
Each tax is defined by its base (what is taxed) and its rate (how much 
is taxed). We will consider changes in the rate of taxation and in the 
definition of the tax base, which could be used to generate revenue for 
improving access to health care. As part of the base change proposals, 
we will consider elimination of some specific tax expenditures  
exemptions or deductions as potential revenue sources. 1
Sales and Excise Tax Sources
State and local governments rely on sales and excise taxes for a 
substantial portion of their own-source revenue. The general sales tax 
accounts for about 14 percent of state-local general revenue in the United
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States. The percentage ranges from a high of 29 percent in Washington 
State and 25 percent in Tennessee to a low of 7 percent in Vermont. 2 
There are also five states without a general sales tax: New Hampshire, 
Delaware, Montana, Oregon, and Alaska. In addition to the state sales 
tax, many states permit local sales taxes, making the combined state- 
local sales tax rate higher. The highest combined rate is that of New 
York City 8.25 percent.
With this reliance on the general sales tax, it is natural to ask whether 
improved access to health care could be funded through increased general 
sales taxes. There are two basic ways to increase the sales tax. One 
is to raise the tax rate, say, from a state's current 5 percent to 6 percent 
or 7 percent. The other is to broaden the tax base, taxing more goods 
or services than the tax is currently levied against. We will discuss each 
of these possibilities in turn.
Sales Tax Rate Change
A sales tax rate increase will raise revenue, the precise amount depend 
ing upon the size of the tax base. As an example, consider the Michigan 
sales tax at its current rate of 4 percent. The sales tax generates $2.6 
billion (FY89 DMB estimate) in revenue. Including the state use tax 
puts the total at $3 billion. 3 The combined tax base is therefore $75 
billion ($3 billion divided by .04). Hence, a 1 percent increase in the 
tax will generate $750 million in revenue. This estimate overstates the 
revenue that will be generated, however, since as prices rise due to the 
higher tax, fewer goods will be demanded, reducing the tax base. The 
precise reduction in the tax base will depend upon the elasticity of de 
mand for those commodities being taxed.
One potential problem in raising a state sales tax rate is the border 
effect, when neighboring states have substantially lower tax rates. Tax 
able economic activity may be shifted to the lower tax state when the 
potential tax saving is large enough to cover the added expense of moving 
the transaction site.
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Sales Tax Base Changes
A direct way to increase general sales tax revenue is to tax goods 
or services not currently taxed. Most states exempt food and prescrip 
tion drugs from the general sales tax for equity reasons to make the 
sales tax less regressive. (A tax is regressive when the portion of in 
come paid in tax falls as income rises and progressive when the op 
posite holds.) Other common exemptions designed to relieve the 
regressivity of the sales tax are those for clothing or household gas/elec 
tric. While some revenue could be gained by eliminating these exemp 
tions, they are a necessary part of the sales tax base definition intended 
to reduce the regressiveness of the tax.
Tax General Services
The major way to change the sales tax base is to extend the tax to 
services. Presently, the sales tax applies to commodities but not to ser 
vices (at least not to very many services). Economists have suggested 
that this differential treatment of commodities and services causes distor 
tions in the economy's allocation of resources between the two. There 
is a clear incentive to shift resources into services and away from com 
modities to avoid the tax. For example, the present system taxes a new 
shirt purchased at a retail store, but exempts the laundering of the shirt 
from taxation. Why should the tax system distort the decision on whether 
to purchase a new shirt or launder old shirts? On efficiency grounds, 
we would like the tax system to be neutral, not affecting such decisions. 
If we were to broaden the base of the sales tax to include services, we 
could either reduce the tax rate and collect the same revenues or make 
available additional revenues. As an example, if the State of Michigan 
were to tax all services, an additional $1 billion in revenue would be 
generated at the state's present 4 percent tax rate. 4 The largest category 
of services is health services, taxation of which would generate $479.8 
million annually in Michigan.
Such a change in the tax will, of course, generate criticism, as Florida's 
recent experience has clearly illustrated (Hellerstein 1988). Florida's 
attempt to broaden the state sales tax to include services was vigorous 
ly opposed by advertising firms whose products would have been
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subjected to the tax. Despite the potential for political opposition, the 
notion of taxing services deserves careful consideration. 5
The taxation of health care services would have the effect of increas 
ing the price of such services and reducing the equilibrium quantity of the 
services. Estimates of the elasticity of demand for hospital care services 
are in the range of 0.7 or less, which indicates that consumers are not 
very sensitive to price changes. In addition, if the supply of health care 
services is relatively elastic (responsive to price changes), the incidence 
of the tax on health care services would be borne mostly by the con 
sumers of the care, not the producers. Improved access to health care 
financed in this way would raise the price of care for all in order to 
provide access for some.
The distributional effects of broadening the sales tax base to include 
health-related services can be investigated using recent research on the 
sales tax base. Bohm and Craig (1987) have simulated service-sector 
expenditures as a percentage of income for a number of services, in 
cluding several health-related services. Their estimates of the distribu 
tion of expenditures indicate that extending the sales tax to health-related 
services will be regressive. 6 Consumption expenditures as a percent of 
income fall as income rises. Consequently, applying the sales tax to 
these services will disproportionately fall on the poor.
This problem could be partially corrected by applying a refundable 
credit on the state income tax for sales taxes paid. The income tax credit 
could be designed to phase out with income, relieving the regressivity 
of the sales tax for low income levels. Net revenue from the sales tax 
on services less the income tax credit for sales tax paid on health ser 
vices could then be used to fund improved access to health care.
Table 1 provides aggregate U.S. data on several alternative sales tax 
bases. The first alternative is to tax consumption, less expenditures on 
food and all services. This results in a narrow tax base, $998.3 billion, 
similar to the present tax base used by most states. A somewhat broader 
tax base could be constructed by taxing consumption less expenditures 
on food, housing, medical care and household gas and electric. The 
resulting tax base is $1,784.1 billion, or a tax base about 1.79 times 
larger than the present tax base. An even broader tax base to consider 
would be taxing consumption less expenditures on housing and medical
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care. In that case, the tax base is $2,467.5 billion, a tax base 2.47 times 
larger than the present tax base. These data indicate that substantially 
more revenue can be generated from the sales tax by including services. 
These figures are broadly suggestive of the potential revenues that would 
follow from sales tax base-broadening at the state level, although regional 
differences in consumption patterns would affect the revenues involved.
Table 1 
Alternate Sales Tax Bases, 1989
Personal income
Disposable personal income
Personal consumption
Consumption expenditures
Food
Clothing
Services
Housing
Medical care
Gas and electric
$ billions
4,396.2
3,744.5
3,437.9
588.6
198.5
1,851.0
527.5
442.9
94.8
Alternate tax bases
1. Consumption less expenditures on food
and all services 998.3
2. Consumption less expenditures on food, housing,
medical care, and household gas and electric 1,784.1
3. Consumption less expenditures on housing
and medical care 2,467.5
SOURCE. U.S Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, July 1989, pp. 50, 51
Tax Amusements and Recreation Services
By extending the sales tax to amusements and recreation services, 
additional revenue could be generated. This base-broadening would apply 
the state sales tax to theater and athletic tickets and other such recrea 
tion or amusement admission charges. The distributional consequences
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of such taxation are not known with precision. While theater ticket tax 
ation would probably fall on the wealthy, athletic contest ticket admis 
sion taxation would probably affect lower-income consumers. Recent 
work by Blair, Giarratani, and Spiro (1987) indicates that an amuse 
ment tax may not be shifted to ticket purchasers (through higher ticket 
prices) at all in the case of sports franchises, may only be shifted par 
tially in the case of nonprofit concert and theater series, and is only 
partially shifted in the long run for movie theaters. Overall, we do not 
know how the tax would be borne by low-income residents relative to 
high-income residents of a state, but this work indicates only partial 
shifting of the tax burden.
Tax Interstate Sales
Taxing interstate sales would generate additional revenue. Current 
ly, state sales taxes typically apply to those businesses with a tax nexus 
in the state, i.e., retail outlets in the state. As a result, national retailers 
such as L.L. Bean who do not have such nexus in the state do not col 
lect sales or use tax on purchases by customers in the state. Hence, 
present tax administration and policy favors purchase of a shirt from 
the L.L. Bean catalog over purchase of the same shirt from a local depart 
ment store. 7 Such differential tax treatment of the same commodity is 
inefficient, encouraging tax avoidance activity, and should be remedied. 
There are substantial administrative difficulties in taxing interstate sales, 
although these problems have been a topic of discussion at the state 
and national levels for several years and expedient solutions are being 
formulated. 8
The incidence of such a tax is likely to be the same as that for the 
sales tax on intrastate sales. There is no particular reason to believe 
that consumers ordering from retailers outside a given state differ 
substantially from those purchasing goods from retailers within that state. 
To the extent that some of the interstate sales are attributed to upscale 
catalog retailers, the incidence may be somewhat more progressive than 
the normal sales tax.
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Cigarette Excise Tax Rate Change9
States vary widely in their taxation of cigarettes. Table 2 illustrates 
the current rate of taxation in the states, varying from a low of $.02 
per package in North Carolina to a high of $.40 per package in Con 
necticut. The southern tobacco-producing states tend to have very low 
rates of taxation; for example, the tax is $.03 in Kentucky and $0.025 
in Virginia.
To compute the effects of an increased tax rate requires knowledge 
of the tax base. As an example, the current rate of taxation in Michigan 
is 12.5 mills per cigarette, or $0.25 per package of 20 cigarettes. At 
this rate the tax generates $268 million (FY89 DMB estimate) in revenue. 
The tax base is therefore 1.072 billion packages of cigarettes. A con 
templated tax increase of $.05 would then be expected to raise approx 
imately $53.6 million in revenue. This, of course, assumes present rates 
of consumption will hold constant, which is not a realistic assumption.
Research on smoking indicates that the price elasticity of demand is 
about -0.35, indicating that a 10 percent change in price would lead 
to a 3.5 percent reduction in the quantity of cigarettes demanded. This 
relatively weak price response reflects the addictive nature of cigarettes 
and suggests that efforts to reduce smoking by raising the price of cig 
arettes (within politically acceptable limits) through higher taxes may 
be ineffective. It also indicates that an increased tax on cigarettes would 
lead to some reduction in the quantity demanded and therefore less tax 
revenue than might first be expected. In addition, with smoking habits 
on the decline, the tax base may be diminishing over time.
Continuing the example of a $.05 increase, we would expect that tax 
increase to reduce consumption of cigarettes by about 1.4 percent (.35 
times .05), making the new tax base 1.057 billion packages of cigarettes. 
Hence, the tax will raise $52.8 million in revenue, not $53.6 million 
as first supposed.
This elasticity estimate is also useful in assessing the extent to which 
the tax increase will reduce smoking and thus improve health. It is often 
argued that a tax increase on cigarettes will be beneficial due to its ef 
fect of discouraging smoking. As the above estimates indicate, the im 
pact of the tax increase is modest, however. Any substantial reduction 
in smoking would require very large increases in taxation. Taxation
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Table 2
State Cigarette Tax Rates Per Package, 1989 
(local taxes not included)
New England 
Connecticut
Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire 
Rhode Island 
Vermont
Mideast
Delaware
D.C.
Maryland 
New Jersey 
New York
Pennsylvania
Great Lakes
Illinois
Indiana
Michigan 
Ohio 
Wisconsin
Plains
Iowa
Kansas 
Minnesota
Missouri
Nebraska
North Dakota
South Dakota
.40
.31
.26
.21 
.37 
.17
.14
.17
.13
.27 
.33
.18
.30
.155
.25 
.18 
.30
.31
.24 
.38
.13
.27
.30
.23
Southeast 
Alabama
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia 
Kentucky 
Louisiana
Mississippi 
North Carolina
South Carolina
Tennessee
Virginia 
West Virginia
Southwest 
Arizona
New Mexico
Oklahoma
Texas
Rocky Mountain 
Colorado
Idaho
Montana
Utah
Wyoming
Far West
California
Nevada
Oregon 
Washington 
Alaska
.165
.21
.24
.12 
.03 
.16
.18 
.02
.07
.13
.025 
.17
.15
.15
.23
.26
.20
.18
.18
.23
.12
.35
.30
.28 
.34 
.29
Hawaii 40 percent of 
wholesale price
SOURCES: ACIR's Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1989 Edition, Volume 1; and Tobac 
co Institute of America data.
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is simply a very ineffective method of reducing smoking. That is not 
to say, however, that a tax increase will not be more or less important 
in affecting the smoking behavior of a given group of people in soci 
ety. It has been suggested that young smokers, just getting started in 
the habit, may be more responsive to prices than older smokers. If that 
is the case, a tax increase may be somewhat more effective for that group.
Recent studies, such as Manning et al. (1989), also suggest that the 
present level of cigarette taxation, both state and federal, in the United 
States is at the correct level to compensate for the social costs imposed 
by smoking. This result, together with potential border problems 
associated with differential state cigarette tax rates, suggests that other 
revenue sources be investigated for improved health care access.
The cigarette tax should be levied in an ad valorem manner, perhaps 
as a percentage of the wholesale price of the product, in order to avoid 
the problem that a unit tax generates less real revenue over time as in 
flation erodes the value of the tax. A unit tax must be adjusted periodical 
ly to maintain its real revenue-generating ability. This process is time- 
consuming and politically troublesome as the question of the level of 
taxation is re-examined. Currently, Hawaii is the only state to levy a 
cigarette tax in an ad valorem manner. Their tax is 40 percent of the 
wholesale price per package of cigarettes.
Alcoholic Beverage Tax Rate Change
Taxation of alcoholic beverages typically includes excise taxes on beer, 
wine, and liquor. A specific tax is sometimes also applied to liquor. 
Rates of taxation on these commodities can be adjusted to generate more 
revenue and also help pay the costs associated with externalities caus 
ed by their consumption. Recent studies of the social costs associated 
with the consumption of alcoholic beverages suggests that present levels 
of federal and state taxation only cover about half of the external costs. 
As a result, a substantial increase in taxation may be justified at either 
the federal or state (or both) levels. See Pogue and Sgontz (1989) and 
Manning et al. (1989) on this issue.
Estimates of the price and income elasticities of demand for alcoholic 
beverages are presented in Table 3 (Marshall 1985). The own-price
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elasticities of demand are small for both beer and wine (-0.76 and -0.50 
respectively) indicating that the quantity demanded is not very sensitive 
to changes in the good's own price. A 10 percent increase in its price 
would lead to a 7.6 percent reduction in the quantity of beer demand 
ed, and for wine, a 5 percent reduction in the quantity demanded. The 
price elasticity of demand for spirits is unitary, indicating that a given 
percentage change in price will lead to a proportionate percentage change 
in the quantity demanded.
Table 3 
Alcoholic Beverage Elasticities
Beverage
Beer
Wine
Spirits
Beer 
price
-0.76
0.09
0.61
Wine 
price
0.12
-0.50
0.33
Spirits 
price
0.63
0.31
-1.00
Income
0.23
2.00
1.27
SOURCE. Marshall (1985)
There are several implications that follow from these elasticity 
estimates. First, since the demand for beer and wine is inelastic, tax 
increases on these commodities will result in higher revenues. As the 
price rises due to a tax increase, the quantity demanded falls, but not 
proportionately. Consequently, tax revenues rise with tax rate increases. 
A second implication of the elasticity estimates for alcoholic beverages 
is that a tax increase on beer or wine will be borne by the consumer 
to a greater extent than an increase in the tax on spirits. With relatively 
inelastic demand, the consumer bears a greater share of the tax burden 
than the producer (for a given elasticity of supply). The final implica 
tion is that the cross-price elasticities indicate the strength of 
substitutability among the alcoholic beverages. Note that beer and wine 
are not close substitutes, since their cross-price elasticities are nearly 
zero. The cross-price elasticities are greater for spirits and beer, but 
are still less than unitary. In general, the cross-price elasticities indicate 
that the three forms of alcoholic beverages are not very close substitutes.
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As a result, an increased tax on one form of alcoholic beverage will 
not affect the quantity of other beverages demanded to a significant 
degree.
The income elasticity estimates indicate that beer consumption does 
not rise proportionately with increased income, while wine and spirits 
rise more than proportionately with income. Increased taxes on beer 
will be regressive, while increased taxes on wine and spirits will be 
progressive. 10
Border crossing due to alcoholic beverage tax rate differentials may 
be a problem, as with cigarette tax differentials. The problem is ex 
pected to be smaller in the case of beer, wine, and liquor taxes, however, 
due to the higher cost of transporting the goods.
Many states are currently proposing increased taxes on alcoholic 
beverages, however. The Distilled Spirits Council reports that 30 states 
have proposed tax increases in 1989, while 7 have actually adopted in 
creases, 2 states having increased their taxes by 50 percent. 11 If neighbor 
ing states were also to increase their taxes on alcoholic beverages, the 
potential border problems would be lessened.
Taxation of alcoholic beverages cannot be analyzed in the absence 
of information on the state distribution methods as well. States either 
have a controlled distribution system (monopoly distribution) or an open 
method of distribution (relying on licensing of distributors). The taxa 
tion of alcoholic beverages is closely tied with the pricing of the 
beverages, which is directly tied to the distribution method. While a 
full discussion of the issues involved is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
it must be stressed that both sets of issues should be considered. See 
Fisher (1988) for a good discussion of the issues involved.
Income and Payroll Tax Sources
Payroll Tax
A natural way to pay for health care access is through a payroll tax 
mechanism. Wages and salaries would be subject to a tax of a given 
percentage, perhaps shared equally by employer and employee. The 
tax would apply to personal earnings only. Capital income is not taxed
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under the payroll tax. The social security tax is a good example of this 
type of tax; employer and employee both pay 7.65 percent, up to a max 
imum taxable wage of $51,300. The precise tax rate needed would de 
pend upon the tax base and the revenue needs of the access improve 
ment program. A payroll tax is simple to administer and capable of 
generating large amounts of revenue.
As an example of the potential application of payroll taxes to fund 
health care access, consider Ohio House Bill 425, introduced during 
the 1989-90 regular session of the General Assembly. That bill 
establishes a universal health insurance plan funded through a payroll 
tax of 8 percent to be paid by employers together with a 1 percent wage 
tax and a 2 percent tax on interest and dividends to be paid by individuals. 
In this case, the distribution of tax burden is affected by the combina 
tion of taxes and differing rates.
Of course, the incidence of a payroll tax is not what it appears. If 
we first consider personal earnings, it is clear that the specification of 
a cap, beyond which the marginal tax rate is zero, means that the tax 
is proportional up to the cap and regressive thereafter. Taking a broader 
view of income, and including capital income (interest and dividends), 
makes the payroll tax even more regressive overall. Musgrave and 
Musgrave (1989) note that the payroll tax is largely a regressive tax 
since the share of capital earnings rises with income. Further, while 
employer and employee appear to share the tax burden equally, the 
employer is able to shift part of the tax to the employee through lower 
wages than would be paid in the absence of the tax.
As an example of a payroll tax approach to fund improved health 
care access, consider such a tax on uninsured workers to provide ac 
cess. Simulating such a tax for the State of Michigan, Goddeeris finds, 
in chapter 4 of this volume, that a tax of 10 percent on wages and salaries 
for adult workers not covered by group insurance in their own names 
would generate $430 million in revenue.
Income Tax Rate Change
Forty of the states have comprehensive income taxes with marginal 
tax rates ranging from about 1 percent to 12 percent. 12 Five of these 
states have flat rate taxes, while the remainder have progressive rate
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structures. 13 One method of raising revenue is to raise tax rates. To 
estimate potential revenues, one must know the tax base the state defini 
tion of taxable income and apply the increase in rate to it to compute 
new revenues that would be generated. State income tax structures are 
often complex, and detailed knowledge of the specific provisions of tax 
law are required. As an example, Michigan's flat rate income tax is 
applied at the rate of 4.6 percent to taxable income based on the federal 
definition of adjusted gross income. The tax generates $3.6 billion (FY 
1989 estimate). Taking the broadest possible definition of the tax base 
(no effective exemptions, no credits, no deductions), an additional 1 
percent tax will generate nearly $1 billion in revenue. Other state in 
come tax structures can be analyzed similarly to determine the revenue 
response likely from a given change in tax rate. It should be noted that 
such rough rules of thumb ignore elasticity responses. Higher income 
tax rates will alter the level of economic activity in the state and ultimately 
affect the tax base.
Income Tax Base Changes
Twenty-three of the 40 states with comprehensive income taxes use 
federal adjusted gross income (AGI) as the starting point in defining 
taxable income. 14 As a consequence, federal tax preferences generally 
apply at the state level as well. For example, the favorable tax treat 
ment of benefits compared to wages applies to state tax structures as 
well. Since benefits are not included in the definition of AGI, they are 
generally not taxed at the state level either. As a result, the tax system 
distorts the choice between wage/salary income and benefits. Another 
large tax preference is provided for owner-occupied housing, because 
the value of housing services provided by a home is tax-exempt. Other 
capital assets generating income are taxed.
Other examples could be cited but these two are sufficient to make 
the point that the current definition of income is rather narrow. 15 Tax 
ing some of these forms of income would generate additional revenues 
for health care access.
Economists have suggested several base-broadening measures for the 
federal income tax which may also be relevant for state income taxes.
196 Public Financing Approaches
Table 4 provides Joseph Pechman's estimates of the broadening in tax 
able income which would follow from less liberal personal deductions, 
taxing some transfer payments, taxing fringe benefits, and alteration 
of the two-earner deduction. These base-broadening measures would 
increase federal taxable income by 15.7 percent, compared to the 1986 
definition. The amount by which a state's tax revenue would rise depends 
upon several factors, including: (a) the nature of the state's tax base 
and the link between the state's tax code and the federal code (i.e., 
whether the state has adopted the federal definition of AGI for taxable 
income); and (b) the state's marginal tax rate structure. State-specific 
estimates of the revenue implications of base-broadening measures re 
quire this information, together with assumptions regarding the 
behavioral changes likely to be prompted by the change in tax base.
Table 4
Alternative Personal Income Tax Base 
(billions of dollars)
Item
Tax Reform Act of 1986
Plus:
Personal deductions
Transfer payments 
Fringe benefits 
Two-earner deduction
Other
Equals: comprehensive tax
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office,
Adjusted gross 
income (AGI)
$3,545
0
226 
187 
-82
43
$3,919
as reported in Pechman (1987).
Taxable 
income
$2,407
68
164 
185 
-81
42
$2,785
Tax Benefits
The suggestion to tax fringe benefits alone would generate an addi 
tional $37 billion in federal revenue, assuming an average marginal tax 
rate of 20 percent. More specifically, consider the taxation of health 
insurance premiums provided by employers. The rationale for this ap 
proach lies in the observation that the present income tax base includes
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wage and salary income but not benefits provided by the employer. An 
additional dollar of salary is taxed at a 15 percent, 28 percent or 33 
percent rate by the federal government, plus a state tax rate of perhaps 
5 percent, while additional benefits are not taxed at all. As a result, 
there is a clear incentive for employees to request benefits in place of 
some money income. 16 From an individual's point of view, the choice 
is clear. If a person would have purchased a $1,200 health insurance 
policy anyway, receiving the benefit of the policy rather than $1,200 
in salary saves the typical taxpayer $336 in federal income taxes (assum 
ing the individual is in the 28 percent tax bracket). To remove this distor 
tion from the tax system, and to take away the substantial subsidy in 
volved, the insurance premium paid by the employer on behalf of the 
employee could be counted as taxable income.
States can consider several variants of this proposal: (a) taxing the 
first x dollars of coverage; (b) taxing all coverage provided; or (c) tax 
ing coverage over x dollars. The first approach was included in the 1981 
proposal for federal tax reform, which contained a provision taxing the 
first $10 per month ($120 per year) for a single filer or $25 per month 
($300 per year) for a married filer. As an example of the state level 
impact, that proposal would have increased the Michigan income tax 
liability of Michigan residents by $24 million. In addition to the revenue 
impact of the proposal, a state needs to consider the distributional con 
sequences. Simulations performed by the Michigan Department of 
Treasury indicated that this proposal would have reduced tax liability 
for 20,688 Michigan income tax filers by a total of $51,000 while in 
creasing tax liability for 2,309,740 filers, raising their taxes by $24.305 
million. 17 Most of the impact of this proposal would have been felt by 
taxpayers with adjusted gross income in the $30,000 to $50,000 range. 
In fact, 60 percent of the total tax increase is borne by taxpayers with 
AGI of $30,000 or more. Low-income taxpayers, with AGI less than 
$15,000, would bear 12 percent of the tax burden.
Such a proposal is misdirected, however, being very regressive in 
only taxing the first $120 or $300 of benefits. Above these levels, the 
marginal tax rate would be zero. From a state tax policy perspective, 
it would be better for a state to exempt the first x dollars of benefits 
and to tax benefits above that level. In this way, the tax would be
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somewhat progressive and treat wages and benefits equally, above some 
basic level of benefits.
The exclusion of health care benefits from taxation results in substantial 
loss of revenue. Pechman (1987) reports that the tax expenditure 
associated with the exclusion of employer contributions to medical in 
surance premiums and medical care at the federal level is $30.205 billion 
(1988 estimate). Additional revenues are involved at the state level as 
well. For example, the Michigan Department of Treasury estimates that 
taxing all employer contributions to health and life insurance would 
generate $296 million in state income tax revenue. 18 Removing the life 
insurance portion of this total may reduce the current tax expenditure 
to $250 million. For equity and efficiency reasons, however, there is no 
reason to separate the two types of insurance both should be taxed.
Tax Lottery Winnings
States with lotteries can consider broadening the income tax base to 
include lottery winnings, if they are not currently taxed. Lottery win 
nings are taxable at the federal level, but not at the state level in all 
states with lotteries. At the federal level, gamblers are permitted to deduct 
losses, paying tax on net winnings, which cannot be done on some state 
income taxes. As an example of the revenue potential here, consider 
the Michigan case where taxation of lottery winnings is estimated to 
generate $24 million in revenue.
The incidence of the lottery tax has been investigated by Suits (1982). 
He found that the lottery is twice as regressive as the second most 
regressive tax the sales tax. From this perspective, additional reliance 
on a very regressive tax is not a just change in tax policy. Arguments 
that the regressivity of the lottery does not matter because it is a volun 
tary tax are specious.
Tax Employer Contributions to Pensions 
or Social Security
The exclusion of net pension contributions and earnings results in 
a sizable amount of lost tax revenue. Pechman (1987) reports that the 
exclusion of employer plans results in a tax expenditure of $58.185
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billion at the federal level, while the exclusion of IRA contributions 
results in a loss of $11.635 billion, and Keogh plans add another $1.715 
billion. The exclusion of social security income also results in a substan 
tial revenue loss. Taxing OASI benefits for retired workers would 
generate an additional $12.025 billion in federal revenue, while taxing 
benefits for dependents and survivors would generate $3.545 billion, 
and disability insurance benefits would generate $1.040 billion. State 
revenues involved are less, of course, depending upon state tax base 
definition and marginal tax rates.
Taxing employer contributions to pension plans or taxing social securi 
ty income would generate large revenues for states, but both of these 
tax expenditures have strong political support and are unlikely targets 
for added revenue. States can at least conform to the federal definition 
of taxable income in this regard. For example, a state could at least 
tax that portion of social security income which the federal government 
taxes. In Michigan, for example, this would generate an additional $27.5 
million in revenue. 19
A recent Supreme Court ruling requires that states tax state and federal 
pension income alike, rather than exempting state pension income and 
taxing federal pension income as some states currently do.
Business Taxation
Table 5 illustrates the many ways in which states have chosen to tax 
business activity. While all states tax business activity, and a number 
tax it several different ways, there is a wide variety of tax mechanisms 
employed. Most states rely on a corporate income tax for about 4 to 
5 percent of state general revenue. Some states use gross receipts taxes 
(Hawaii, Indiana, West Virginia, and Washington) and one state uses 
a value-added tax (Michigan). Forty-nine of the states also have cor 
porate license taxes, and all 50 tax insurance premiums. In addition, 
33 states levy severance taxes on natural resources.
Since states use very diverse methods of taxing business activity, it 
is difficult to generalize about potential revenues. Revenues can cer 
tainly be raised by increasing the rate of taxation, whether it be based 
on corporate profits, gross receipts, or value-added. Aside from rate
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change, though, most states' business tax structures are replete with 
myriad forms of business tax expenditures. Consideration should be 
given to repeal of specific exemptions which may no longer be effec 
tive in accomplishing the stated objective. Tax preferences for specific 
industries, or for specific firms for that matter, may not serve legitimate 
state policy objectives and may be targeted for potential revenue. 
Analysis of the incidence of the state business tax structure is a necessary 
prerequisite for making such changes. After determining that specific 
industries pay more or less than their share of state business taxes, tax 
policy changes can be recommended.
Table 5 
State Business Taxes
Number of Tax revenue Percent of state 
Type of tax states ($ billion, 1985) general revenue
Corporate income tax
Gross receipts tax
Value-added tax
Corporate license tax
Severance tax
Insurance premiums tax
45
4
1
49
33
50
16.915
1.670
1.448
3.065
6.125
5.489
4.3
0.4
0.4
0.8
1.6
1.4
SOURCE- Fisher (1988), p 215
Transition From Business Provision 
of Health Insurance to State Insurance Plan
An important policy suggestion which states are grappling with centers 
on the question: Who pays for health insurance? The tradition, coming 
from years of collective bargaining and cultural expectations, has been 
that the employer provides health insurance and other benefits. This 
is quite reasonable, especially in light of the tax incentives involved. 
Employees can receive insurance at substantially subsidized rates by 
having the employer pay the premium, which is exempt from federal 
and state income taxation. Recent pressures for U.S. industry to become
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more competitive in world markets, however, force firms to reconsider 
the provision of such benefits. A specific proposal to move from 
employer-provided health benefits to a more universal health care system, 
provided by the states, has been suggested (see chapter 3). Of course, 
the major economic stumbling block in this proposal lies in the fact that 
the health insurance benefits become taxable when moved out of the 
workplace under current tax law. With changes in tax law, creative solu 
tions to the transition may be forthcoming. In the absence of such 
changes, the penalty for such a change is severe.
Issues of Federalism
Deducibility Issues
Federal deducibility of state taxes has several important implications 
for state tax systems. 20 First, with federal deductibility states may have 
more progressive tax structures than they would otherwise. The high- 
income taxpayers, who pay the higher marginal tax rates at the state 
level, are also more likely to itemize on their federal returns, deduct 
ing the state taxes and lowering their federal tax liability. A second im 
plication of deductibility is that states can collect more revenue than 
they could in the absence of deductibility. Deductibility can induce some 
taxpayers to support higher state taxes than they otherwise would since 
it reduces the net marginal tax price of an added dollar of increased 
state expenditure. Finally, deductibility dampens interstate tax dif 
ferences. If taxes are $300 higher for a given individual in State A com 
pared to State B, the deductibility of state taxes reduces that difference 
to $216 (assuming the taxpayer is in the 28 percent marginal tax bracket 
and there is no deductibility at the state level).
Understanding these deductibility implications has relevance to the 
choice of a tax instrument for financing improved health care access. 
Choosing a deductible tax, such as the income tax, brings with it all 
of these implications. Choosing a nondeductible tax, such as the sales 
tax, does not. While there are certainly other issues to consider, these 
implications must be part of the policy discussion in selecting a tax- 
based financing method.
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Since the Tax Reform Act of 1986, state (and local) sales taxes are 
no longer deductible from federal adjusted gross income. As a result, 
increases in the sales tax rate would cost itemizing taxpayers an addi 
tional 15 percent, 28 percent, or 33 percent, depending on their tax 
bracket, when compared to financing that relies on a deductible tax. 
Nonitemizers, of course, would not be affected by the nondeductibility 
of the sales tax. As an example of a typical case, consider a state where 
35 percent of federal income tax returns filed by taxpayers included 
itemization. If the average marginal tax rate for those taxpayers is 20 
percent, then an additional dollar of revenue raised in the state through 
a nondeductible sales tax would cost the taxpayers $1.00 compared to 
$0.93 if the same revenue were raised using a deductible tax. The 7 
percent difference is the premium a state pays if it chooses to fund health 
care access using the nondeductible tax. The federal government has 
given states the clear incentive to finance new activity with income or 
property taxes, not sales taxes.
Tax/Revenue Limitations
A number of states have enacted revenue or expenditure limitations 
since California led the way with Proposition 13 in 1978. Notable among 
the state limitations are Massachusetts' Proposition 2-1/2, which is a 
property tax limitation, and Michigan's Headlee Amendment, which 
limits all state revenues. With such limitations in place, states must con 
sider the implications of new funding mechanisms proposed to improve 
health care access. For example, a new tax source that would generate 
several hundred million dollars in revenue in Michigan would violate 
the Headlee Amendment, requiring either dramatic reductions in other 
taxes or a change in the state constitution, neither of which is attractive.
Summary and Conclusions
A number of potential revenue sources for financing improved ac 
cess to health care have been identified in this chapter. The choice of 
which funding mechanism is best for a given policy proposal is com 
plex. For access proposals that are relatively cheap ($100 million), some
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combination of increased taxes on alcoholic beverages, prescription 
drugs, or amusement services can be used. More comprehensive policy 
proposals carrying higher price tags ($400 to $600 million) will require 
correspondingly more substantial tax policy changes. Including some 
services in the sales tax base (perhaps coupled with a sales tax credit 
on the income tax to relieve regressivity), taxing employer contribu 
tions to health and life insurance under the state income tax, or levying 
a payroll tax are all possibilities. For any given policy proposal, the 
appropriate funding mechanism should be identified not only on the basis 
of the revenue generated, but also with regard to the incidence and in 
centive effects of the mechanism.
NOTES
1. The notion of a tax expenditure comes from a budgeting perspective that acknowledges that 
when a tax system exempts certain activity from taxation, the preferential treatment is equivalent 
to a direct budget expenditure for that activity Hence, the amount of the tax exemption or preferential 
treatment is termed a tax expenditure.
2. ACIR (1991).
3 A use tax is a form of sales tax due on goods used but not purchased in the state For example, 
a sales tax is levied on a pair of shoes purchased in the state, but a use tax is levied on a pair 
purchased from a mail order firm in another state As another example, a sales tax is applied 
to the purchase of a new car, a use tax is applied to the lease of a new car The use tax is designed 
to close common sales tax loopholes.
4. State of Michigan Executive Budget, Tax Expenditure Appendix, 1987-88 Fiscal Year, p. 39.
5. For a discussion of the economic issues involved, see Fox and Murray (1988). 
6 It should be noted that recent research using computational general equilibrium methods finds 
that taxing services under the sales tax may be less regressive than traditional theory suggests. 
The reason is due to the reduction (increase) in labor supply by lower- (higher-) income households 
For the low-income households, the income effect of a higher cost-of-hving due to the sales tax 
on services appears to dominate the income effect of wages, resulting in upward sloping labor 
supply curves with respect to both wages and the cost-of-living. For further discussion of this 
view, see Baum (1991)
7. It must be noted that transportation costs are a factor to consider as well
8. See ACIR (1986).
9. This section discusses taxation of cigarettes, but other forms of tobacco should be taxed in 
similar ways That would include cigars, pipe tobacco, and chewing tobacco products To avoid 
distortions in the system, all tobacco products should be taxed at the same rate.
10. Some caution is needed in making this generalization, since the elasticity estimates are point 
estimates evaluated at a mean level of income and do not hold precisely over the income 
distribution.
11. Wall Street Journal, July 12, 1989.
12 Those states with no income tax are: Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, 
Washington, and Wyoming. States with limited income taxes are: Connecticut, New Hampshire, 
and Tennessee.
13. Those with flat rate taxes are: Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan 
(ACIR 1989).
14. ACIR (1988; 1989).
15. See Pechman (1987).
16. See Woodbury (1989).
17. Michigan Department of Treasury (1986)
18. Michigan Department of Management and Budget (1987-88).
19. Federal income tax liability occurs when half of the social security benefits plus modified 
adjusted gross income is more than $32,000 on a joint return ($25,000 on a single return) The 
federal tax applies to half of the excess, or half of the social security income, whichever is less. 
Michigan does not tax this income.
20. The reasons cited here are adapted from Fisher (1988).
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Labor Market Impacts of Policies 
to Expand Access to Health Care
Stephen A, Woodbury 
Andrew J. Hogan
Michigan State University
In the United States, private health insurance coverage is closely tied 
to employment most individuals who are covered by private health 
insurance receive it either as part of their compensation for employ 
ment or through a family member who receives it as part of his or her 
compensation. As a result, policies designed to alter health care provi 
sion may have the side effect of influencing labor markets. That is, 
policy-induced changes in the health care system can be expected to 
alter the mix of employment, total employment, and wages.
This paper examines how various policies intended to expand health 
insurance coverage in a state may also affect that state's labor market. 
The first section of the paper provides background data on the U.S. 
labor market; it explores the relationships among hourly wages, inclu 
sion in an employer-provided group health plan, and coverage by any 
form of health insurance. Also provided are data on wages and health 
insurance coverage by industry. The second section of the paper develops 
the linkages between changes in health care policy and changes in wages 
and employment. Although we offer predictions about the qualitative 
impact of the policies (that is, directions of the policies' impacts on 
the labor market), we are reluctant to make precise quantitative predic 
tions because little of the empirical work needed to offer quantitative 
estimates of wage and employment impacts has been performed.
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The Labor Market and Health Insurance
Table 1 shows the distribution of hourly wage and salary earnings 
in the United States in 1988 (see the first two columns). The figures 
show that nearly 2.7 million workers earned less than the minimum 
wage of $3.35 in 1988, and that another 6.8 million earned from $3.35 
to $4.00 an hour. (Hourly earnings below the minimum wage are possible 
because of incomplete coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act and 
because of imperfect compliance with the Act.) It follows that nearly 
9.5 million workers or about 11 percent of all wage and salary workers 
in the United States had earnings near or below the minimum wage 
in 1988.
Table 1 also shows that an additional 8.3 million workers had hourly 
earnings of $4.01 to $5.00 in 1988. If we characterize all workers with 
earnings at or below $5.00 per hour as low-wage, then a total of 17.8 
million workers in 1988 or over 20 percent of all wage and salary 
workers in the United States would be characterized as low-wage.
Table 1 also shows that the inclusion of workers in employer-provided 
group health insurance plans is strongly correlated with hourly earn 
ings (see the columns headed "Included in Group Health Plan"). 
Workers whose hourly earnings were $5.00 or less were far less likely 
to be included in an employer-provided health insurance plan than were 
workers whose hourly earnings were above $5.00. Only about 13 per 
cent of workers with hourly earnings below $3.35 were included in an 
employer-provided health insurance plan, whereas nearly 88 percent 
of workers with hourly earnings over $15.00 were included.
Finally, Table 1 shows that even though low-wage workers are far 
less likely than high-wage workers to be included in employer-provided 
health insurance plans, they are only slightly less likely than high-wage 
workers to be covered by any form of health insurance (see columns 
headed "Covered by Any Health Insurance"). Low-wage workers  
those earning $5.00 or less per hour had roughly an 80 percent prob 
ability of being covered by any form of health insurance, whereas 
workers earning over $5.00 per hour had better than a 90 percent prob 
ability of being covered. The difference between the percentages of
Table 1
Inclusion of U.S. Workers in Group Health Plans, 
by Hourly Wage and Salary Earnings, 1988
Hourly wage and 
salary earnings
Less than $3.35
$3.35 - $4.00
$4.01 - $5.00
$5.01 - $7.50
$7.51 - $10.00
$10.01 - $15.00
Over $15.01
All workers
Total 
number of
workers 
(1,000s)
2,674
6,816
8,267
19,150
17,203
19,849
13,613
87,590
Included in group 
health plan
Number of
workers 
(1,000s)
346
1,282
3,097
11,487
12,936
16,755
11,962
57,865
Percent 
of total
12.9
18.8
37.5
60.0
75.2
84.4
87.8
66.1
Covered by any 
health insurance
Number of
workers 
(1,000s)
2,068
5,329
7,107
17,600
16,507
19,508
13,502
81,621
Percent 
of total
77.3
78.2
86.0
91.9
95.9
98.3
99.0
93.2
NOTES: Figures displayed are authors' tabulations from the May 1988 Current Population Survey. The sample includes wage and salary workers who 
responded to the May Employee Benefits Supplement and reported information about occupation and industry of employment. Military and self-employed 
workers are excluded.
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low-wage and high-wage workers who are covered by any health in 
surance is far less than the difference between the percentages of low- 
wage and high-wage workers who are included in an employer-provided 
group health plan. The reason is that most low-wage workers are either 
covered by a public program or are part of a family in which someone 
else's health insurance extends to the low-wage workers.
Table 1 suggests the importance of designing health care access policies 
that target the uninsured. In particular, the figures suggest that policies 
designed to include more workers as the primary insured in employer- 
provided health plans are less likely to target uninsured individuals than 
are policies that act directly to cover uninsured individuals. The reason 
is simply that most individuals who work in the labor market are, 
regardless of their hourly earnings, covered by some form of health 
insurance. Including more workers as the primary insured in employer- 
provided group health plans would result in the addition (as primary 
insureds) of many workers who are already covered by some form of 
health insurance.
In Table 2, the same sample of workers is broken down by industry 
of employment. The first two columns show that by far the largest sec 
tors of the economy are professional and related services, retail trade, 
and durable goods manufacturing. The column labeled "Included in 
Group Health Plan" shows that there is much interindustry variation 
in the percentage of workers who are included in employer-provided 
health plans. In several industries, more than 70 percent of all workers 
were included in employer-provided group health plans: mining, durable 
and nondurable goods manufacturing, transportation, wholesale trade, 
finance, and public administration. But in other industries agriculture, 
retail trade, and personal services only about 30 to 40 percent of all 
workers were included. It follows that policies to expand the inclusion 
of workers in employer-provided health plans would probably have an 
uneven impact, affecting mainly industries in which health insurance 
provision tends to be low.
Although there is much industry-to-industry variation in the percent 
age of workers included in employer-provided health plans, Table 2 
also shows that there is far less industry-to-industry variation in the 
percentage of workers who are covered by any health insurance (see
Table 2
Inclusion of U.S. Wage and Salary Workers 
in Group Health Plans by Industry of Employment, 1988
Industry
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries
Mining
Construction
Durable goods
Nondurable goods
Transportation, communications,
public utilities
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Finance, insurance, real estate
Business and repair services
Personal services
Entertainment and recreation services
Professional and related services
Public administration
All workers
Total
number of
workers
(1,000s)
1,468
665
4,806
10,578
7,982
6,382
3,490
14,211
6,415
4,072
2,540
894
19,267
4,820
87,590
Included
health
Number of
workers
(1,000s)
443
570
2,748
9,053
6,299
5,342
2,568
6,095
4,658
2,198
813
415
12,651
4,014
57,865
in group
plan
Percent
of total
30.2
85.7
57.2
85.6
78.9
83.7
73.6
42.9
72.6
54.0
32.0
46.3
65.7
83.3
66.1
Covered by any
health insurance
Number of
workers
(1,000s)
1,060
651
4,079
10,287
7,636
6,139
3,348
12,506
6,165
3,588
2,153
775
18,503
4,732
81,621
Percent
of total
72.2
97.8
84.9
97.2
95.7
96.2
95.9
88.0
96.1
88.1
84.8
86.6
96.0
98.2
93.2
NOTES: Figures displayed are authors' tabulations from the May 1988 Current Population Survey. The sample includes wage and salary workers who 
responded to the May Employee Benefits Supplement and reported information about occupation and industry of employment. Military and self-employed 
workers are excluded.
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columns labeled "Covered by Any Health Insurance"). Only in 
agriculture is the percentage of workers covered by any health insurance 
less than 80 percent, and in the four largest industries, the percentage 
of workers covered is 88 percent or greater. Again, it appears that most 
workers who are not included in an employer-provided health plan are 
covered nevertheless by some form of health insurance.
Table 3 shows the distribution of wages within each of the major in 
dustries in the United States in 1988. The table shows both the number 
and percentage of workers in each industry whose hourly wage and salary 
earnings were under $5.01, from $5.01 to $10.00, and over $10.00. 
In three industries agriculture, personal services, and retail trade at 
least 45 percent of all workers had hourly wage and salary earnings 
under $5.01 in 1988. At the high end of the wage scale were mining, 
durable goods manufacturing, transportation, and public administration. 
In all of these industries, at least half of all workers had hourly earn 
ings over $10.00 in 1988.
Together, Tables 2 and 3 show that industries that tend to pay high 
wages also tend to include a high proportion of their workers in 
employer-provided group health plans. This apparent link between wages 
and employer-provision of health insurance suggests that high- 
productivity workers are highly compensated with both wage and non- 
wage benefits. This link bears implications for how changes in health 
care policy will affect different industries and groups of workers.
Labor Market Analysis of the Policies
Conventional labor market analysis can provide insights into how 
various policies to expand health insurance coverage might influence 
wages and employment. The strategy here is as follows. First, we set 
out a general labor market model that can be used to analyze the im 
pact of various policies on the labor market outcomes that are of greatest 
concern: wages and employment. The model involves specifying two 
sets of factors: those influencing the quantity of labor that workers are 
willing to supply to a given labor market, and those influencing the quan 
tity of labor that employers will demand from that same labor market.
Table 3
Distribution of U.S. Hourly Wage and Salary Earnings 
by Industry of Employment, 1988
Industry
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries
Mining
Construction
Durable goods
Nondurable goods
Transportation, communications,
public utilities
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Finance, insurance, real estate
Business and repair services
Personal services
Entertainment and recreation services
Professional and related services
Public administration
All workers
Total
number of
workers
(1,000s)
1,468
665
4,806
10,578
7,982
6,382
3,490
14,211
6,415
4,072
2,540
894
19,267
4,820
87,590
Number (1,000s) and percentage of workers 
with hourly wage and salary earnings of:
Under
Number
839
46
587
784
1,370
368
471
6,392
640
933
1,397
323
3,253
355
17,757
$5.01
Percent
57.2
6.8
12.2
7.4
17.2
5.8
13.5
45.0
10.0
22.9
55.0
36.1
16.9
7.4
20.3
$5.01 -
Number
496
169
2,203
4,173
3,403
2,035
1,601
5,751
3,072
1,755
971
373
8,443
1,909
36,353
$10.00
Percent
33.8
25.4
45.8
39.4
42.6
31.9
45.9
40.5
47.9
43.1
38.2
41.7
43.8
39.6
41.5
Over $10.00
Number
133
451
2,016
5,621
3,209
3,979
1,418
2,068
2,704
1,384
172
198
7,571
2,556
33,480
Percent
9.1
67.7
41.9
53.1
40.2
62.4
40.6
14.5
42.1
34.0
6.8
22.2
39.3
53.0
38.2
NOTES. Figures displayed are authors' tabulations from the May 1988 Current Population Survey. The sample includes wage and salary workers who 
responded to the May Employee Benefits Supplement and reported information about occupation and industry of employment Military and self-employed 
workers are excluded.
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Next, we define what we mean by a labor market and discuss the ap 
plication of the model to the various policies that are of interest. Final 
ly, we use the model to analyze in a general qualitative way the im 
plications of the policies for labor markets. We plan in future work to 
derive quantitative estimates of how large the predicted effects would be.
The Model
In general, both economic theory and a significant body of empirical 
work suggest that the amount of labor willingly supplied to a given labor 
market [or labor supply to market /, LS/] will depend on five influences: 
(1) hourly wage and salary earnings paid in that labor market [w/]; (2) 
taxes paid by workers on their earnings [t] ; (3) nonwage characteristics 
of work in that labor market [n/], including the safety and desirability 
of the work, and the provision of health and pension benefits by the 
employer; (4) the ease or difficulty of gaining entry to the labor market 
[ei\ due, for example, to educational of licensing requirements; and (5) 
opportunities (including earnings) available to workers in other pur 
suits and other labor markets [w;]. These considerations can be sum 
marized compactly as a labor supply function, which shows the quanti 
ty of labor supplied to labor market / as a function of the factors just 
described:
LSi = LSi(\vi; t, HI, ej, wj).
The relationship between the quantity of labor supplied to labor market 
i and the wage in that market can be summarized as a labor supply curve 
(see Figure 1), which shows that as the wage in labor market / increases, 
more workers are willing to supply labor to this market, other things 
equal. Changes in the other factors in the labor supply function [t, n^, 
ei, and wj\ can be shown graphically as shifts of the LS; curve. 1
The amount of labor that employers demand from labor market / [LD/] 
will depend on the following factors: (1) hourly wage and salary earn 
ings paid in that labor market \wj\\ (2) nonwage costs of employing 
workers from that labor market [c{\, including training costs, costs of 
complying with safety regulations, and legally required payroll taxes 
for social security, unemployment insurance, and workers' compensa 
tion; (3) prices of other inputs into production [p;], including capital
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Figure 1
Effects of Universal Health Insurance 
on Low-Wage Labor Markets
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costs and the total cost of employing other kinds of labor; (4) the quan 
tity of output [q] desired by the employer, which may depend in turn 
on market conditions and current output prices; and (5) the technology 
of production or organization of the production process [g]. These con 
siderations can be summarized as a labor demand function, which shows 
the quantity of labor demanded in labor market i as a function of the 
factors just described:
LDt = LDi(wi; cit pj, q, g).
The relationship between the quantity of labor demanded from labor 
market i and the wage in that market can be summarized as a labor 
demand curve (see Figure 1), which shows that as the wage in labor 
market / increases, employers will demand less labor from this market, 
other things equal. Changes in the other factors in the labor demand 
function [q, pj, q, and g] can be shown graphically as shifts of the LD/ 
curve.
Applying the Model
The labor market model developed above can be applied to a wide 
variety of problems. Here we are interested in the labor market im 
pacts of the following policies designed to expand access to health care: 
(1) universal health insurance managed by the state (chapter 3 in this 
volume); (2) mandatory employer-provided health insurance, coupled 
with a public sponsor for those not covered by employer-provided health 
insurance (chapter 4 in this volume; Mitchell 1989); and (3) a Small 
Employer Health Insurance Pool, coupled with Medicaid Buy-In pro 
grams for the unemployed uninsured and not-in-the-labor-force un 
insured (chapters 5.2 and 5.3 in this volume).
We examine the impacts of these policies on two representative labor 
markets: "low-wage" and "higher-wage." The key assumption we will 
make about these two labor markets is that workers in low-wage labor 
markets do not currently receive employer-provided health insurance 
(although they may as a result of policy changes), whereas workers in 
higher-wage labor markets do. This assumption simplifies the analysis, 
and is roughly consistent with the empirical findings reported on low- 
and higher-wage workers. 2
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In addition, it should be understood that low-wage labor markets in 
clude a disproportionate number of relatively young workers, minorities, 
and women, whereas higher-wage labor markets include a dispropor 
tionate number of workers aged 25 to 54 who are male. In the labor 
economics literature, low-wage labor markets are frequently referred 
to as "low-skill" or "unskilled" labor markets, whereas higher-wage 
labor markets are referred to as "skilled." These characterizations are 
intended to be descriptive rather than normative, and there is clearly 
a whole range of labor markets in between these two types. 3
Universal Health Insurance
The provision of a specified package of health care services by a single 
provider to all individuals, regardless of their income or employment 
status, is universal health insurance. Universal health insurance has 
become increasingly attractive in recent years because it has the poten 
tial both to eliminate incomplete coverage and to bring health care costs 
under control (chapter 3 in this volume). In view of the possibility that 
some type of universal plan will be adopted in the future, it is impor 
tant to understand the labor market effects of such a policy.
Special Assumptions
To analyze the effects of universal health insurance, we adopt the 
following assumptions. First, we assume that the universal health plan 
is financed through an increase in personal income tax rates. (If the 
universal health plan were state-managed, this would imply an increase 
in state personal income tax rates; if federally managed, it would imply 
an increase in federal tax rates.)
Second, we assume that the universal health plan will provide health 
care more efficiently than the current system, in that the total amount 
of health care provided will increase, but the total resources spent on 
health care will remain constant. This assumption is one reasonable 
benchmark, based on the argument that a universal, state-managed, 
health plan would eliminate administrative and other inefficiencies that 
are inherent in the current system (see chapter 3 for further discussion).
Third, we assume that workers who are already covered by health 
insurance will receive health care under a universal plan that is similar
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to the health care they now receive under their employer-provided plans. 
The implication of the second and third assumptions is that everyone 
who is currently covered by health insurance will receive equally good 
care under the universal plan, and further that individuals who are cur 
rently uninsured will receive health care that they would not receive 
under the current system.
Effects on Low-Wage Labor Markets
The effect of universal health insurance on the supply of low-wage 
workers is essentially a tax effect. That is, low-wage workers will ex 
perience a tax increase that reduces their hourly after-tax earnings. It 
follows that they will reduce the number of hours they are willing to 
work at a given before-tax wage (we show this tax effect in Figure 1 
by a leftward shift of the labor supply curve from LS to LS7)- 4
There would be no effect of the universal plan on the demand for 
low-wage workers, because we assume that low-wage employers do 
not currently provide health insurance. As a result, the equilibrium wage 
in low-wage labor markets would rise, and employment would fall, in 
response to universal health insurance (see Figure 1). The magnitude 
of these changes is potentially large, because low-wage workers tend 
to show a relatively large labor supply response to changes in the real 
(after-tax) wage. 5
Effects on Higher-Wage Labor Markets
The effects of universal health insurance on higher-wage labor markets 
are more complex. Consider first the effect of a universal plan on the 
supply of higher-wage labor. The tax effect would again apply higher- 
wage workers will experience a tax increase that would reduce the 
number of hours they are willing to work at a given before-tax wage. 
We would expect this tax effect to be smaller than the tax effect for 
low-wage workers, because empirical evidence shows that the labor 
supply of higher-wage workers tends to be relatively insensitive to 
changes in the real wage. Accordingly, we show the tax effect by a 
small shift of the supply curve, from LS to LS' in Figure 2. 6
In addition to the tax effect, there will be a loss-of-beneflt effect on 
the labor supply of high-wage workers. Universal health insurance
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Figure 2
Effects of Universal Health Insurance 
on Higher-Wage Labor Markets
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would essentially sever the link between employment and the availability 
of health insurance. As a result, individuals would no longer need to 
be employed in order to receive health insurance, and an important non- 
wage aspect of employment would be eliminated. It follows that labor 
supply would be further reduced (see the shift from LS' to LS" in Figure 
2). 7
Consider now the effect of a universal plan on the demand for higher- 
wage workers. Because higher-wage employers currently provide health 
insurance, the adoption of universal health insurance could have a large 
impact on nonwage labor costs of higher-wage employers it would 
eliminate the need to pay directly for employees' health insurance. As 
a result, the demand for higher-wage workers would increase (see the 
shift from LD to LD' in Figure 2).
Given the assumptions we have made, the increase in labor demand 
would be in proportion to the decrease in labor supply induced by the 
loss-of-benefit effect. It follows that, absent the tax effect on labor supply, 
the equilibrium wage would rise by exactly enough to offset the reduc 
tion in employers' nonwage labor costs, and equilibrium employment 
would be unchanged. But when we add the tax effect, the equilibrium 
wage increases by more than enough to offset the loss of benefit; as 
a result, equilibrium employment falls (see Figure 2). Hence, the model 
does not predict a reduction of total labor costs following adoption of 
universal health insurance, as some employers appear to expect. On 
the contrary, the model suggests that total labor costs would rise 
somewhat, and that employment would fall, in both higher-wage and 
low-wage labor markets.
Effects if Efficiency Gains Were Small
It is also important to consider how violations of the second and third 
assumptions made above would change our predictions. That is, what 
would happen if the efficiency gains from the universal health plan were 
small, so that even though the total resources devoted to health care 
would be unchanged, the process of expanding coverage to all individuals 
reduced average access to health care? In this case, employers would 
still be relieved of the direct burden of health insurance premiums, and 
the tax effect on labor supply would still occur. But the loss-of-benefit
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effect would be blunted because individuals would have an incentive 
to work so as to pay for additional health care or insurance coverage 
(in order to receive access and coverage comparable to what they had 
received before). As a result, the decrease in labor supply would be 
less, the increase in the equilibrium wage would be less, and the decrease 
in employment would be less than shown in Figure 2.
Summary
The most likely effects of universal health insurance on low-wage 
labor markets are higher before-tax wages, higher total labor costs, and 
lower employment. The analysis of higher-wage labor markets is more 
complicated, but the results are similar: higher before-tax wages (and 
higher total labor costs) and lower employment. Our predictions do not 
appear to be sensitive to the assumptions we have made. Nevertheless, 
we would emphasize that our conclusions are qualitative, not quantitative, 
and that the empirical research needed to make quantitative predictions 
about the effects of universal health insurance on labor markets has not 
been performed. Filling this gap in the empirical work on labor markets 
should have a high place on the research agenda.
Mandatory Employer-Provided Health Insurance
In view of its adoption in Hawaii and Massachusetts, mandating has 
taken on considerable importance as a policy option. Most proposals 
to require employers to provide health insurance to their workers are 
coupled with creation of a public program that would sponsor health 
insurance for anyone who remained uncovered by mandatory employer- 
provided health insurance. Accordingly, we consider mandating and 
the public sponsor in tandem.
Mandating is highly controversial, in part because of its potential im 
pact on labor markets. Curiously though, there is broad agreement among 
labor economists on the general qualitative impact of mandating on labor 
markets (see Mitchell 1989 for a review). The direct effects of man 
dating are on low-wage labor markets in which health benefits are not 
currently provided. There would be two kinds of direct effect. First, 
to an employer who does not now provide health benefits, the man 
dating of benefits connotes an increase in the nonwage costs of employing
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labor [c/]. This would lead to a reduced demand for labor (in Figure 
3, a leftward shift of the demand curve from LD to LD'}. Second, the 
availability of health benefits from low-wage employment where none 
had been available before could lead a greater number of potential low- 
wage workers to actually offer their services in the low-wage labor 
market. This implies an increased supply of low-wage labor. (In Figure 
3, we show a rightward shift of the supply curve from LS to LS'—that 
is relatively small.) 8
In a labor market where there is no effective minimum wage, the 
outcome is a reduced wage and a likely decrease in employment. (In 
Figure 3, the wage falls from w0 to wlt and employment falls from L0 
to Ll .)9 But if an effective wage floor exists in the low-wage labor market, 
the wage cannot adjust downward. This would occur in the presence 
of an effective minimum wage, in which case the wage would remain 
constant, but employment in the low-wage labor market would fall by 
more than it would if the wage could adjust downward. (In Figure 3, 
if w0 is the wage floor, then employment falls from L0 to L2 . The dif 
ference between L0 and L2 can be interpreted as the number of workers 
displaced from this labor market.)
The impact of mandating on higher-wage labor markets would be more 
subtle, but there are two possible effects. First, mandating would in 
crease the demand for higher-wage workers to the degree that it in 
creased the cost of employing low-wage workers. That is, the higher 
cost of low-wage labor would induce employers to substitute higher- 
wage (skilled) workers for low-wage (less-skilled) workers. 10 It follows 
that the increase in demand for high-wage workers will be greater, the 
more inflexible are wages in the low-wage labor market (since the total 
cost of employing low-wage workers rises more when wages cannot 
adjust downward). We show the impact of mandating on the demand 
for higher-wage workers by a shift of the demand curve from LD to 
LD' in Figure 4. Second, the public sponsor component of mandating 
could have an impact on the supply of higher-wage labor by providing 
workers with a relatively low-cost means of obtaining health insurance 
without being employed. For example, the availability of low-cost public 
health insurance might increase the likelihood that a worker consider 
ing early retirement would actually retire. If so, then the supply of higher-
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Figure 3
Effects of Mandatory Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
(with a Public Sponsor) on Low-Wage Labor Markets
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Figure 4
Effects of Mandatory Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
(with a Public Sponsor) on Higher-Wage Labor Markets
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wage workers would fall under mandating with a public sponsor. (See 
the shift from LD to LD' in Figure 4. We show this as a small shift 
on the assumption that the labor supply effect of the public sponsor would 
not be great.) It follows that mandatory employer-provided health in 
surance (with a public sponsor) would lead to both increased wages and 
increased employment in higher-wage labor markets (see Figure 4). 
Although economists agree on the qualitative impacts of mandating, 
there exists no work that offers quantitative estimates of the labor market 
impacts of mandated health benefits. We urge that high priority be given 
to obtaining such estimates.
Voluntary Programs to Improve Access to Health Care
Elsewhere in this volume we have explored two so-called voluntary 
programs to improve access to health care: the Small Employer Health 
Insurance Pool and Medicaid Buy-In programs for the unemployed and 
not-in-the-labor-force uninsured. Because a voluntary approach to im 
proving access to health care would involve adoption of both of these 
programs, it is useful to examine their labor-market effects in tandem.
The Small Employer Health Insurance Pool would reduce the cost 
of providing health insurance for some employers mainly small 
employers of low-wage workers. Specifically, employers who do not 
now provide health insurance (because their workers are either high- 
risk or low-productivity) would find the cost of providing health in 
surance reduced for two reasons. First, creating a pool within which 
risk could be shared would reduce the premiums needed to provide a 
given level of health benefits. Second, the policy is designed so that 
the employer's cost of health insurance is subsidized if the total cost 
of health benefits exceeds 4 percent of payroll. In effect, the Small 
Employer Pool would provide a subsidy to employment of low-wage 
labor by reducing an important nonwage cost of employing low-wage 
workers (q, in terms of our model). Accordingly, the Small Employer 
Pool would increase demand for low-wage labor (in Figure 5, LD shifts 
to LD').
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Figure 5
Effects of Voluntary Programs
(Small Employer Health-Insurance Pool and Medicaid Buy-In Program) 
on Low-Wage Labor Markets
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The Small Employer Pool (by itself) would also tend to increase the 
supply of low-wage labor. The reason is that the existence of health 
insurance benefits in low-wage jobs that previously offered no benefits 
would induce more workers to seek work in the low-wage labor market. 
(In terms-of our model, a nonwage characteristic of working in labor 
market i, n/, would be improved.) 11
However, the positive effect of the Small Employer Pool on low-wage 
labor supply would probably be offset by the Medicaid Buy-In programs 
that would also be part of a voluntary approach. Since the Medicaid 
Buy-In programs would allow individuals who are without employment 
or health insurance to buy a comprehensive package of health benefits 
(usually at subsidized rates), they would provide an income subsidy for 
the purchase of health insurance. Such a subsidy implies an improve 
ment in the opportunities available to workers outside of the low-wage 
labor market (that is, a change in Wj in our model). Accordingly, the 
Buy-In programs would tend to reduce labor supply to low-wage labor 
markets. The magnitude of this supply effect would be larger the more 
generous is the subsidy and the larger is the share of health insurance 
in low-wage workers' total consumption.
Since the labor supply effects of the Small Employer Pool and the 
Medicaid Buy-In programs would offset each other, the voluntary pro 
grams would have no (or only a very small) effect on labor supply. 
It follows that the main impact of the voluntary programs on low-wage 
labor markets would be to increase labor demand, which in turn im 
plies higher wages and increased employment of low-wage workers (see 
Figure 5).
Whereas the voluntary programs would have a direct impact on low- 
wage labor markets, their impact on higher-wage labor markets would 
be indirect. Consider first the impact of the Small Employer Pool on 
labor supply to higher-wage labor markets. Because the compensation 
package in low-wage labor markets would improve as a result of the 
Small Employer Pool (compensation now includes health insurance in 
addition to wages), fewer workers would offer their labor in higher- 
wage labor markets. Most likely, this would occur at the margin, as 
prospective workers leave school and choose jobs and career paths. It 
follows that the supply of labor to higher-wage labor markets would 
fall (see the shift from LS to LS' in Figure 6).
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Figure 6
Effects of Voluntary Programs
(Small Employer Health-Insurance Pool and Medicaid Buy-In Programs) 
on Higher-Wage Labor Markets
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The Small Employer Pool would also influence the demand for higher- 
wage labor. Because it provides a subsidy to employment of low-wage 
labor, the Small Employer Pool would induce employers to substitute 
low-wage for higher-wage workers. As already noted, this implies that 
the demand for low-wage workers would increase, but it also implies 
that the demand for higher-wage labor would fall (see the shift from 
LD to LD1 in Figure 6).
We believe that the Medicaid Buy-In programs would have only a 
negligible impact on higher-wage labor markets. Accordingly, the im 
pact of the Small Employer Pool on the higher-wage labor market also 
constitutes the total effect of the voluntary programs on that market. 
As can be seen in Figure 6, the voluntary programs would tend to reduce 
employment of higher-wage workers, and would have little if any im 
pact on the wage.
Summary and Conclusions
Because private health insurance coverage is closely tied to employ 
ment, policies that are intended to expand the coverage of health in 
surance can also be expected to have side effects on the labor market. 
This paper offers both a characterization of the U.S. labor market with 
an eye to the role of employer-provided health insurance, and a sketch 
of the theoretical linkages between health policy and the labor market.
The main findings from the statistics we set out in the first section 
can be summarized as follows.
(1) Roughly 20 percent of all individuals in the United States who 
worked during 1988 were low-wage workers, earning $5.00 per hour 
or less (see Table 1). Only 27 percent of these low-wage workers were 
included in employer-provided group health insurance plans. But 82 
percent of these same workers were covered by some form of health 
insurance. Two points follow from this finding. First, there is far more 
variation in the degree to which workers are included in employer- 
provided group health plans than in the degree to which they are covered 
by health insurance. Second, policies designed to include more workers 
as the primary insured in employer-provided health plans are less likely
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to cover uninsured individuals than are policies that act directly to cover 
uninsured individuals.
(2) There is much variation from industry to industry in the inclu 
sion of workers in group health plans. Higher-wage industries tend to 
provide health insurance to a high proportion of their workers, whereas 
low-wage industries tend to provide health insurance to a relatively low 
proportion of their workers (see Tables 2 and 3). It follows that policies 
to expand the inclusion of workers in employer-provided health insurance 
plans would have an uneven impact, affecting low-wage industries more 
than others.
We set out a standard model of the labor market that offers predic 
tions about the effects of three policies to improve access to health care. 
The predictions of the model can be summarized as follows.
(1) Universal health insurance would lead to increased before-tax 
wages paid to workers, increased total labor costs to employers, and 
lower employment in both low-wage and higher-wage labor markets. 
In particular, the belief that universal health insurance would reduce 
labor costs of employers is not supported by our model.
(2) There is considerable agreement among labor economists regard 
ing the probable effects of mandatory employer-provided health in 
surance on the low-wage labor market. In the absence of an effective 
wage floor (or minimum wage), wages would fall and employment would 
fall somewhat in response to mandating. But in the presence of an ef 
fective minimum wage, total costs of employing low-wage labor would 
rise substantially, and employment of low-wage labor would fall by more 
than if wages could adjust downward. The increase in total cost of 
employing low-wage labor would in turn induce employers to substitute 
higher-wage (skilled) labor for low-wage (less-skilled) labor, and wages 
and employment in higher-wage labor markets would rise in the long run.
(3) Finally, we considered two voluntary programs to improve ac 
cess to health care: the Small Employer Health Insurance Pool and 
Medicaid Buy-In programs for the unemployed and not-in-the-labor- 
force uninsured. The most important predicted effect of the voluntary 
programs is an increase in employment, wages, and total compensa 
tion in low-wage labor markets. This suggests that the voluntary pro 
grams would unambiguously improve the welfare of low-wage workers.
Labor Market Impacts of Policies 231
It also seems likely that employment would fall in higher-wage labor 
markets, although wages would be affected minimally if at all. Since 
any contraction of higher-wage labor markets would take place over 
a long period of time, and would result mainly from workers' choices 
stemming from improved opportunities in the low-wage labor market, 
we conclude that this contraction would be rather benign from the stand 
point of workers' welfare.
NOTES
1. We separate the wage from the other factors in the supply function by a semicolon in order 
to distinguish factors that result in movements along the supply curve from factors that shift the 
supply curve.
2. In fact, some low-wage workers do receive health insurance, and some higher-wage workers 
do not. Our assumptions are made for analytical clarity.
3. See Dickens and Lang (1985) on the appropriateness of dividing the labor market into two sectors.
4. It is also possible that universal health insurance would have an income effect on the supply 
of low-wage workers The reason is that some low-wage workers currently use part of their earn 
ings to buy nongroup coverage, but universal insurance would eliminate the need for private pur 
chase of health insurance. As a result, universal health insurance would be like an increase in 
income to these low-wage workers. The result would be a further reduction of labor supply.
5. Good summaries of the empirical work on labor supply responses to real wage changes include 
Keeley (1981) and Killingsworth (1983)
6. Two factors could make the tax effect larger, however First, the effect would be greater if 
households were pushed into higher tax brackets by the increased taxable earnings that result from 
severing the link between employment and health insurance (see the discussion of the loss-of- 
benefit effect below). Second, the wage elasticity of labor supply for higher-wage workers could 
increase if health insurance were no longer linked to employment (Currently, benefits are usual 
ly provided only to workers who work close to full time, so that higher-wage workers are unlike 
ly to adjust hours as readily as they would if benefits were not tied to full-time employment.) 
7 With the exception of work by Atrostic (1982), little is known about the magnitude of labor 
supply responses to changes in nonwage benefits. Atrostic's work suggests that changes in non- 
wage benefits have a larger effect on labor supply than do changes in the wage.
8. For two reasons, the effect of mandating (with a public sponsor) on labor-supply would prob 
ably be small. First, many potential low-wage workers are (and would be) covered by another 
family member's employer-provided benefits, as Table 1 demonstrated Accordingly, many potential 
participants in the low-wage labor market are insensitive to the provision of health insurance. 
Second, the creation of a public sponsor to provide health insurance to anyone who remains unin 
sured would reduce the advantages of obtaining a job that provided health insurance.
9. Note that there is no guarantee that the wage reduction will exactly offset the cost of the newly 
provided health benefits, as some have contended. Only if the labor supply response were pro 
portional to a labor demand reduction that precisely offsets the costs of mandated benefits would 
a dollar-for-dollar tradeoff between wages and health insurance occur
10. In terms of the model, the price (p) of an input that can be substituted for higher-wage labor 
has increased For evidence on substitution between various groups of labor, see Hamermesh (1986). 
11 How many employers would actually participate in the Small Employer Pool is an important 
topic for further research. There is relatively little work on the reasons for employer participation 
in government programs, the paper by Ashenfelter (1978) being an important exception.
232 Labor Market Impacts of Policies
References
Anderson, John E. "Public Financing Approaches to Improve Access to Health 
Care." Chapter 7 in this volume.
Ashenfelter, Orley. 1978. "Evaluating the Effects of the Employment Tax 
Credit." In Conference Report on Evaluating the 1977Economic Stimulus 
Package, U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Policy, Evaluation and Research. Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office.
Atrostic, B.K. 1982. "The Demand for Leisure and Nonpecuniary Job Char 
acteristics," American Economic Review 72 (June): 428-440.
Dickens, William T. and Kevin Lang. 1985. "A Test of the Dual Labor Market 
Theory," American Economic Review 75 (September): 792-805.
Hamermesh, Daniel S. 1986. "The Demand for Labor in the Long Run." 
In Handbook of Labor Economics, eds. Orley Ashenfelter and Richard 
Layard. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Hogan, Andrew J. and John H. Goddeeris. "Universal Health Insurance Cov 
erage Through a Single Public Payer." Chapter 3 in this volume.
Hogan, Andrew J. and Stephen A. Woodbury. "Small Employer Health Insur 
ance Pools." Chapter 5.2 in this volume.
Hogan, Andrew J. and Stephen A. Woodbury. "Medicaid Buy-In Programs for 
Uninsured Children and Non-Working Adults." Chapter 5.3 in this volume.
Goddeeris, John H. "Combining Private Insurance With Public Programs to 
Achieve Universal Coverage." Chapter 4 in this volume.
Keeley, Michael C. 1981. Labor Supply and Public Policy. New York: Aca 
demic Press.
Killingsworth, Mark R. 1983. Labor Supply. New York: Cambridge University 
Press.
Mitchell, Olivia S. 1989. "The Effects of Mandating Benefits Packages." In 
Investing in People: A Strategy to Address America's Workforce Crisis, 
Commission on Workforce Quality and Labor Market Efficiency, U.S. 
Department of Labor. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
September.
Woodbury, Stephen A. 1989. "Current Economic Issues in Employee Ben 
efits." In Investing in People: A Strategy to Address America's Workforce 
Crisis, Commission on Workforce Quality and Labor Market Efficiency, 
U.S. Department of Labor. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
September.
Woodbury, Stephen A. and Douglas R. Bettinger. In press. "The Decline of 
Fringe Benefit Coverage in the 1980s." In Issues in Contemporary Labor 
Economics and the Implications for Public Policy, eds. Randall W. Eberts 
and Erica Groshen. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
9 
Just Caring
An Experiment in Health Policy Formation 
Leonard M. Fleck
Michigan State University
Over the past three years or so, a movement has gradually developed 
that is described as the "Health Decisions" movement. It refers to 
statewide, grass roots efforts aimed at stimulating health policy discus 
sions at the community level about many of the more controversial and 
morally troubling aspects of health policy in the United States. This 
is an important social and political phenomenon for four reasons. First, 
these projects have attempted not to be just another special interest group 
in the state. Rather, they have aimed, through public conversation, to 
identify common purposes in health decisions. In analyzing these proj 
ects, Bruce Jennings writes that "they have taken pains to avoid polariz 
ing the issues with which they deal. Their objective is to provide a new 
space for moral and political discourse. This is the space of the 
democratic forum, where groups that usually confront one another in 
an adversarial fashion can bracket their differences, at least for a while, 
and search for common objectives and some common ground. The 
guiding metaphor of these projects is conversation, not confrontation; 
and their spirit of advocacy is tempered by one of open and tolerant 
inquiry" (Jennings 1988, p. 9). This attitude of open and tolerant in 
quiry should be seen as motivating the project I describe later in this 
essay.
Second, these projects help to disabuse us of the false belief that our 
moral concerns and moral conflicts are purely matters of private con 
science to be worked out however we wish within that personal inner 
sanctum. This is especially true when the moral value with which we 
are concerned is that of justice. If justice exists anywhere, it must exist 
as a feature of our social policies and practices, not our private con 
sciences. As the philosopher John Rawls observes, "Justice is the first
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virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought" (Rawls 
1971, p. 3). Just as truth must be an object of public inquiry through 
the methods of science, so also justice must be an object of rational 
public inquiry. The difference is that we have had good models of how 
science ought to be carried on for the past 400 years. We have had few 
good models of how public moral inquiry might be done, though the 
objective of these projects is to create such models.
Third, these projects are important because they reinforce the idea 
that profoundly moral issues in our public life ought not to be left to 
political and moral experts, much less managerial, organizational, or 
economic experts. As Daniel Callahan has noted, there is a strong temp 
tation in our society to treat the problems of health care financing, health 
care cost containment, and health care rationing as exclusively economic 
and organizational issues, ignoring entirely the moral dimensions of 
these issues (Callahan 1990, p. 27). There are reasons why this hap 
pens, but they are not good reasons. The issues that need to be addressed 
are potentially painful and divisive. Health policy options that require 
us to consider who lives, who dies, and how much we as a society are 
willing to spend to save or prolong a life are difficult choices. Our social 
life will be much more pleasant if we can continue to affirm the social 
illusion that human life is priceless. And, of course, we can get away 
with just that if we give authority to economic experts to make these 
choices in think tanks safely sequestered from public view. However, 
making appropriate decisions in these matters is a moral responsibility 
that each and every citizen has; and hence, a good democratic society 
will provide democratic forums and decisionmaking structures that will 
facilitate the carrying out of that responsibility by its citizens, even though 
the matters to be discussed are painful and divisive. The fact is that 
health policy decisions do affect all of us, not just economically, but 
in profoundly moral ways. The choices we make with respect to health 
policy reflect very concretely the extent to which we are a just and car 
ing community in practice. Symbolic social affirmations of the 
pricelessness of human life that mask discriminatory rationing decisions 
privately effected are both dishonest and unjust.
Fourth, if there are limits to what we can and ought to spend on health 
care as a social good, and if the factors that have precipitated escalating
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health care costs over the past 20 years are going to continue unabated 
and even intensified for the foreseeable future, then we will have to 
accept the conclusion of most health economists that rationing access 
to health care is inescapable (Fuchs 1974, chap. 1; Thurow 1985, pp. 
611-14; Schwartz 1987, pp. 220-24). But, I would argue, we ought 
not accept the conclusion, advocated by some, 1 that such rationing be 
effected by institutional mechanisms that are private and invisible, hid 
den from public scrutiny. I have argued elsewhere that such invisible 
rationing mechanisms are presumptively unjust. 2 Just rationing policies 
can be effected publicly. Again, the virtue of the Health Decisions move 
ment is that it has provided us with models of how such public conver 
sations can be productively carried on. It has helped to make these 
choices visible, painful and tragic though they be.
Though the state projects that have come under the rubric of the Health 
Decisions movement have had much to recommend them, there has been 
one major shortcoming. It is that most of these projects have been 
organized around discrete public forums and workshops that have at 
tempted to address "the" problem of escalating health care costs and 
equitable access to health care. In point of fact, however, there are at 
least 20 large problems that can and ought to be distinguished within 
this policy domain. What virtually everyone who is familiar with this 
problem domain concedes is that multiple, conflicting social and moral 
values are at stake, and that tradeoffs need to be made. This last point 
is something that the larger public will never achieve an adequate ap 
preciation of, so long as their exposure to these issues is in discrete 
chunks. More sustained and comprehensive public conversations that 
span months and years are needed to bring about that level of public 
understanding. What we describe below is a project that represents one 
model of how that might be done.
In these introductory remarks, I have made what some would regard 
as debatable assertions which really are in need of intellectual justifica 
tion, since they ground the practical need for the project I describe. 
One such proposition is that health care ought to be thought of as a 
social good or public good rather than simply a private consumer good 
that is properly distributed according to individual ability to pay. This 
proposition is needed to support the moral claim that there are matters of
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justice that need to be addressed as part of our choice of health care 
policies. My second claim is that there are multiple moral problems 
connected with justice and health policy that need to be addressed and 
that require, for their resolution, value tradeoffs. During the 1970s, 
philosophers seemed to think there was really only one moral issue here, 
namely, whether or not there was something called a right to health 
care. Anyone familiar with health policy today in its concrete details 
would see that as a wholly inadequate moral framing of our problem. 
In the first part of this essay, I attempt to provide a sketch of an in 
tellectual justification for these claims. In the second part, I describe 
a model for a statewide project that would address, through public con 
versation, the moral issues that are integral to our health policy choices 
at both the state and national levels.
Health Care Justice 
Who Lives? Who Pays? Who Cares?
The current climate in health care is dominated by multiple demands 
for health care cost containment. These demands come from both the 
public and private sectors. The statistics cited most often to portray the 
problem are the following: In 1990, it is estimated that we in the United 
States spent about $660 billion on health care, which represented about 
12.2 percent of our Gross National Product (GNP). By way of com 
parison, in 1960 we spent $26 billion on health care, which represented 
5.2 percent of GNP then. While the dollar figures are very large, what 
is most distressing to economists and policymakers is that the fraction 
of GNP devoted to health care has more than doubled. Worse still, there 
are few signs in the foreseeable future that escalating health costs will 
flatten out. Over the past 20 years, health costs have escalated at roughly 
twice the rate of inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index, 
and this has remained true through a major recession during the 1980s 
and assorted stringent efforts at health care cost containment. Again, 
by way of comparison, Great Britain spent about 6.4 percent of its GNP 
on health care in 1989, while Canada spent about 8.7 percent of its GNP. 
The implication here is that it is possible to spend less on health care;
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and, at least in the case of Canada, to have a health care system equal 
in quality to what we have in the United States (Evans 1986; Evans 
et al. 1989).
If health care were purchased as a private consumer good, as are all 
sorts of other consumer goods, then all of the above statistics would 
have little practical import. For they would simply reflect in aggregated 
form hundreds of millions of individual consumer decisions to purchase 
health care rather than something else. However, we do not treat health 
care as a private good. Rather, since the 1930s we have treated it as 
a social good, which is purchased primarily through an insurance 
mechanism, either in the private sector or the public sector. No one 
doubts that health insurance represents a rational social response to the 
personal tragedy of serious illness and hospitalization. For the fact is 
that the occurrence of illness for any individual is mostly unpredictable. 
Further, in the case of serious illness, there will usually be high costs 
associated with either cure or relief of the illness, costs that few people 
would be prepared to meet. It was no coincidence that effective health 
care and health insurance emerged about the same time. What we mean 
by "effective" health care are interventions that saved lives, prolong 
ed lives, and relieved serious suffering. These are goods to which all 
of us want and need secure access, most especially when we are ill. 
Health insurance represents one sort of appropriate social response to 
that need.
While there may be much that individuals can do to forestall the oc 
currence of many diseases, there is relatively little that individuals can 
do as individuals in response to serious disease once they have been 
afflicted with that disease. Again, a rational approach to this problem 
is to devise appropriate social responses. Thus, the bulk of medical 
research and medical education are publicly funded. Physicians have 
the healing powers they have because a large social investment has been 
made in them. Moreover, public dollars have built most of the hospitals 
and paid for most of the technology that makes our health care system 
effective. As a society, we have even facilitated the purchase of health 
insurance by exempting that benefit from income and social security 
taxes, which represented a $48 billion subsidy to the middle class and 
$48 billion in revenue forgone by the federal government in 1990. It
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would be very difficult to justify this kind of subsidy, either morally 
or politically, if what were being publicly subsidized were simply private 
expenditures by the middle class.
Everything said thus far may be taken as so much stage setting for 
our primary claim, namely, that there are profound moral issues that 
must be addressed as we make appropriate health policy decisions. For 
example, in arguing that health care represents a social good in our 
society, what we are implying is that there are important matters of 
justice pertaining to how this good is distributed, which would not be 
the case if it were merely another private consumer good. Thus, no 
one objects to the fact that a unique Picasso painting is sold to the highest 
bidder, but virtually everyone in our society would be morally outraged 
if human hearts or livers for transplant purposes were literally auction 
ed off to the highest bidder. This seems like a solid moral intuition on 
which there is widespread agreement. But it does not seem to take us 
very far. If the wealthiest individual with a failing heart or liver has 
no special moral claim to that organ, who does and who is to decide?
We often think of our society as being meritocratic, which suggests 
that there are always some individuals who are "more deserving" than 
others. This makes sense when we are thinking about rewarding in 
dividuals for a job well done with a promotion or pay raise. But how 
would such notions apply when we are distributing transplant organs, 
which literally will make the difference between life and death. Some 
may be tempted to suggest that there are individuals who have contributed 
more to society than others; but certainly this is the sort of claim that 
could be open to interminable dispute about how we would judge and 
compare an indefinite variety of incommensurable social contributions. 
Moreover, many would feel that there was something morally inap 
propriate and incommensurate in "rewarding" some productive in 
dividuals with life while consigning others who were a bit less produc 
tive to death.
For those who are inclined to some sort of egalitarian conception of 
justice, it might seem that because we all have an equal right to life, 
all who need that organ transplant should at least have an equal chance 
to get it. This idea has considerable moral appeal. However, the Pitts 
burgh transplant surgeon Starzl drew significant criticism when he did
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a liver transplant in 1987 on a 76-year old woman (Koenig 1986). After 
all, he could have saved more life-years at a lower cost per life-year 
if a younger patient had received that transplant. This erodes a bit of 
our confidence in the egalitarian ideal. Then, of course, there are all 
those patients whose livers or hearts are failing because of their own 
bad health habits, i.e., an alcoholism problem, or cigarette smoking, 
or poorly managed stress, etc. Many would feel it is unfair if these in 
dividuals have an equal claim to a transplant organ when others have 
done nothing to bring an organ-destroying illness upon themselves. Most 
recently, the question was raised of whether individuals who are sero- 
positive for the AIDS virus should have an equal right of access to an 
organ transplant. It needs to be noted that such individuals will more 
than likely go on to have the full-blown version of AIDS, from which 
they will die. However, it could be as long as 10 years before the disease 
actually manifests itself. In the meantime, this individual has an im 
mediate need for that life-preserving organ transplant.
Nothing said here is meant to suggest there is any easy or obvious 
answer to these moral problems. There are conflicting intuitions of justice 
in these cases that pull us (both as individuals and as a society) in various 
directions. To make matters even more difficult, we need to note that 
justice is not the only moral value at stake. Many in our society would 
assert the equal moral importance of affirming the "pricelessness of 
human life." This value represented "cheap and easy" morality when 
there was relatively little that medicine could do to prolong human lives 
afflicted with life-threatening disease. But in an era of rapidly pro 
liferating, expensive, life-prolonging medical technologies, sustaining 
this value is neither cheap nor easy. And in the real world it often 
represents a threat to our commitment to justice.
A clear example of how the pricelessness ideal threatens justice is 
to be found in the Cruzan case in Missouri. Nancy Cruzan was a 25-year 
old woman in 1983 who was involved in an automobile accident that 
resulted in her being reduced to a persistent vegetative state for the next 
seven years. She was sustained in this unconscious state via tube 
feedings, which her parents asked to have discontinued so that she be 
allowed to die. Virtually all of the attention of the public and the courts 
was focused on the issue of whether surrogate decisionmakers have the
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moral right to choose death for an incompetent patient. But what was 
ignored was the equally significant moral issue raised by the fact that 
the State of Missouri was paying $130,000 per year through Medicaid 
to sustain Nancy Cruzan in that unconscious state, this in keeping with 
its recently enacted "right-to-life" constitutional amendment. What 
makes this a significant issue of justice is that the Missouri Medicaid 
program covers only 40 percent of those below the poverty level, and 
clearly those other 60 percent could benefit much more from secure 
access to health care than Nancy Cruzan. 3
But even if we ignore for a moment these conflicts between justice 
and the pricelessness ideal, there are substantial difficulties in inter 
preting what that ideal itself is supposed to mean practically. One way 
of interpreting what is meant by the pricelessness of human life is to 
say that a good society will not allow people to die who cannot afford 
the successful but expensive medical technology that might save and 
prolong their lives. Our commitment to this belief is most clearly il 
lustrated by the 1972 Medicare amendments that underwrote the cost 
of dialysis for all those with renal failure. (Prior to those amendments 
the cost of dialysis, at $30,000 per year in 1968, was a real barrier 
to access for the vast majority of patients in that condition. Further, 
there was only one dialysis slot available for every ten patients who 
needed a slot for survival.) As a result of those Medicare amendments, 
there are 95,000 people alive today who owe their life to that program. 
But the cost of that program to Medicare in 1988 was about $2.8 billion. 
Further, Congress has, of late, strongly resisted any effort to create 
a similar program that would underwrite the costs of organ transplants, 
now with a much higher success rate as a result of the introduction of 
(expensive) immuno-suppressive drugs such as cyclosporine. Major 
transplant surgery generally carries front-end costs of $100,000 to 
$150,000 per case. What should we conclude from this lack of political 
enthusiasm? Do we value human life less now? That is, do we no longer 
think human life is priceless? If so, should we be subjected to moral 
criticism? What does justice require in these circumstances so far as 
our health policy is concerned? Are we treating those in need of organ 
transplants unfairly, since we refuse to provide public funding for these 
procedures, especially when we consider that those in need of organ
Just Caring 241
transplants have paid taxes to fund renal dialysis? And what are we to 
conclude, morally speaking, about the fact that we do fund kidney 
transplants through the End-Stage Renal Dialysis (ESRD) amendments, 
but not other organ transplants?
It was announced in October 1987 that the federal government had 
awarded the University of Utah a $10 million grant over a five-year 
period to finish the development of a totally implantable artificial heart 
(TIAH). Unlike the artificial heart that sustained Barney Clark for several 
months, this heart would not require a 300-pound power source out 
side the individual. Its power source would be wholly self-contained. 
On the assumption that this project is successful, how should we res 
pond from a moral perspective? Such a device might be able to pro 
long the lives of more than a hundred thousand people each year who 
are in the end stages of heart disease. But the cost of implanting that 
device in all those people would be more than $12 billion per year, 
unless we were able to agree upon some set of criteria for rationing 
access to that device. Here we need to keep in mind that an advantage 
of the limited supply of natural hearts for transplant purposes is that 
we cannot escape the need to make rationing decisions. But if we ar 
bitrarily limit the number of artificial heart transplants for political or 
economic reasons, then we will be saying publicly that there are some 
lives that we judge are not worth saving, even though we have the 
technology available that could save those lives. That would represent 
a public repudiation of the widely held belief that human life should 
be thought of as being priceless. Further, there would be intense public 
conflict over what represented a truly just distribution of the artificial 
hearts that were available. At the moment, the choice is still theoretically 
available to us as to whether or not we ought to fund such technologies. 
Would we be unjust as a society if we were to choose not to fund that 
technology?
It would be a mistake to think that the problems we are sketching 
here pertain primarily to organ transplants. The larger issue pertains 
to what our societal response ought to be to the occurrence of catastropic 
illness. As the health economist, Victor Fuchs, points out, health in 
surance was originally designed to protect all of us from financial ruin 
by spreading out the risk associated with costly catastrophic illness.
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The assumption behind such insurance is that relatively few people would 
be so afflicted. However, given the continued advances in life-prolonging 
technology of all sorts, the likelihood is that the vast majority of us 
will be afflicted with one or more costly episodes of catastrophic ill 
ness. That threatens to undermine the whole point of health insurance. 
The response of insurance companies, as they seek to protect their own 
interests and those of their clients, has been to increase their vigilance 
in identifying before the fact individuals who are most likely to suffer 
such catastrophic illnesses. The best current example would be in 
dividuals who are sero-positive for the AIDS virus. Those individuals 
are then denied insurance, which will mean that they will ultimately 
be denied needed health care. 4
The average heterosexual reader should take small comfort in know 
ing this because, as more tests are developed to identify individuals who 
are genetically predisposed from birth for certain illnesses, those in 
dividuals too will be excluded from insurance pools. It is easy enough 
to understand the reasoning of insurers in these matters: they will argue 
that they are not a welfare system, but a mechanism for distributing 
risk. Still, the net result will be that those who are most in need of health 
care will most likely be denied access to the health care that they need. 
This result seems neither just nor humane. But it is clear that this is 
the direction in which we are moving. Further, where we could once 
expect that community hospitals would care for these patients as chari 
ty care, that is becoming increasingly less true. Hospitals find themselves 
under intense pressure from purchasers of their services to give dis 
counts, and that effectively eliminates the financial cushion that per 
mitted hospitals in the past to provide charity care.
There are numerous other moral issues that could be fleshed out at 
this point, but for which space allows only brief allusions. The likelihood 
of needing a major organ transplant is, I take it, a small probability 
event for most of my readers. This might undermine my claim that there 
are issues here that must be addressed by all citizens in our society. 
However, I would judge that all my readers confidently expect to grow 
old. The care of the elderly certainly represents a focal point of much 
moral and health policy attention. The chief reason for this is that the 
elderly are disproportionately recipients of health resources in our soci-
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ety. Though the elderly represent only 12 percent of the current popula 
tion in the United States, they are responsible for consuming about 34 
percent of all health resources. The twofold emerging problem is that 
as the post World War II "baby boom" generation ages out, the frac 
tion of this high health care consumption group will grow significant 
ly. Roughly 20 percent of our total population will be elderly in the 
year 2030, about 62 million people. Further, this problem might be 
economically manageable if the relative level of health needs per per 
son remained constant into the indefinite future. However, continuing 
advances in medical technology promise that the health "needs" of this 
generation will continue to grow dramatically as the elderly live longer 
and have more chronic health problems for which there will be an in 
creasing number of costly ameliorative interventions.
Given this likely scenario, should we as a society adopt the recom 
mendations of Daniel Callahan and others to identify an age (such as 
80) beyond which the elderly would be denied expensive life-prolonging 
interventions?5 Or would such a policy be morally objectionable as a 
form of discrimination comparable to racism and sexism? And what 
about human growth hormone for the elderly? Recent research suggests 
that it will improve muscle mass and quality of life for the elderly but 
at a cost of $13,700 per year per person? (Rudman et al. 1990; Vance 
1990). Should Medicare cover those costs? Would it be fair for the public 
to cover those costs even though there are 37 million Americans without 
any health insurance at all? And if we are concerned about fair treat 
ment of the elderly and equal moral respect for them, then what are 
we to conclude about the fact that the Medicare program is a uniform 
national program, while the benefit package and eligibility levels for 
Medicaid vary substantially from state to state? Relative to the poor 
under Medicaid, are the elderly being treated more than fairly, with 
something more than equal respect? The very asking of this question 
seems insensitive in the light of great unmet health needs of the elderly 
in our society, especially their needs for long-term care, home care, 
and a broad range of social support services. But that only serves to 
emphasize our larger point: there are real resource limits regarding health 
care. These limits become painfully evident with every advance in 
medical technology.
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Everything said above may be taken as a very compact sketch of some 
major problems faced by our health care system today. The conclu 
sions we would wish to draw from this sketch are the following. First, 
we cannot escape the need to make choices that will involve rationing 
access to health care, especially expensive life-prolonging forms of health 
care. The simple fact that economists properly emphasize is that 
resources are always scarce relative to wants and needs. Second, the 
problem of rationing is not merely a technical problem to be resolved 
by economic experts. It is at bottom a moral and political problem, the 
sort of problem that benefits from the knowledge and advice of experts, 
but that ultimately must be resolved through the processes of democratic 
decisionmaking. Third, to improve as much as possible the quality of 
those democratic decisionmaking processes, it is imperative that there 
be a broad public conversation of the moral issues that are involved 
and the policy options that are available to us. Fourth, we are not talk 
ing about a single problem that can be easily captured by a single phrase, 
such as the problem of health care cost containment. This problem spills 
over and affects a large number of health policy questions, all of which 
have to be addressed in a comprehensive fashion. What this suggests 
is the need for public policy conversations among members of the 
educated public that are sustained and coherent and well informed. Fifth, 
the most important moral notion that should serve as a focal point for 
such conversations is the notion of justice. What we need to formulate 
as a society are just health care policies that will sustain a just health 
care system. Sixth, we operate with conflicting conceptions of justice 
in our society, which are often poorly articulated in public forums. We 
need to improve our articulateness in thinking through our conception 
of justice.
Seventh, we have no reason to believe there is only one just health 
policy that somehow all truly rational citizens would agree upon. It is 
highly improbable that such would be the case. Having conceded that, 
we do not have to concede that it is impossible to make any moral prog 
ress in moving toward more just health policies, for we ought to achieve 
considerable agreement about those policies or practices in health care 
that are clearly unjust. If we can accomplish that much through our 
public conversations, we should regard that as a major achievement. 6
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Just Caring 
Health Policy for the 1990s
In the remainder of this essay, I describe a project that we have pro 
posed in Michigan, offering one model of how a socio-moral conver 
sation regarding health care policy might be carried on that is rational 
and respectful of our liberal democratic political traditions. It is more 
complex than any of the other projects that have been part of the Health 
Decisions movement, but I would argue this is what the policy area 
itself requires.
Project Goals and Objectives
There have been two projects in the United States that have gotten 
a fair amount of national visibility and that provide a useful reference 
point for the proper design of this project. Both were citizen-based rather 
than expert-based projects. One was the "Oregon project," 7 a three- 
year project that covered the State of Oregon. It involved over 300 grass 
roots community meetings to identify what citizens in general took to 
be important moral and public policy issues with respect to health care. 
Those meetings took place in almost that number of communities. The 
information gathered from those meetings was fed into a citizen's health 
parliament, which distilled a number of broad principles regarding the 
just distribution of health care resources from those meetings. The prob 
lem with this approach is its superficiality at the grass roots level. The 
grass roots meetings were more like gripe sessions and less like public 
moral conversations in which citizens would have to struggle with making 
difficult tradeoffs. That kind of conversation was restricted to the 
parliamentary representatives.
The other noteworthy project was from Minnesota. It involved a 
distinguished, broadly representative task force of community leaders 
and health care providers who sought to articulate principles for the 
just distribution of scarce life-saving medical technologies, especially 
organ transplants. This project required more in the way of public con 
versation by project participants, but the range of issues considered was 
too restricted, given the real range of tradeoffs that ought to be addressed
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within the health care field. Still, both these projects provide us with 
important guidance. Specifically, they suggest the importance of a proj 
ect's being statewide in scope. That helps to give a project visibility 
and will help to generate commitment since the project is likely to make 
a difference in the real world. Next, the project should cover a broad 
range of issues pertaining to justice and health care policy. There is 
something that is morally deceptive about taking a piecemeal incremen- 
talist approach to these matters. Finally, the project ought to involve 
(at least as observers who have an opportunity to question and challenge) 
as broad a segment of the public as possible.
With the above suggestions in mind, I offer the following as project 
objectives:
1. To create public forums in which health care professionals and 
thoughtful citizens can engage in a sustained and systematic discussion 
of critical moral issues raised by changes in health care technology, 
health care delivery, health care financing, and health care policy.
2. To raise the overall level of awareness and understanding of these 
moral issues throughout the state through the judicious use of local 
newspapers and television, recognizing that only a limited number of 
people can participate in the face-to-face conversations envisioned under 
objective 1.
3. To identify and assess from a predominantly moral perspective 
policy options at the institutional, community, state, and national levels 
regarding moral issues raised by changes in health care technology, 
financing, and delivery mechanisms.
4. To identify as clearly and precisely as possible those "considered 
moral judgments" of justice that the philosopher John Rawls (1971) 
refers to as the shared starting points for moral conversations that ad 
dress more controversial moral issues, the assumption being that this 
is an effective method for reaching some expanded level of agreement 
with respect to these controversial issues (pp. 19-20, 47-53).
5. To develop a richly nuanced and realistic moral conversation at 
the state and community levels, one that is both sensitive to the political, 
economic, and institutional constraints that make "perfect justice" im 
possible, and that balances what are sometimes several legitimate moral 
values that conflict with one another.
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6. To create institutionalized state and community linkages that will 
assure the sustaining of this conversation after the project has been com 
pleted, in particular, linkages between an informed lay public and in 
stitutional providers of health care.
Project Design
Our best judgment is that a project of the sort we have in mind might 
require three years to complete, probably three years for project plan 
ners and two years for project citizen participants. In order to cover 
a state such as Michigan in some fashion, there should be 15 to 20 proj 
ect sites, probably located in larger urban areas. (Using Michigan as 
an example, there might have to be 5 project sites in metropolitan Detroit, 
given the density of the population. Other sites could include Ann Ar 
bor, Battle Creek, Kalamazoo, Flint, Lansing, Grand Rapids, Saginaw, 
Midland, Mt. Pleasant, Escanaba, Marquette, Traverse City area, Benton 
Harbor-St. Joseph area, Petoskey area, Grayling area. For reasons listed 
below, easy access to a community college, private college, 
or university is one criterion that should determine choice of sites.)
We envision four stages for a project. The first stage is for detailed 
project planning. The second stage would be the problem identification/ 
seminar stage. The third stage would be a problem response/activity 
stage. The fourth stage would involve a summative project conference 
whose primary objective would be to articulate both a shared vision 
of what our health policy ought to be and a strategy for getting from 
here to there. Stages one and four would take place at some central 
location. Stage one really requires the resources of a large university 
or a consortium thereof. Stage four requires the visibility of the state 
capitol. Ideally, stage four would involve a formal engagement with 
the state legislature and representatives from the executive branch of 
government. Stages two and three would take place in the various proj 
ect communities, though there would be substantial centralized coor 
dination and resource provision from the university that served as an 
administrative home for the project.
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Stage One: Planning and Organization
1. Identify project board and core staff
The project needs a large Board that will be broadly representative 
of the different interests and constituencies affected by changes in health 
policy. Part of the role of the Board is to give visibility and legitimacy 
to the project. The role of the Board is not to "protect interests," but 
to show that fruitful moral conversation is possible among individuals 
with diverse interests. That means that the Board itself must be com 
mitted to rational "neutral conversation," 8 as opposed to partisan or 
ideological conversation. That also means that the capacity for and com 
mitment to critical analysis must be an integral part of that conversa 
tion. To help achieve that ideal, it is necessary that there be 10 or so 
academics from diverse disciplinary backgrounds who will assist the 
Board (as well as project participants at various sites) in developing 
and using those critical skills. In addition, some core staff will be needed 
to coordinate and support project activities at the various project sites. 
This would include the development and dissemination of materials need 
ed at the various project sites. The importance of this last task should 
not be underestimated. It takes a lot of creative thinking to design educa 
tional materials that will effectively stimulate and focus those community 
conversations.
2. Identify broad plan of project activities
It would be very surprising if the project proposed here is simply 
adopted by any project Board. We assume that there will be further 
discussion and revision regarding both the broad design of a project 
such as this, and the definition of project goals and objectives. Project 
sites would also have to be identified. It is obviously desirable that 
population centers be covered, though somewhat rural areas cannot be 
justifiably ignored since there are important health policy issues unique 
to that setting. A project such as this needs academic talent at the local 
level for the reasons cited above, so easy access to such talent ought 
to be a consideration. Also to be considered are local hospitals who 
have a Board and/or hospital ethics committee with a serious interest 
in the goals and objectives of this project. The Goshen project
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that I directed (which was the small-scale forerunner of this larger sort 
of project I describe here) was successful because both the Board and 
the Ethics committee of Goshen General Hospital were intensely com 
mitted to the project. 9 An entity that could facilitate access to such in 
stitutions in Michigan would be the Medical Ethics Resource Network 
of Michigan, which is based at Michigan State University, and which 
links together hospital ethics committees throughout the state. There 
are at least 15 such networks of hospital ethics committees in other states, 
which would be seen as an important resource for a project such as 
this, in part because they will ultimately have responsibility for ar 
ticulating rationing/resource allocation policies at the institutional level.
3. Establish a project budget and raise needed funds 
If I were forced to attach some sort of very crude budget figure to 
the project envisioned here, assuming a total life of three years, I would 
guess at $35,000 per project site, plus about $300,000 for central plan 
ning and administration costs, or about $1 million over a three-year 
period for a 20-site project. This includes a lot of volunteer effort. But 
a project of this complexity cannot rely exclusively on volunteer ef 
fort. There is simply too much effort and responsibility required at each 
local site to ensure the success of the project. As for securing funding, 
it is not unreasonable to pursue state support for this project because 
it does represent a serious state responsibility; and a project such as 
this can facilitate legislative decisionmaking. The fact is that legislators 
are reluctant to undertake any major reforms of health care policy when 
the policy choices themselves are painful and controversial, and when 
no more than a small minority supports any particular reform proposal. 
Other sources of funding include larger foundations in the state and in 
communities where the project is sited.
4. Identify local project directors
A significant commitment of time at the local level would be needed 
to make this project work. I know that very well from personal ex 
perience. Local project directors should be knowledgeable about health 
care policy and some of the moral issues raised by our policy options. 
They should have good facilitative and organizational skills, and should
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feel comfortable working with a highly diverse group of citizens and 
professionals. They should have some experience with community educa 
tion. My own biases would incline me toward academics who are suc 
cessful communicators with a broad professional public, and who are 
competent in fostering and sustaining the neutral conversation that is 
necessary for the success of this project.
5. Identify local planning committees
These local committees should probably have about a dozen or so 
members who are broadly representative of key health care constituen 
cies, much like the project Board. This local committee would 
presumably help with recruiting and identifying individuals who ought 
to be part of the "core seminar groups" in each community. What we 
would want are individuals who have a very serious interest in the moral 
and health policy issues that would be the focus of this project. Work 
ing closely with each of these local planning committees would be a 
mini-academic consortium of three to five individuals who would have 
pertinent academic backgrounds and who would assist with delivering 
project seminars/workshops or other such educational efforts.
6. Hold a planning conference
The planning conference I refer to here would be for, say, five 
representatives from each project site. This might really be more of 
a training conference aimed at making sure that key people at each site 
understood the goals/objectives of the project, and had some practical 
direction in recruiting individuals for the "core seminar groups" at each 
site. Also, strategies for accessing the media should be discussed, so 
that the project received visibility before a large public and could pro 
duce spinoff educational effects in the larger community. Here in 
Michigan, consortiums of public television stations have worked with 
one another to develop important statewide programs. Similar ar 
rangements are possible in other states. This project seems ideal for 
that kind of cooperative effort. Also, in these training sessions there 
would have to be discussion of mechanisms for stimulating and focus 
ing the conversations that would occur in each of the core seminar 
groups.
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Perhaps the first third of that planning conference ought to be given 
over to laying out the broad range of problems I alluded to in the first 
part of this essay for purposes of establishing some shared sense of vi 
sion and purpose among participants. The last two-thirds of the program 
would be given over to exploring various ways in which the project 
might be implemented at the local level, with special attention given 
to identifying and resolving potential implementation problems. I en 
vision this as a long one-day conference. That may not be a realistic 
time frame.
It might also be very desirable to spend a week in the summer train 
ing those academics who will have the most direct involvement with 
the project seminars at each site. Much of that week might be spent 
modeling, practicing, and testing different ways in which those com 
munity seminars might be run. It is critical that there be genuine con 
versation among seminar participants (as opposed to a series of ques 
tions directed to faculty facilitators), and that these conversations be 
focused and directed.
7. Develop educational resources needed locally
The second stage of the project, what I shall refer to as the community 
seminar stage, is modeled on the Goshen project that I directed. The 
central premise of that project was that successful community discus 
sion of issues of justice and health care policy required community con 
versations that had depth, that were comprehensive, that were well 
organized, and that were sustained over a period of time. In order to 
achieve that objective, considerable resources had to be developed in 
that project, such as newspaper essays, very detailed leader's guides 
for community seminars, reading materials for each seminar, guides 
for the work of project task forces, and so on. This required a lot of 
tune and energy, but it certainly resulted in community discussions that 
were much more focused and productive. If that same effort were re 
quired of each project director at the local level, I doubt very many 
would be interested in attempting the project. Or else project costs would 
escalate enormously. Consequently, my recommendation is that the 
educational/publicity resources needed for the project be developed in 
a centralized way. I can guarantee that this will not produce carbon copy
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conversations at each site, but will instead facilitate greatly the ease 
with which such conversations can be initiated.
My suggestion is that for each seminar/workshop there ought to be 
four to six articles that are required reading for each member of the 
core seminar group, about 40-50 pages. The sort of articles I have in 
mind are those that discuss issues of ethics and health policy in profes 
sional health care journals, or in publications such as The Hastings Center 
Report. Such articles are generally not excessively academic and 
opaque. 10 Those articles should be as balanced as possible in terms of 
reflecting alternative points of view on these policy issues, since there 
are many reasonable but conflicting points of view on these matters. 
In the past I also developed leader's guides (four to six typed pages) 
to accompany each packet of articles. The guides focus attention on 
specific issues, assist the reader in reading more carefully and critical 
ly, and articulate a number of issues that can serve as focal points for 
discussion in the seminars themselves. The guides also provide cases 
and exercises for stimulating conversation in the group.
For the project we envision in Michigan, we plan to produce a book- 
length manuscript organized into 20 chapters that will be coordinated 
with each of the community seminars that are planned. Each chapter 
will be a combination of an essay introducing the specific issues that 
will be the focus of that seminar, and a leader's guide geared to the 
readings that project participants will be doing for that session. Like 
the earlier leader's guides, this will also provide specific questions that 
will give focus and direction to each seminar. The larger objective I 
have in mind is developing a resource that will have utility as a stimulus 
for such community conversations elsewhere in the United States.
I also wrote a number of newspaper essays that were published in 
the Goshen paper just prior to each seminar. These served as a way 
of involving a larger public in the project. Such essays could also be 
produced locally for the opinion pages of local papers, depending upon 
the time and commitment of local academics/participants. This is 
something that we strongly encourage, because this is a way of draw 
ing these issues to the attention of a public larger than those who can 
participate in the seminars themselves.
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Stage Two: Project Seminars and Workshops
1. Identify local core seminar groups
I think there ought to be a "core seminar group" in each communi 
ty. This could be anywhere from 25 to 50 people who would be invited 
to be part of the group. About half these people should be connected 
with health care as providers or administrators or insurers. The other 
half ought to be broadly representative of the community at large and 
should themselves be part of the "educated lay public," who under 
stand the importance of reading and are willing to make a commitment 
to do a fair amount of it. When I say "broadly representative" I mean 
those groups who are affected in significant ways by health policies. 
That means both large and small businesses, organized labor, the elderly, 
the poor, disability groups, and so on.
We would want in this core group people who already have some 
sort of knowledge base regarding health care policy and the concerns 
of this project. Members of this core group would commit themselves 
to attending all of the seminars that would be part of this stage of the 
project, and they would also commit themselves to participating in 
whatever activities were part of stage three. They would also commit 
to doing the reading, since this is the key to having an informed com 
munity discussion as opposed to just exchanging prejudices. In the course 
of organizing this project in Michigan, I have discovered that there is 
a surprisingly large number of citizens in our society who are significant 
ly involved in health policy groups of one kind or another. These are 
the sorts of individuals who already have a strong knowledge base in 
the area, who have the requisite energy and interest, and who would 
seem to be the group from which seminar participants are most readily 
recruited. Further, these are the sorts of individuals who will just natural 
ly carry on the project conversation in the larger community long after 
the formal project has concluded.
Each seminar would last two hours. The first half-hour can be given 
to a panel presentation or key speaker, just to get things rolling; the 
rest can be for organized discussion emerging from the readings, the 
leader guide, or suggested exercises. The public at large should be in 
vited to attend all these sessions, but they are there primarily as observers
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because, presumably, they will not have invested the time and energy 
in reading and reflection that members of the seminar group proper will 
have done. This is not intended to be antidemocratic. Rather, the prac 
tical objective is to create a sense of identity and cohesiveness among 
members of the seminar group proper. My experience shows that this 
is necessary in order to facilitate the conversational process in the group 
itself. That is, group members begin to develop a sense of where other 
seminar members are coming from, which is important for achieving 
a certain level of psychological comfort necessary for candor. It needs 
to be kept in mind that the issues to be addressed are both intellectually 
difficult and emotionally charged.
2. Seminar topics
The same topics should be chosen for all the community seminars. 
Common topics are essential to preserve the statewide nature of this 
moral and public policy conversation. My recommendation would be 
that there should be two series of seminars, perhaps 10 weeks for the 
first set and 8 weeks for the second, with either a winter or summer 
break, depending upon how they are scheduled. The first series of 
seminars would serve as an introduction to the major areas of current 
health policy attention, including the relevant issues of justice, with one 
seminar focusing on each area. The second series would focus on univer 
sal health insurance proposals, or, more generally, proposals aimed at 
restructuring the way in which we finance health care in America. This 
latter focus seems to be dictated by emerging policy debates, reflected 
both in congressional deliberations and in discussions in professional 
health journals. Though that is a national issue, the issue at the state 
level that has precipitated that debate is the issue of what ought to be 
done about the growing number of uninsured in our society, a highly 
heterogeneous mix whose needs are not readily met by current health 
financing options.
I am not quite sure how this second series ought to be organized. 
There are at least eight major credible universal health insurance pro 
posals on the agenda now. Maybe each one of them ought to be a focus 
of a seminar, the object of which would be to assess each one from 
the perspective of about a dozen assessment (value) criteria that would
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have been introduced in the first series of seminars. Of course, one of 
the options would be that we do nothing at the national level, that each 
state be left more or less on its own to work out its own policy solutions. 
What I imagine as the lead-off seminar at each site would be what 
I call a "big picture" seminar aimed at giving everyone a sense of the 
range of health policy issues that must be addressed in public forums 
and how these issues are connected with one another. That seminar would 
then be followed by seminars of the sort listed below. Space does not 
permit a complete listing.
  Health Care, Justice, and the Elderly. How might we justifiably 
set limits on the demands that the elderly make on the health care 
system, bearing in mind that all of us aspire to be among the elderly 
some day?
  Health Care, Justice, and the Poor. To what extent as a society 
are we morally obligated to provide for the health care needs of 
the poor, the uninsured, and the underinsured?
  Health Care, Justice, and the Terminally III, Chronically III, and 
Critically III. How can we justifiably limit the demands that these 
very needy individuals make on our health care system? Justice 
may not require doing everything possible, though compassion 
pushes us in that direction. Still, we are rationally disturbed that 
we might spend so much and achieve so little in the way of benefit 
for these individuals. AIDS, of course, fits in under this topic.
  Justice, Health Care Cost Containment, and the Development and 
Dissemination of Expensive Life-Prolonging Technologies. This 
includes technologies such as organ transplants and artificial hearts.
  Justice and the Financing of Health Care in America. Would we 
have a fairer system for financing health care if we adopted some 
version of national health insurance, perhaps something along the 
lines of Canada?
  Justice and Health Care Cost Containment Approaches. Assum 
ing that we really must do something to control escalating health 
care costs, what mix of policies and approaches would be most 
fair, all things considered?
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  Justice, Health Care, and the Good Physician. The fact is that 
70 percent of all health care dollars are allocated as a result of 
physician decisions. That effectively makes the physician the 
gatekeeper to the health care system; and it would imply that he/she 
ought to be primary rationer of health care sources at the level 
of the patient. That, however, conflicts with our traditional ex 
pectation that physicians will be absolutely loyal to the welfare 
of their patients.
Stage Three: Critical Value Inquiry
The primary objective of stage three is to acquaint project participants 
with the broad range of issues we must face more or less simultaneous 
ly with respect to making health care policy choices. This will require 
the making of more systematic, and presumably more thoughtful and 
more fair, tradeoffs among competing moral and social values. In my 
mind, the primary objective of stage three is to actually make an effort 
to work out some set of tradeoffs, and to make explicit the principles 
and value commitments that govern the choices made. There are really 
two tasks that need to be undertaken here. The first of these should 
be the "value inquiry/value tradeoff task described below. The sec 
ond should be a working paper in which participants apply the results 
of their value inquiry to the task of articulating both a state-based and 
a national policy regarding access to health care. Presumably, this sec 
ond task should be the natural outcome of the second set of seminars 
that had focused on the issue of universal access/universal health 
insurance.
1. Value inquiry/value tradeoff exercise
The value exercise I would recommend is based upon something called 
the "Delphi technique." We start by imagining that as a society we 
want to commit no more than 12 percent of GNP to health care, which 
was a little over $660 billion in 1990. Then everyone is individually 
given a survey form with 70-90 budget items for health care that might 
be described in some detail. We might ask, for example, whether we 
should continue to spend $1.5 billion per year to sustain the 10,000
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people who are in a persistent vegetative state, just like Nancy Cruzan. 
Or do we wish to make available 40,000 totally implantable artificial 
hearts for those under the age of 65 at a cost of $6 billion per year? 
Or would we be willing to spend $15 billion to make up to 100,000 
implants per year available to all who have the relevant medical need 
regardless of age? Individuals would make their choices among the 
possibilities up to the specified budget limit. There could easily be $1 
trillion worth of choices, which means a large portion of our health 
wants/ needs would not be funded. To simplify tabulating, we could 
use a computer score sheet. We would also ask these individuals (the 
seminar participants) to list the moral principles or other social values 
they used in making each of their choices. Again, it might be possible 
to provide a list of 30-50 such "value justification statements" that some 
one might choose from. Individuals would be asked to make a copy 
of their choices for their own records.
All of these surveys would be tabulated at some central site. Par 
ticipants would then get two sets of aggregated results. One set would 
be their local aggregated results, the other would be the statewide results. 
Seminar participants would then get together to discuss these results 
among themselves, perhaps for three sessions of two hours each. They 
could "make a case" for affirming or rejecting whatever the aggregated 
results were on each item. After this discussion takes place, the same 
survey is once again filled out by all, and the results are once again 
aggregated to see what sorts of changes take place as a result of the 
group interaction and assessment. If people are willing to commit the 
time, then this second round of aggregated results should be discussed 
and assessed by the group, after which the survey is completed a third 
time.
Throughout this exercise it is important to keep in mind two things. 
First, the objective is not to achieve some sort of agreement on a societal 
health budget as such. Rather, the objective is to use this budgetary 
exercise as an effective way to explore the moral and social values in 
dividuals believe ought to serve as a basis for making fair and efficient 
allocations of health care resources. Second, there is nothing morally 
commendable about one group in society making rationing decisions 
that will affect the lives and welfare of another group. Hence, it is very
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important that this exercise be structured in such a way that it is clearly 
recognized that we are making rationing choices for ourselves and our 
loved ones. There is a real world circumstance that we ought to be fac 
ing up to now, namely, that the post World War n "baby boom" genera 
tion is aging out and will make enormous demands on the health care 
system starting in the years 2010 through 2035. If we, the members 
of that generation, are unwilling to bear those expenses ourselves, then 
now we ought to begin making the rationing decisions to which we will 
bind ourselves in the future.
2. Critical final paper
As noted above, each core seminar group should apply the results 
of the prior inquiry to the task of articulating a policy proposal related 
to the issue of universal access to health care. Such a paper would reflect 
the discussions of the group from the second set of seminars, as well 
as the results of the value inquiry exercise. This is the product that would 
be brought to the summative conference that would conclude the project.
Stage Four: Summative Conference
This last stage of the project is something that is far from clear in 
my own mind. It has to be the integrative stage of the project. We might 
follow the lead of Oregon and Minnesota in this matter and see this 
summative conference as really a "Health Congress." Each project site 
would then send some limited number of delegates to this congress. 
Their task would be to make some specific health policy recommenda 
tions that would reflect both the results of the third "Delphi" survey 
and the papers that had been prepared at each project site. I was recently 
a participant in a conference that employed a "futures methodology" 
for defining and integrating the views of the professionals and disciplinary 
experts who were part of that conference. It struck me that that approach 
would apply nicely to what we were trying to accomplish here, since 
this approach involved an explicit integration of values, policy choices 
and strategies for effecting those policy options. Another possibility 
is that this "congress" would not just meet on its own. Instead, this 
would be a sort of joint meeting with the state legislature. Again, a key
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objective of such a conference would be to engage legislators in the 
debate rather than to allow them to just listen passively.
From this conference, some sort of public document ought to emerge, 
though this document would not be a "final report." Rather, it would 
serve as a starting point for future public moral conversations about 
the nature of just health care policies and practices. Ultimately, I think 
it would be desirable if we, as a society, could hammer out something 
like a "just health care constitution," a practical document that sought 
to spell out in an explicit and principled way the sort of balances that 
had to be struck among the many competing values and constraints and 
considerations that must shape our health care system and health care 
policy. That requires an even longer and more sustained public con 
versation, but I believe the sort of project proposed here would make 
a good start in that direction.
To conclude, a project of this magnitude, properly organized and 
managed, is likely to have a significant impact in shaping health policy 
at least at the state level, especially if well managed. It should certain 
ly garner significant media attention. And it should serve as a model 
for intelligent public policy debate in other states and for other policy 
areas. One of the things that is assumed is that members of those core 
seminar groups should be chosen because they have the capacity to 
educate and influence their constituents or professional peers. What they 
need to do that effectively are the sorts of resources that would be 
developed through this project.
NOTES
1. The most vocal defenders of invisible rationing are Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbin in their 
book Tragic Choices. The title of their book nicely captures the core of their basic argument, 
namely, that in matters of health care rationing at the level of social policy, we will always be 
confronted with tragic choices, choices which will necessarily require that we violate some deep 
social value This is because the value conflict is such that to choose one is necessarily to violate 
the other. Hence, their practical recommendation is that to avoid "exposed choices against life" 
and "exposed megalitananism" (and the social rancor that might be precipitated), these choices 
ought to be made through social choice mechanisms, such as markets, that will effectively hide 
the fact that such choices are being made.
2. I have argued against the moral legitimacy of invisible rationing mechanisms in health care 
in two of my articles (Fleck 1987, 1990a).
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3. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see my article "Pricing Human Life 4 The Moral 
Costs of Medical Progress" (1990b). What has emerged more recently is the case of Helga Wanglie 
in Minneapolis She is an 87-year-old woman who suffered a very severe heart attack in May 
of 1990 that resulted in her being reduced to a persistent vegetative state dependent upon a respirator 
and ICU care. Her husband and two children insist that she herself would have wanted to be sus 
tained in this state indefinitely using all available medical technology. In late 1990, her physi 
cians went to court to ask permission to remove her from the respirator (thereby causing her death) 
because her care was futile, and there was no medical obligation to provide such care. More notewor 
thy, however, is that by June of 1991 her care had cost in excess of $1 million The real issue 
we need to address here as a society is whether anyone in such circumstances has a just claim 
on resources of this magnitude. See Miles (1990).
4. For an excellent discussion of these moral issues, see Daniels (1990).
5. See Callahan, Setting Limits. Medical Goals in an Aging Society (1987) and Daniels, Am I 
My Parents' Keeper 7 An Essay on Justice Between the Young and the Old (1988). These two 
books have sparked an intense debate on the issue of age-rationing. One critical response is Kilner, 
Who Lives? Who Dies? Ethical Criteria in Patient Selection (1990).
6. As noted in the text, I could only present a sketch of the problem of justice as that pertains 
to health care policy in the United States, and I could only sketch a justification for the moral 
claims I advanced. The interested reader may find a more detailed analysis in a paper I prepared 
for the Governor's Task Force on Access to Health Care [Michigan], which has been published 
as part of the final report of that task force. [SeeVolumeS, Background Research Papers, 109-18.] 
The paper is titled "Health Care and the Uninsured Choosing a Just Social Policy.'' The arguments 
for the claim that health care policy is a matter of social justice rather than social beneficence 
may be found in my papers "Just Health Care (I): Is Beneficence Enough?" (1989a) and "Just 
Health Care (II): Is Equality Too Much?" (1989b).
7. See Crawshaw and others, "Oregon Health Decisions An Experiment with Informed Com 
munity Consent" (1985) A more detailed description is available in a project booklet by Brian 
Hines, Oregon and American Health Decisions (Salem, OR: 1985). More recently, Oregon has 
garnered considerable media attention for its effort at priority setting and rationing in the state 
Medicaid program. One of their more controversial tradeoffs would deny organ transplants to 
Medicaid recipients in exchange for expanding the program to cover 100 percent of the poor in 
the state as opposed to the current 58 percent. See the article by the physician who is president 
of the Oregon Senate, John Kitzhaber (1990).
8. This phrase is borrowed from the political philosopher Bruce Ackerman, for whom this is a 
central practical and philosophic notion in his book, Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980). 
9 The Goshen project is very well described in a 30-page project booklet available from Goshen 
General Hospital in Goshen, Indiana. That booklet is titled, Just Caring: Justice, Health Care 
and the Good Society. The project itself was carried out in 1985-87.
10. An excellent example of the sort of essays I have in mind for project seminars are the pieces 
that David Eddy has been doing in JAMA on an occasional basis They are clear, brief, problem- 
focused essays that also suggest alternative ways of thinking about issues of health care rationing 
These essays nicely integrate the moral, political, economic, and organizational dimensions of 
these issues. They all appear under the column heading "Clinical Decision Making: From Theory 
to Practice." The first essay appeared in volume 263 (January 12, 1990) The most recent essay 
appeared in volume 265 (May 8, 1991) There have been 13 essays so far.
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